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The  "Seveso"  Directive,  82/501/ECC,  requires  certain  industrial 
activities to  notify  the  national  competent  authority  of details  about 
the  dangerous  substances  involved  or  possibly  involved  in  the 
industrial  activity,  information  about  the  installation,  and 
information  about  possible  major  accident  situations.  This  collection 
of  information  is  commonly  known  as  the  safety  report.  The  scope  of 
the  information  required  may  be  found  in  Article 5  and  Annex  V to  the 
Directive. 
Some  Member  States  have  taken  the  opportunity  to  require  the 
provision  of  further  information  to  meet  the  particular  needs  of  the 
control  strategies  they  apply  to  major  hazards  sites.  For  instance, 
those  Member  states  who  have  adapted  the  safety  report  for  other 
purposes  such  as  licensing  or  as  a  more  general  report  on  health  and 
safety at work  may  require  more  detailed  information  on  some  topics. 
This  study  is  not  restricted  to  the  narrow  requirements 
concerning  the  implementation  of  Article 5  safety  reports  by  Member 
States which,  therefore,  explains  some  of these  differences. 
Although  the  report  has  therefore  identified  some  variability  in 
the  level  of  implementation  between  the  Member  States,  the  Commission 
would  not  wish  to  suggest  any  relaxation  of  standards  by  individual 
states,  but  would  encourage  Member  States  to  improve  their  own 
·  ·- standards  in  1  i ne  with  the  best  practice  across  the _Community,  and  to 
provide  the  public  with  the  assurance  of the  highest  level  of safety. III 
Part  I  sets  out  the  background  to  the  report  and  the  manner  in 
which  the  Commission's  Joint  Research  Centre  at  Ispra  has  carried  the 
study  forward  in  co-operation  with  the  Committee  of  Competent 
Authorities · for  the  Directive.  The  Member  States  are  represented  .-on 
this  committee  by  the  bodies  they  have  appointed  as  competent 
authorities  under  Article 7.  These  bodies  are  charged  with  organizing 
inspections,  receiving  the  notifications,  examining  the  information 
provided,  and  ensuring  that  manufacturers  take  the  most  appropriate 
measures  to  prevent  major  accidents  and  to  1  imit  the  consequences  of 
any  that do  occur. 
The  Council  Resolution  (89/C  273/01)  stemming  from  the  Council 
of  Environment  Ministers  meeting  during  September  1989,  invited  the 
Commission  to  work  with  Member  States  towards  a  mutua 1  understanding 
and  harmonization  of  national  principles · and  practices  regarding 
safety reports.  This  research  project  is part of that exercise. 
It should  be  noticed  that: 
- the  status  of  the  national  requirements  corresponds  to  that  at  the 
date  of the  enquiry  (December  1989). 
The  report  caul d  not  take  into  account  progress  achieved  in  the 
meantime  in  the  Member  States; 
- the  report  does  only  include  discussions  and  answers  from  national 
authorities.  Where  the  responsabilities  are  shared  with  regional 
administrations  (like  in  Spain  or  in  Belgium  for  external  safety) 
regional  differences  could  not  be  taken  into account. 1 
1.  BACKGROUND 
The  action  has  been  decided  at the  18th  Meeting  of the  Competent 
Authorities  Committee  (CAC)  and  has  been  developed  according  to 
suggested  planning  and  modalities: 
- At  this  meeting  (February  1989)  a  draft  questionnaire  has  been 
proposed  (Room  doc.  XI/116/89-EN)  as  a  possible  scheme  for 
comparison  of the  national  requirements  for  the  safety reports; 
- As  a  result of  some  few  comments  received,  the  final  version  of  the 
questionnaire  has  been  distributed on  April,  11; 
- Between  May,  4  and  July,  11  the  competent  authorities  have  been 
personally  contacted  by  JRC  representatives  either  by  paying  visits 
in  the  capital  cities  (UK,  IR,  P,  E,  F,  0,  B,  NL,  GR)  or  by 
organizing  meetings  at  Ispra/Varese  (L, I)  at  the  occasion  of  the 
Risk  Communication  Conference.  The  questionnaire  could  be  discussed 
in  any  detail  in  such  meetings;  in  some  cases  examples  of  safety 
reports  could  be  seen  (VROM  has  made  available  two  external  safety 
reports  for  the  documentation  center  CDCIR);  in  most  cases 
inspectors  involved  in  analyzing  the  reports  attended  the meeting. 
Accardi ng  to  the  procedure  preferred  either  the  quest i onna_i re  has 
been  filled  out  by  JRC  and  submitted  for  revision  to  the  relevant 
authorities,  or  the  answers  to  the  questionnaire  have  been  drafted 
at  the  meeting  by  the  authorities  themselves  and  afterwards  sent  to 
JRC  fully compiled. 
When  in  a country  the  responsibilities for the  directive were  shared 
among  multiple  ministerial  organizations,  these  have  been  all 
->'·represented  at.- ·the .meeting .. In.--.th.is  way  only  o~e~ a.nswer  coordinated 
.••  J  , 
between  the  different  bodies  has  been  given.  As  far  as  Belgium  is 2 
concerned,  after  a  joint meeting  in  which  even  representatives  from 
the  Environment  Ministry  participated,  the  questionnaire  has  been 
compiled  only  as  far  as  the  operational  safety  report  is  concerned 
by  the  Ministry  of Labour. ·-Indeed· responsabi.l i ty for  extern  a  1 safety. 
was  shared  with  the  regions,  and  JRC  did  not  attempt  to  involve  all 
the  regions.  However  the  answers  got  by  the  Vallonia  authority  even 
if  not  included  in  the  appendix  were  used  for  the  comparison 
summary. 
The  answers  taken  from  the  inquiry  have  been  documented  in  the 
Appendix  in  which  no  JRC  comments  have  been  introduced  (quoted 
national  documents  have  been  introduced  into the  CDCIR); 
A more  critical  comparison  has  been  drafted  by  JRC  with  the  aim  of 
identifying  basic  convergent  or divergent  points. 
- The  draft  report  has  been  submitted  to  the  comments  of  all  the 
authorities  (October,  16)  and  has  been  reviewed  by  the working  group 
set  up  at  the  19th  CAC  _Meeting,  which  met  at  Ispra ·o·n  November,  16-
17. 
This  meeting  has  resulted  in  a  revised  version  of  the  comparison 
report,  which  has  been  finalized  after having  incorporated  in  it any 
other  comment  or  material  made  available  by  the  authorities  by  ~he 
12th  of January  1990. 
In  any  case,  it  should  be  stressed  that  this  report,  with  its 
appendix,  aims  at  reviewing  the  actual  situation  rather  than  at 
expressing  any  kind  of recommendations.  Indeed,  any  further  action  can 
-only  be  suggested  by  the  Commission  working.  together  with  the 
Committee  of the  Competent  Authorities. 
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2.  SOME  OBSERVATIONS 
2.1  The  questionnaire  has  proved  to  be  sufficiently  adequate  to 
allow  a  structured  comparison.  However,  the  results  indicate that more 
information  could  have  been  sought  .about  .the  differing  ways  in  which 
member  states  de a  1  with  existing  i nsta  11 at  ions  and  new  ones  in  the 
different stages  of the  project  and  operation. 
2.2  The  enquiry  has  been  focused  principally  on  the  contents  of  the 
safety  reports  (SR).  However,  it  has  been  possible  to  have  some 
interesting  insights  on  the  SR  uses  and  acceptability  criteria.  These 
have  confirmed  that  the  most  striking  differences  lie  in  the 
control/acceptance  approaches.  In  most  countries_  ... · the  authority 
judgement  is  based  on  a  more  or  less  explicit  risk  acceptance 
criterion  and,  therefore,  external  consequences  of  accident  scenarios 
are  required  to  be  evaluated  _in  the  safety  ~reports  ·in  order  to 
increase  industry  awareness  about-~ risk,  to  a  11 ow  authorities  to  use 
the  results  for  emergency  planning  or  land-use  purposes.  The  FRG  ·-
acceptance  principle  is  based  on  a  deterministic  zero-risk  criterion 
to  avoid  public  hazards:  as  far  as  external  emergency  planning  is 
concerned,  the  amount  of  the  inventory  of  dangerous  substances  which 
might  be  released  in  the  case  of  an  unpredictable  calamity  is derived 
by  the  safety  report,  but  is  communicated  by  other  means  to  the  civil 
protection  authorities.  Prescriptive .  quantitative  risk  acceptabi 1 i ty 
criteria have  been  adopted  only  by  the  Netherlands ·as  far  as  external 
safety  is  concerned.  Risk  criteria  are  set  in  the  United  Kingdom  by 
.~health. and  safety  legislation  requiring  the  on  and  off site safety of 
persons  to  be  ensured  so  far  as  is  reasonably  practicable.  The  United 4 
Kingdom  has  also  developed  guidelines  based  on  acceptable  risk 
criteria for  land-use  planning  purposes. 
2.3  The  ·safety  report  ·is  .not  a  ,stand  alone .--·object.  Safety  is 
controlled  by  inspections,  safety  audits,  prescriptive  rules  and  - in 
some  cases  - multiple  authorities.  This  overall  system  may  result  in 
different  standards  for  man  and  environment  protection  and  in 
different  cost  and  burdens  to  the  industry.  It  can  be  misleading  to 
single  out  the  safety  report  as  a  separate  issue.  The  CDCIR 
contributes  to  a  reciprocal  information  about  standards  and  norms.  It 
should  be  considered  whether  this  action  is  per  se  sufficient  to 
achieve  the  desired  objectives;  or  some  more  direct  comparison  of  the 
approaches  might  be  envisaged  for  selected classes of plants. 
2.4  links  with  environmental  .impact  .directive:. in· some  count~ies 
(e.g.  F,  D,  OK)  both  the·  safety  report  and  the  environment  impact· 
study  are  submitted  to the  same  authority at the  same  time. 
2.5  Certain  countries  (e.g.  IR,  GR)  find  ~t  difficult  to  have 
information  on  hazards  potentially  affecting  nearby  installations 
which  might  be  provoked  by  facilities  not  covered  by  Article  5 
obligations. • 
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3.  GENERAL  INFORMATION  ON  NATIONAL  PROCEDURES 
Belgium 
For  the  safety  of  the  workers,>the  Ministry  ·~of  Labour  at  a 
national  level  has  the  responsibility  to  approve  an  operational  safety 
report.  The  most  important  requirement  is  the  demonstration  that  the 
manufacturer  has  imp 1  emented  an  adequate  safety  po 1  icy.  The  report, 
based  on  qua 1  i tat  i ve  structured  ana 1  ys is  techniques  1  ike  HAZOP,  is 
analyzed  by  ministerial  inspectors.  As  far  as  external  safety  and 
environment  protection  are  concerned,  preventive  control  is 
implemented  at  regional  level.  A  quantitative  analysis  is  being 
required,  even  if  no  risk  acceptabi 1  i ty  criteria  have  been  defined. 
The  report  is  analyzed  by  regional  inspectors  with  the  advice  of 
external  experts  (e.g.  Universities,  Research  Organizations, 
Certification Agencies  like  Vin~otte}. 
Denmarlc 
The  safety  report  is  submitted  to  the  local  council,  that  sends 
copies  to  the  district  office  of  the  Labour  Inspection  Service,  the 
local  fire  authority,  and  the  local  chief  of  Police.  It  is  also 
foreseen  to  inform  the  National  Information  Center  for  Toxic 
Substances.  The  approach  to  the  safety  report  shows  fl exi bi 1  i ty  to 
include  qualitative  and  quantitative  methods·  without  prescriptive 
acceptability criteria.  New  guidelines  are  being  finalized,  following 
the  first  ones  issued  in  1985.  This  issue  is  worked  out  by  the 
. Environmental  .Protection  Agency,  the  Labour  Inspection  Service,  Fire 
Authorities  and  the  Po 1  ice.  The  inspectors,  as  a  consequence  of  the 6 
relatively  small  number  of  plants,  have  a  good  knowledge  of  the 
p  1  ants;  they  can  be  contacted  by  the  industry  for  advice  on  contents 
and  requirements  of  the  safety  report.  Emergency  preparedness  is 
requested  on  the  basis of credible accidents. 
France 
The  procedure  follows  the  law  of  19  July  1976  and  the 
ministerial  applicative  decree  of  21  September  1977.  The  installations 
classified  according  to  the  list  established  since  the  Napoleon  time 
(1810)  and  updated  continuously,  are  submitted  either to  a declaration 
procedure  or  to  an  authorization  regulation  depending  on  their nature. 
The  safety  report  is  supplied  for  authorization  regulation.  The 
authorization dossier  is constituted of four  parts: 
- the  description of the  installation; 
- the  environmental  impact  study; 
- the  safety report  (etude  des  dangers); 
- the  report  on  health  and  safety at work. 
The  dossier  is  established  on  the  definitive  design  of  installation. 
It  is  submitted  to  the  "Prefet"  of  the  department  in  7/8  copies (  1). 
The  dossier  presented  to  the  public  inquiry  is  distributed  for  the 
analysis  and  approva 1  to  the  different  competent  bodies  (e.g.  fire 
brigades,  water  authority,  agri cul tura  1  department,  etc.).  The 
technical  body  analyzing  the  safety  report  is  the  regional  service  of 
inspection  for  industry  (DRIR;  there  are  25  DRIRS  in  France).  Normally 
·- ;:~(1) ,The" "Prefet"  has.  the  power  to  authorize  by  ,~'arrete  prefectoral" 
· ·  ·-·(there·· are·-: 95· prefets  ·,;ni~france  who  are  membe'r~·-;'()f-:th~e  State,  and 
obey  the  Ministers). 
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the  dossiers  are  kept  at local  level.  The  Ministry  for  Environment  can 
get  a  copy  of  the  dossier  on  request  and  has  the  power  to  impose  to 
the  Prefet all  the  decisions  retained necessary. 
There  is  now  a  propos a  1  to  -fi na 1  i ze· ..  a  mini steri a  1  decree  in 
order  that the  most  important  dossiers  have  to  be  sent  directly to  the 
central  ministry,  without  the  formal  request  by  the  ministry  itself, 
and  for  an  ultimate decision  by  the minister. 
The  Prefet  checks  for  completeness  and  can  ask  any  complement  of 
information  he  thinks  to  be  necessary  before  opening  formally  the 
·public  inquiry:  an  instructor  commissioner  (named  by  the 
administrative  tribunal)  takes  care  of  collecting  the  remarks  or  the 
approval  from  the  compentent  bodies  and  public  associations.  The 
dossier  without  the  confidential  parts  are  at  the  disposal  of  the 
citizens  in  the municipal  offices. 
After  reception  of  the  advjses  of  his  technical-services  and  the 
/ 
results  of:the  public  inquiry,  the  authorization  is given  (or  not)  at 
the  end  by  the  Prefet· after  consultation  of  its  technical  body  CDH 
(Departmental  Health  Council). 
The  procedure  can  last  8  months  if  no  major  problem  is 
encountered.  If  from  the  public  inquiry  there  is  a  feedbak  on 
technical  proposals  or  new  information  requirements,  then  it  is 
necessary  to  repeat  the  entire procedure.  This  is the  reason  why  it is 
preferred  to  complete  the  dossier  by  prel iminarly. answering  possible 
remarks  before  starting  the  public  inquiry  (many  meetings  between 
industrial,  expert,  DRIR  and  eventually  Prefet  are  necessary).  Even  on 
·  ····  -·.  ·-.. ,part..icu1 ar.~._.aspects . or:• for:: particularly  risky- i  n$~~1.1 at  ions  it  is  in 
:  ~.  ..  .. 
the  faculty  of the  Prefet  to  ask  an  independent  critical  review  of  the 8 
safety  analysis  (etude  de  sQrete);  he  can  also  ask  for  safety  audits 
on  the  site  (e.g.  after  an  incident;  in  this  case  even  if  the 
installation  has  been  authorized  to  operate,  it is  always  possible  to 
require  to  stop  to operate  on  waiting  for  further  safety analysis). 
·In  order  to  ensure  that  a  uniform  criterion  is  adopted  in  a  11 
places,  the  DRIR  inspectors  involved  with  the  analysis  of  the  safety 
reports  have  periodical  meetings  at  the  ministry  of  Environment 
(Service  de  l'Environnement  Industriel)  every  2/3  months  to discuss  in 
depth  the  way  to compile  and  to  judge  safety reports. 
Federal  Republic  of Germany 
The  Federal  Immission  Control  Act  (BimSchG)  of  1974,  its 
ordinances  and  the  related  administrative  regulations  provide  the 
legal  basis  for  the  protection  of  people,  animals,  vegetation  and 
other  items  against  adverse  environmental  ~ffects.  They  also  provide 
protection  -against  hazards,  major· disadvantages  and  high_  .levels  o~ 
:nuisance  caused  by  plants--subject  to-.:licensing.  Among  other  things,--:~­
the  Act  1  ays  down  statutory  1  i cens i ng  for  certain  types  of  p  1  ant  as 
well  as  conditions  which  have  to  be  met  before  a  licence  is  granted. 
The  13  ordinances  to  the  Act  lay  down  and  itemise  requirements  for  the 
plants  concerned,  the  obligations  of  the  plant  operators,  the  inspec-
tion  requirements  and  the  administrative  procedures  to  be  followed. 
The  gth  ordinance  to  the  Act  (9.  BlmSchV)  governs  the  various 
steps  in  the  licensing  procedure.· It regulates  specifically the  appli-
cation  procedure,  the  content  of  the  applications,  the  type  and  scope 
of  documents  to  be  submitted,  the  involvement  of  the  general  public, 9 
the  involvement  of  the  various  authorities,  the  question  of expert  re-
..  ·!·····."'ports' and· the-··content -of  the  1  icensing -permit.  · 
- i.' 
The  competent  authorities  are  responsible  for  implementing  the 
Federal  Immission  Control  Act  in· the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany. 
These  authorities  are  normally  the  regional  presidents  ·  {Regierungs-
prasidenten)  and/or  the  industrial  inspectorates  {Gewerbeaufsichts-
amter)  attached  to  them.  The  licensing  authorities  also  call  for  com-
ments  from  the  authorities  whose  area  of  work  is  affected  by  the 
project.  These  inc 1  ude,  for  ex amp 1  e,  the  water  authority,  the  fire 
brigade,  the  municipal  authorities,  etc.  As  part of  the  licensing  pro-
cedure,  a  safety  report  has  to  be  submitted  for  certain  plants.  The 
rquirements  are  derived  from  the  Hazardous  Incidents  Ordinance  {12th 
ordinance  to  the  BlmSchG).  This  is  the  only  one  of  the  relevant  regu-
lations  which  defines  requirements  for  plants  in  relation  to  opera-
tional  disturbances,  with  the  aim  of  preventing.hazardous  incidents  or 
limiting.the effects of-such  incidents. ·It. thus  represents  to  a parti-
.. cul arly ·high  degre~  _an·. instrument ·for  damage  prevent ion ..  Article- l  of  .. 
.  :  · •  4 --~the ,Hazardous- Incidents  Ordinance  defines  the  scope  of  application. 
Four  conditions  have  to  be  met  here  if a  plant  is  to  fall  within  the 
scope  of the  ordinance  and  to  be  subject  to  its provisions: 
1)  The  plant  has  to  be  one  of those  subject to  licensing  under  the ·4th 
ordinance  {4.  BimSchV). 
2)  The  plant  must  be  one  of  those  specified  in  Annex  I  to ·the  Hazar-.. 
dous  Incidents Ordinance. 
3)  The  p  1  ant  must  contain  during  norma 1  operation  a  substance  spec i-
fied  in  Annex  II  to  the  Hazardous  Incidents  Ordinance,  or  it must 10 
be  possible  for  such  a  substance  to  arise  during  disturbance  of 
normal  operation. 
4)  The  amount  of  the  Annex  I I  substance  present  or  arising  in  the 
plant  must  be  so  great  that it  is~clearly not  possible  to  discount 
a public  hazard  arising through  a disturbance  of normal  operation. 
To  ensure  uniform  interpretation  of  condition  4,  the  quantity 
specified  for  each  of  the  substances  mentioned  in  Annex  I I  is  that 
below  which,  on  the  basis  of available  experience  and  knowledge,  there 
will  clearly  be  no  public  hazard  emanating  from  the  plant.  These  quan-
tities are  recorded  in  the  1st administrative  regulation  to  the  Hazar-
dous  Incidents  Ordinance  ·(1.  StorfallVwV),  and  they  are  given  there  as  ·· 
quantity thresholds  A. 
A public  hazard  is  deemed  to  be  present  if one  of  the  following 
three types  of danger  arises: 
1)  -The  health  of a large number·of  people  can  be  impaired. 
2)  · The  -1 i fe  of  human  beings  is  threatened . or  serious  ·damage  to  the 
health  of human  beings  is to  be  feared. 
3)  Material  goods  of a  high  value,  particularly-bodies  of water,  soil, 
stocks  of  fauna  or  flora,  can  be  damaged  if  a  change  in  their 
state,  condition  or  usefulness  would  be  detrimental  to  the  public 
interest. 
To  demonstrate  that  there  is no  public  hazard·emanating  from  the 
plant,  the  safety  analysis  has  to  show  deterministically  that  the 
plant  has  safety equipment  to  prevent  hazardous  incidents  or  to  limit 
their  effects.  The  2nd  admi ni strati  ve  regulation  specifies  the  re-11 
quirements  for  the  individual  matters  to  be  dealt  with  in  the  safety 
analysis. 
A hazardous  incident  in  the  meaning  of  the  Hazardous  Incidents 
Ordinance  is defined  as  a  coincidence  of the following  three events: 
1)  A disturbance to normal  operation. 
2)  The  release,  formation,  ignition  or  explosion  of  a  substance  ac-
cording  to  Annex  II,  resulting  from  an  event  of the  type  described 
under  1. 
3)  The  causation  of a  public  hazard  by  an  event  of the  type  described 
under  1. 
In  order  to  attain  the  safety  analysis'  objective  of demonstra-
ting that  no  public  hazard  will  arise  through  a  disturbance,  it is  ne-
cessary  to  adopt  a  deterministic  approach  when  de a  1  i ng  with  incident 
scenarios  and  their possible  ef~ects. Jt. is·- often_ not  possible ·to de-. 
termine  the  risk  using  probabilistic  methods·,  because  the  data  basis·---
is  not  reliable.  The  result  of. the  safety  analysis·  is· as -follows:  It 
·---·highlights  the  effectiveness  of  all  measures  taken  with  regard  to 
plant-related  connections  between  hazard  sources  and  the  preconditions 
for  the  occurrence  of  incidents  with  a  view  to  controlling  such  inci-
dents  and  to  ensuring  work  safety.  It  also  identifies,  where  neces-
sary,  weak  points ·in  the design  concept  and  highlights· measures  needed 
to rectify them. 
The  safety  analysis  must  be  drawn  up  by  the: plant·  operator.  For 
existing  plants,  it  has  to  be  submitted  to  the  competent  licensing 
·.,authorities  by. 31.08.1990  under . .the. statutory. regulations.  For  new 
plants,  it must  be  submitted  as  part of the  licensing procedure. 12 
The  safety analysis  must  be  examined  by  the  authority.  The  scope 
of  the  examination  is  defined  in  the  2nd  administrative  regulation. 
The  authority  may  call  for  expert  reports  on  specific  matters  in  the 
safety  analysis  or  on  the  safety  analysis  as  a  "whole.  For  this  pur-
pose,  competent  and  independent  expert  organisations  are  normally 
called  in,  for  example  the  authorised  technical  inspection  organisa-
tions  (TUV).  In  the  course  of their assessment,  the  experts will  visit 
the  plant to check  that the  facts  described  in  the  safety analysis  are 
in  accordance  with  the  actua  1  design  of  the  p  1  ant.  Any  nonconforming 
matters  are  discussed  wi.th  the  p  1  ant  operator  and,  if necessary,  i m-
provements  wi 11  be  1  aid  down  in  the  report  in  the  form  of  specific 
st  i pul ati  ons.  The  report  then  pro vi des  the , basis  for  the  1  i cens i ng 
permit  issued  by  the  authority. 
The  safety analyses  must  be  updated.  Plant  modifications  must  be 
subjected  immed-iately  to a corresponding-safety-related examination. 
Thus,· the  operator  -has  ·to  give  very  detailed  co~sideration  to 
safety· matters·· in  relation  to  his  plant,  and  this  is  combined  with  the 
independent  assessment  of  the  safety  report  by  experts.  This  means 
that plants with  a  high  hazard  potential  are  operated  with  a  very  high 
safety  standard,  and  so  any  hazard  to  the  environment  emanating  from 
the  plant  is limited to a  residual  risk. 
Greece 
A general  legislative  framework  has  been  established  since  1986, 
and  specialized  for  major  accident  hazards  in  1988;  however,  no 
impulse  has  been  given  until  now  to obt,aining  from  industry  the  safety 
reports.  Some  risk  studies  have  been  performed  but  outside  the  1  ega 1 
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praxis  of  the  directive.  Guidelines  or  experience  do  not  exist  at the 
-moment,  so  'that  the  answers  to  the  quest i onna 1  re- ·express  a  verba 1 
consensus  on  the  way  of  collaborating  between  the  Ministry  of  Industry 
responsible  for  giving  the  obligatory  permit  after  the  submission  of 
the  safety  report  and  the  Ministry  of  the  Environment  which  is called 
to  give  an  advice  which  is  expected  to  be  accepted,  even  if the  1  aw 
does  not  give  it a mandatory  status. 
A very  short  period  is  estab  1 i shed  for  the  permit  procedure, 
which  involves  advices  from  other  Ministries  (agriculture,  culture, 
health,  environment,  labour). 
The  Ministry  of  Industry  has  a  body  of  inspectors.  However,  the 
·other competent  ministries  have  right  to  inspect  the  plants  according 
to  their  competences.  The  application  is  normally  submitted  to  the 
provinces,  but  for  major  plants  (of  national  interest)  it is submitted 
to  the  central ;authority. -Problems  ·connected_: .. wi-th- the-- re_sponsibil ity 
of  the  manufacturer ·and  of-the  licensing  authorities  in  the  event  of··-
an  accident  must  still  be  solved. 
Luxemburg 
Because  of  the  size  of  the  country,  very  few  i nsta  11 at  ions  are 
covered  by  article 5  (three  stockages  already  in  operation,  one  still 
in  design  phase).  The  Interministerial  Committee  -responsible  for  the-. 
safety control  requires  that the  manufacturer  let ·the  safety report  be 
performed  by  a  designated  organization  "organisme  mandates",  which  is 
a  non-profit  organization  constituted  by  the  association  of  Lux-
control  (l),  APAVE  Alsacienne  (F),  AIB-Vincotte  (B)  and  TOY-Rheinland 
(D). 14 
It  is  worthwhile  to  remark  that  in  addition  to  the  four 
insta:1lati"on"s····;strictly··  covered?  ·by-··~Article 5 ---o:!:·'fftfligati·ons,  three 
separate  adjacent  stockages  of  flammable  liquids  have  been  assimilated 
to  a site which  must  satisfy Article.5 ·requirements. 
Ireland 
Artcle  5  safety  report  requirements  of  Directive  82/501  are  im-
plemented  by  Regulation  12  of  the  European  Communities  {Major  Accident 
Hazards  of  Certain  Industrial  Activities)  Regulations,  1986.  Safety 
reports  are  submitted  to  the  National  Authority  for  Occupational 
Safety  and  He a  1  th  {NAOSH)  as  the  Centra 1  Competent  Authority.  Safety 
.reports  for  existing  i nsta  11 at  ions  were  presented  by  the  8th  of  July  · 
1989  and  for  new  installations  are  required  at  least 6  months  before 
commencement  date. 
The  report  is  subjected  t~  examination  :by,.~_NAOSH, inspectors.  A 
safety  report  meeting  the  requirements  of  Regulation  12  sho~ld  syste-
·matically  analyse·: all, potential  major·  ·accident~  hazards·~· on-site,  ..  ,i·.e"·-~!'4 
·.identify! type,  consequences  and  likelihood  of  potential  major  acci-
dents,  place  them  in  a  geographical  and  social  context,  identify  con-
trols  and  safeguards,  comment  on  the  acceptability  of  residual  risk 
and  reach  overall  conclusions. 
NAOSH  inspectors  would  initially  examine  all  ~safety  reports  to 
establish  that  all  areas  requiring.  attention  ·are  addressed.  NAOSH 
would  inform  the  manufacturer  of  the .-areas  ,that·:.~were··,·not  adequately 
addressed.  Subsequent  samp 1  i ng  of  the  safety  report  by  NAOSH  i nspec-
tors  would  look  at  chemical,  mechanical,  electrical  and  civil  en-
gineering  aspects  in  detail.  Site  management,  training,  assessment  of 15 
major  accident  hazards  and  risk  assessment  would  also  be  evaluated 
with  this  approach. · Re 1  evant  protect·; on  of· the · env1 ronment  from  the 
effects  of  major  accidents  is  also  considered.  The  safety  report  is 
then  used  by  area  inspectors· as  an· :inspection  tool- especially  when  ... 
specific aspects of concern  require detailed attention on-site. 
Ireland  does  not  operate  an  approval  or  1  icensing  system  of 
major  hazard  installations  but  rather  a  management  control  system 
based  on  inspection  sampling  techniques  to  assess  compliance  with  the 
requirements  of  the  "Seveso"  Directive  and  other  relevant  national 
health  and  safety  legislation  such  as  the  Safety  Industry  Acts  1955 
and  1980  and  the  Safety,  Health  and  Welfare  at  Work  Act,  1989.  NAOSH 
has  received  20  safety  reports  to  date.  In  co 11 aborat  ion  with  other 
E.C.  Member  States,  NAOSH  inspectors  are  building  up  their  expertise 
in  safety report evaluation. 
Italy 
The  Italian· law  ··(DPR  175/88)  identifies  the  Mirristry  of.  the".~ 
·Environment  and  the  Ministry  of  Health  as  the  central  Authorities  and 
the  Regions  as  1  oca 1  Authorities,  and  gives  to  the  competent  Prefet 
the task of the external  emergency  planning. 
The  DPR  175/88  asks  for: 
1)  a  notification  (art.  5  of  EEC  ·Directive)  with  a· complete  Safety 
Report  from  the manufacturer  which  uses, in industrial -operation  or· 
in  separate  storage,  dangerous  substances  in .  ·amounts  1  arger  than 
the  threshold  quantities  (derived  from  Annex  II  and  Annex  III  of 
the Directive as  amended  19.3.1987); 16 
2)  a  declaration  (art.  3-4  of  EEC  Directive)  from  the  manufacturer 
that  uses  (in  industrial  operation  or  in  separate  storage) 
cancerogenic,  highly  toxic,  toxic,  flammable  liquid  or  explosive 
substances  in  quantities larger than  the  exemption  limits  (e.g.  for 
industrial  operation  quantities  larger  than  1/5  of  those 
established  for  the  notification).  The  declaration  must  also  be 
accompanied  by  safety  documentation,  that  in  some  cases  can  be 
compared  to  a limited version  of a Safety  report. 
The  threshold  quantities  for  notification  apply  also  to  a  group 
of  installations  belonging  to  the  same  manufacturer  and  located  in  a 
distance  of  500  m. 
A  notification  is  also  requested  by  the  Regions  to  the 
manufacturers  of  installations  normally  subjected  to  declaration  where 
the  distance  between  the  i nsta  11 at  ions  .is  :.1 ess  than · 500  '!1~. and  the 
dangerous  ·  substances  used  exceed  altogether  the  notification 
threshold.·- These- highly  concentrated  areas  are  identi-fied  by  the 
Ministries of the  Environment  and  Health. 
The  notification  had  to  be  sent  until  8 July  1989  to  the 
Ministry  of  the  Environment  and  the  Ministry  of  Health,  while  the 
declaration  has  to  be  sent  within  the  31st  of  December  1990  to  the 
competent  Region  and  Prefet. 
For-all  the  plants  subjected  to  declaration  or  notification  the. 
Ita  1  ian  1  aw  provides  for  a  techni ca 1  review  of  the  Safety  Report, 
carried  out  by  the  Regions  on  declarations  and  by  the  Ministry  of  the 
Environment  and  the  Ministry  of Health  on  notifications,  respectively. 
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The  Regions  have,  however,  the  task  of  sending  the  results  of 
the  ·analysis  of  the  Safety  Reports· to  the  Central  Authorities,  that 
have  the  function  of  supplying  directives  and  coordination  on  the 
activities  relating  to  the  law  on  Major  Hazard  .of  Industrial 
Activities.  To  cope  with  this  aim,  on  the  31st  of March  1989  a  Decree 
of  the  President  of  the  Counc i 1  of  Ministers  was  issued  that  sets  a 
standard  format  for  the  compilation  of Safety  Reports  attached  to  the 
declaration/notification,  and  defines  criteria  for  information, 
training and  workers'  equipment. 
The  Decree  fixes  the  quantities  of  substances  that  rel eave  the 
manufacturer  of  his  declaration  duty  {art.  3-4  of  EEC  Directive)  and 
establishes  that  the  degree  of  depth  of  the  analysis  to  be  performed 
for the declaration depends  on  the quantities  in  the  installation. 
In  the  case  of  the  notification  {art.  5  of  EEC  Directive)  the 
risk analysis  is composed  of various  sections: 
_preliminary  analysis  in  order  to  identify  critical  areas  of  the 
installation by  means  of an  index method; 
identification  of  accidents  by  the  use  of  check-lists  and 
historical  analysis  of  abnormal  occurrences,  failures  and  human 
errors.  For  new  industrial  activities  an  operability  analysis  is 
required; 
estimate  of  accident  occurrence. probabil ities-.on  the  basis  of  the 
frequency  of-initiating causes  {data  banks,  reliability analysis). 
If  the  available  data  are  not  sufficient  ·the· manufacturer  is 
a  11 owed  to  produce  a  qua 1 i tat  i ve  estimate  with  a  frequency  range 
.·.supplying  a .source. term of. conservative nature;  . 18 
consequence  assessment  (no  particular  model  is  required  and  a 
vulnerability analysis  is not  mandatory). 
The  results  of  this  risk  analysis  are  used  for··the  preparation 
of  an  external  emergency  plan. 
In  the  case  of  the  declaration  (art.  3-4  of  EEC  Directive),  if 
the  installation  exceeds  a  first  level  of  quantities,  an  analysis  is 
required  in  order  to  identify  critical  areas  on  the  installation.  If 
the  quantities  exceed  a  second  level,  a  qualitative  analysis  is 
required  about  accident  occurrence  probabilities  with  an  assessment  of 
the  consequences  to  man  and  the  environment  on  the  basis  of  the  worst 
credible- accident.  In  the  case  that  the  consequences  extend  their 
influence  beyond  the  i nsta  11 at  ion  boundaries,  the  manufacturer  must 
supply  the  elements  for  an  external  emergency  plan. 
For  each  not i fi cation  the  competent· 'Authorities. wi 11~-~ .. s~art _  a 
procedure-that  develops  along;diff~rent steps.  Firstly·the Minister  of 
-. 
the  Environment,  .in  agreement  with  the  Minister  of  He a  1  th,.  nominates 
for  the  Safety  ana 1  ys is  of  the  i nsta  11 at  ion  a  project  1  eader  who 
receives  the  advice  from  four  Technical  bodies.  The  Technical  bodies 
are  the  following: 
the  Superior  Institute  of  He a  1  th  and  the  Superior  Institute  for 
Prevention  and  Safety  at Work  (Ministry  of Health); 
the  Fire Department  (Ministry  of the  Interior); 
the  Research·council  (Ministry  of  Scientific  Resear~h);  the  safety 
review  group  leader  holds  a  Safety  audit  with  the  participation  of 
the  technical  bodies  and  local  Authorities,  and  sends  a  synthetic 
--report-on  the ·Safety ·situation ·to  two  consulting~bodies·for advice. I 
19 
The  Consulting  Institutes: 
a  Commission  established  by  the  Ministry  of  Health  with  the 
participation of the territorial  bodies  and  a Committee  established 
by  the  President  of  the  Council.:of  Ministers  for- the  coordination · 
of the  industrial  safety activities. 
Finally  the  Ministry  of  the  Environment,  in  agreement  with  the 
Ministry  of  Health,  expresses  its  conclusions  on  the  installation, 
asking  if  it  is  the  case,  for  modi fi cations  and  for  procedures  in 
order  to  reduce  the  risk of  the  plant. 
The  manufacturer  can  appeal  against  the  measures  described;  the 
appeal  is  decided  upon  by  the  Ministry  of  the  Environment,  in 
agreement  with  the  Ministry  of  Health,  consulting  also  the  Ministries 
of  Industry  and  of  labour. 
For  the  manufacturers  who-·do  .not  produce  ~in· ·time::the.._  .... required 
notification-or declaration,  the~~aw provides  arrest. 
Inspections  on· installations  are  carried  out  by  the  ·centra  1  or  't 
local  Authorities  through  their  own  personnel  or  through  other 
inspectors  taken  from  the  first  three  technical  bodies  mentioned 
above. 
The  Netherlands 
Permit  Application  (PA):  for  any  new  factory  .. or- .. any  time  a major 
modification  is planned,  a permit  application  must··be  submitted  to  the 
competent  authority:  either  to  the  city  or  to  the  province 
....... administr.at.ion .. ,(province  ~when. the.  installation ,-cgvers. two.  or  more 
municipalities;  or  when  the  permit  is  regulated  by  the  "air pollution 20 
law")  (many  laws  exist  which  cover  single  aspects  of  man/environment 
protection). 
When  the  i nsta  11 at  ion  is  covered  by  the  Seve so  Directive,  then 
an  External  Safety  Report  (ESR)  .-must  .be  submitted._ .together  with  PA. 
ESR  and  PA  are  public  (with  some  exception  concerning  industrial 
secret).  For  existing  installations  the  ESR  makes  reference  to  the  PA 
already  approved.  ESR  and  PA  are  made  on  a  quasi  definitive  design: 
the  layout  must  have  been  finalized,  whereas  P&IDs  cannot  be  complete, 
unless  safety  significant  systems  are  involved.  Once  PA/ESR  are 
accepted,  that  is  the  information  is considered  to  be  sufficient,  then 
by  1  aw  in  7  months  the  procedure  must  be  ended.  After  7  months  no 
answer  of  the  authorities  corresponds  to  a  refusa  1  and  the  owner  is 
enabled  to go  to the Court. 
The  VROM  ministry  plays  through  its  environmental  inspectors  an 
advisory  role.,  These  do  not  enter: .o.ff,icially  in  ·the  ;,licensing 
procedure.  However,  the_.Ministry .is  called  officially  for  an  advice_:_~·. 
any  t-ime  that  because. of disputes  between  industry· and  1  oca  1  authori ty.:;,:A 
the  affair  goes  to  the  State  Council.  The  advices  of  the  inspectors 
are  in  praxis always  accepted  and  applied. 
The  Operational  Safety  Report  (OSR)  has  to  be  submitted  to  the 
1  abour  inspectorate  before  the  operation  starts  (even  1 h  before!). 
The  p  1  ant  can  operate  even  without  the  approva 1  of .. the- OSR.  The  OSR 
has  to  be  evaluated  in  6  months·  time.,  even  there. is  ·no  strict  legal 
obligation.  The  labour  inspectorate  has  the  capability-to  request  and 
to  obtain  that  modifications  retained  necessary  are  implemented.  OSR 
.is .. requested  only  for. the  units-. which  represent a  .c.ons~derable risk to 
the  workers.  These  can  be  i dent i fi ed  through  PA/ESR.  On  the  other 21 
hand,  even  VROM  receives  the  insights  from  the  OSRs,  which  are  made  on 
the  final  design. 
OSR  is  indeed  to  be  presented  in  7/8  copies  (it  is  secret: 
however,·  it is fully available to  the:workcouncil)~  co~ies for: 
steam  boiler inspectorate 
1  ..  : 
local  authority competent  for  PA 
city council/bourgmeister 
fire brigade  chief 
environmental  inspectorates 
labour  inspectorates. 
PA/ESR/OSR  give  a full  coverage  of the  risk. 
Portugal 
To  cope  with  the  Directive  the  ATRIG  authority  has  been  created 
(Technical  Authority  for  Major  .. Industrial  .Risks)  wh_ich, ..  by 
coordinating ·competences  of. ministry  -for·  physical  planning,  with  its·,. 
·- directorat"e· ·general  for  environment-,  indus'try,  ·-'Ci.vil  protection,  is~:·,t 
· able  to  ensure  a  correct  information  flow  for  an  effective  inspection 
policy.  New  plants  need  a  licensing  on  the  basis  of  a  safety  report 
plus  internal  emergency  planning.  Old  plants  can  be  obliged  to  close 
on  the  basis  of  the  safety  report.  Some  safety . reports  have  been 
already  submitted.  Experience  should  .still  further -develop.  A guidance.~ 
note  for the  notification has  been  produced. 
Spain 
Guidelines  for  the  safety  reports  have  been  drafted  but  not  yet 
finalized.  These  draft guidelines  have  been  supplied  but  could  not  yet 22 
be  included  into  the  CDCIR.  The  guidelines  are  being  finalized  in 
agreement  with  a  Technical  Committee  for  the  Chem'ical  ··Risk  created  in 
March  1989,  which  includes  representation  of  industry  as  well.  The 
answer  of  the  questionnaire  reflects ··the  state  of t-he  .deve 1  opment  of -
the activity and,  therefore,  should  be  considered  provisional. 
Whereas  the  Civil  Protection  Directorate  coordinates  the 
activities  in  the  country,  the  implementation  of  the  safety  report 
issue  is responsibility of the  regional  authorities.  Basic  information 
concerning  emergency  plans  are  communicated  at  the  central  level.  The 
authority  is  attempting  to  create a  technical  body  able  to  advise  even 
the  regional  administration at the  CIEMAT  National  Research  Center. 
United  Kingdom 
Article 5  safety  reports  have  to  be  submitted  to  the  Competent 
Authority,  the  He a  1  th  and  _·  Safety · fsecut-ive·  -: (HSE),  ... .at-- J east  ·,.  three 
months  before  commencement- of  the  industrial  activity,  although  in 
-practice  manufacturers  are  normally  alrea·dy  in  discussion  with  HSE ... 
long  before. 
The  report  is  subjected  to  expert  ·-ex ami nation  by  1  oca 1 
inspec~ors  and  their  colleagues  with  specialist  knowledge  in  risk 
assessment,  chemical,  mechanical,  electrical  and  civil  engineering. 
Issues  concerning  human. factors·  and  the  safe  ·~anagement  of  the:· 
. install at  ion  are also examined· as  part of the  review  ..  process~- ·However, 
article 5  safety  reports  (and  any  subsequent  changes-.·to  them  brought 
about  in  the  case  of modifications  referred  to  in  article 6)  are  not 
seen  -as  ·documents  _ of  relevance. only  before -:the  .. start-up  of  an 
installation  so  that  approval  may  be  given  in  one  form  or  the  other. l 
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Indeed,  the  United  Kingdom  does  not  operate  an  approval  or  licensing 
system  of  this  sort.  Instead  it prefers  a method  of continuing  control 
based  on  enforcement  of well  established  health  and  safety  legislation 
(the  Health  and  Safety  at  Work  Act)  :which  complements  the  specific 
Regulations  introduced  for  the  purpose  of  the  Seveso  Directive.  These 
include  powers  to  pro hi bit  an  activity  or  to  require  improvements  to 
it and  such  powers  would  be  used  to  prevent  start-up where  the  HSE  was 
not  satisfied about  the  safety of  an  installation. 
The  national  approach  adopted  in  the  UK  to  article 5  reports 
does  not  end  at  the  start-up  of  the  operation.  It  also  serves  an 
important  function  as  HSE  goes  on  to  its further  roles  under  article 7 
whilst  at -the  same  time  ·fulfilling  the  broader  and  long-established  ..  ~ 
pat tern  of  preventive  inspections  and  investigations  as  part  of  its 
wider  enforcement  role.  Hence,  key  issues  concerning  the  safe 
operation  of  the  plant  identifie_d  by- inspectors  .  .-.specialising.,.in~ this 
.type  of  inspection- will  be  ~targete~  and  reviewed  during  planned 
-·inspections  . of  .the- activity.- The  information- provided  by  the·-·~~:: 
manufacturer  in  his  Safety  Report  can  then  be  compared  to  the 
conditions  actually  found.  In  this way,  areas  for  improvement,  be  they 
technical  or  managerial,  may  be  brought  to  the  manufacturer's 
attention  and  appropriate  action  taken.  This  helps  to  ensure  that  the 
resources  of  both  the  inspector .and  the  manufacturer·· ·are  economically-... ~ 
and  effectively  deployed.  This  approach  is  also~-used  during  the 
investigation  of  dangerous  occurrences,  accidents ·.or ·-.~complaints  that 
come  to  the  attention  of  1  nspectors,  whether  they  concern  events 
..  involving  major  .accidents  under.-the  Directive·  or .. ·,·lesser  events 
reported  under  other  legislation.  Indeed,  the  number  of  lesser events 24 
that  are  required  to  be  reported  is  such  as  to  provide  a  valuable 
·  -~- ·  ·source ·"df··information  which  aids~ ta'rgetting- of:··preventive  inspection 
concerning  major  accidents. 
Article 5  safety  reports  for:·i!Xisting  sites·:-are  also  used  to 
check  the  information  already  held  on  specially  created  records  for 
installations  subject  to  the  Directive,  and  provides  one  input  for 
files concerning  the  inspection of newly  established activities. 
In  addition  to  obligations  met  under  the  Seveso  Directive,  the 
UK  has  well  established  land-use  planning  controls.  These  involve  the 
local  community  through  their elected  representatives  serving  on  local 
authorities  who  have  the  power  to  grant  or  refuse  planning  permission. 
·Such  .  approva 1  is ·  required  ; n  the  case  of  propos a  1  s  for  new 
installations  subject  to  the  Directive,  modifications  to  existing 
installations  as  well  as  other  proposals  for  development  in  the 
vicinity  of  existing  installations.-... The  -local<author~ty's .. decis-ion 
_,.  making  process  is  supported  by·  advice  Jrom  HSE  about  the  ·"residua_l 
risk"  to  the ·public; (that  is,  the  small  risk  which  remains  when  the ·  ..  :. 
1  ike  1  i hood  and  consequences  of  an  ace i dent  are  reduced  to  the  1  ow 
level  required  by  the  Seveso  Directive  but  the  hazard  is  not 
completely  eliminated.  HSE's  advice  to  the  local  authority  is  based 
upon  a  quantified  risk  assessment  of  the  installation  at  the 
·~·  conceptual  design  stage.  However,  it shou-ld  be  noted :,that  the grant of 
planning  permission  is  a  .separate  legislative· matter  which  does'  not 
turn  on  the  submission  of  an  article 5  safety  report  or  issues 




Protection  of  the  environment  from  the  effects  of  major 
accidents  falls  to  HSE.  It  is  addressed  in  the  safety  report  and  in 
the  work  of  HSE  out  1 i ned  above.  Other  en vi ronmenta  1  issues  are  the 
subject  of  further  legislative  controls ·falling· to .,other  enforcing·-·.-. 
bodies. 26 
4.  SAFETY  REPORT  (SR)  REQUIREMENTS 
A  comparative  summary  of  the  answers  obtained  through  the 
questionnaire  is  given  in  the  next  sections.  However,  a  more  detailed 
comparison  can  be  get  through  the ·_.compilation  in-·the·. Appendix.  The .. · 
distribution of this compilation  has  appeared  to  be  useful  for: 
- moving  towards  a  better  mutual  understanding  of  the  different 
approaches  which  cannot  be  caught  by  simple  summaries; 
- moving  towards  a  common  1  anguage  {it  appears  indeed  from  certain 
answers  that  not  always  there  is agreement  on  the  meaning  of certain 
questions,  even  if  these  have  been  discussed  in  the  ad-hoc 
meetings); 
- allowing  authorities  who  are  elaborating  {or  reviewing)  guidelines 
to  have  a direct access  to what  is existing  in  the other countries. 
The  abbreviations  used  in  the  .fo.llow.ing  as  .t(ell ._.as.~. in  the 
.Appendix  normally  follow·those 'at-item 3  {for  instance,- for  NL,  P.A·  .. _=.·· 
'Permit. Application;  ESR  =·  External  Safety  Report;  OSR  =  ·Operational· ··.t 
Safety  Report).  The  Appendix  also  refers  to  some  existing  standards 
and  norms.  These  have  been  included  into  the  CDCIR.  Section  5  lists 
relevant  national  guidelines  and  regulations.  It  should  also . be 
remarked  that  the  word  "inspector"  is  used  in  a  very  broad  sense 
including  experts  analyzing  the .safety ·report ,as··well  as  performing 





4.1  Industrial  complexes  vs  installations 
~uest,ons ·1.1·to 1.4 
This  set  of  questions  had  the  principal  aim  of  identifying 
whether  in  large  industrial  complexes.:t~_e presentation -of  multiple  SRs.~·-.­
might  lead  to: 
- non  i dent i fi cation  of  hazards  provoked  by  interaction  between  the 
plants; 
- non  identification  of  hazard  sources  originated  by  minor 
installations not  covered  by  Article 5; 
- insufficient  analysis  of  the  organizational  aspects  and  management 
of  the  whole  site,  which  at  the  last  end  are  the  principal  factors 
for  safety achievement; 
- insufficient account  of  possible  "common  cause  failures"  provoked  by 
the  loss  of  utilities  or  mitigating  systems  shared  by  the  multiple 
units. 
-,.It. appears .  from  the  answers  that  (with- some  ·.few -exception)  ~hese very<:,.' 
. ~ ·.import.ant .. aspect-s _have  been·.considered  in  the  national prac-ti-ces.·  ..:·1~ 
The  following  table  summarizes  how  single  or  multiple  reports 
are  required  for  installations  on  a  same  site when  bel~nging to  a  same 
owner. 
Single 
OK,  F,  GR,  IR,  l 
Nl  (ESR) 
*A  "core"  report for  the  site is recommended 
Multiple 
B*,  E,  FRG,  I 
Nl  (OSR),  P,  UK* 28 
Questions  1.5 and  1.6 
<These  questions  have  been  addressed  to  understand  the  requirements 
for  SR  when  minor  installations belonging  or  not  to  a  same  owner  might 
present  major  accident  hazards  because  of  their  ·proximity.  For 
installations  of  a  same  owner,  if  within  500  m distance  the  total 
quantity  of  a  same  substance  exceeds  the  thresho  1  d,  then  a  SR  is 
always  required.  The  situation  is  quite  different  in  the  different 
countries  as  summarized  in  the  following,  whereas  interesting  remarks 
can  be  read  in  the  Appendix. 
Art.3  and  4 only 
{+·inspections) 
Art.3  and  4 + 
SR  at the  judgement 
of  inspectors,  or 
local  authorities 








*  IR  underlines  a-deficiency  in  the  directive,  even  as-far  a~ exchange. 
of hazard  informatfon :among -plants--of .different owners  is.  concerned.-,·;_ 
Question  1.7  {further issues  not  covered  by  previous  items) 
OK  and  l  indicated  the  problem  of  the  pipelines  and  transport. 
However,  the  answers  refer better to  the  questions  put  under  item  2.4. 
4.2  Installations vs  Safety Report 
Questions  2.1  to 2.4 
For  Art.  5  on 1  y  F  and  FRG  inc 1  ude  more  substances  than  those 
considered  by  the  Directive,  whereas  OK  includes  further  substances  as 
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far  as  Art.  3  and  4  is  considered.  In  NL,  OSR  is  requested  according 
~o ·hazard ··criteria· rather ·than  substance  names. 
Lower  thresholds  are  assumed  by  F for most  of the  substances  and 
by  FRG  for  many  of  them.  The  problem· -is- under  discussi{)n  in  OK.  I  has 
established  thresholds  for  "declaration"  (minor  safety  analysis)  for 
plants  under  Art.3  and  4. 
Other  kinds  of plant  are  submitted  to  the  same  SR  obligations  in 
F,  FRG  and  at  a  lesser  extent  in  OK  and  in  the  NL  for  PA.  Italy  has 
not  excluded  plants  under  Art.2.3  (disposal  of  toxic  and  dangerous 
waste) .  On  case  by  case  decision  a  SR  in  FRG  can  be  imposed  by  the 
authorities  for  each  installation covered  by  the  emission  control  law. 
In  B and  OK,  SRs  can  be  requested  on  demand  of  inspectors,  in  Italy 
after accidents. 
Terminals  connected  with  plants  under  Art.S  are  to  be  considered 
in  the  SR  for  all  states.- Need  of  inclusion."of .marshalling. ya~ds .un~er 
the·._same  Art.S  obligations  ha~·-been  identified  by  F,  NL  and  Italy.  We 
··  noted :-·that  several  articles  ·of  the· council< resolution· of  September--~ 
1989  rose  .the  subject  of  risks  connected  with  the  transport  of 
dangerous  substances  on  a  broader  context. 
4.3  Installations vs  site related external  hazards 
This  set. of  questions  was  addressed.  to  understand  at  which 
extent .the  effects  of  natural  or  human-induced· hazard· from  outside  of 
the  plant  has  to  be  considered  in  the  SR.  Generally  all  countries · 
consider  that  the  term  "special  analysis"  (question 3.1)  used  in  the 
questionnaire  is  not  applicable,  because  esternal- hazards  should  be 
normally  included  in  the  SR. 30 
Seismic  hazards  {questions  3.2.1  to  3.2.4) 
~whenever  earthquake  risk  is  present,  anti sEfi smi c  construction 
national  standards  are  assumed  in  the  design.  Extensive  "safety 
studies"  for  toxic  material  storages  .and  proce-ss. :installations  have· 
been  requested  by  F.  Arguments  for  adequacy  of  construction  design 
operation  with  respect  to  the  seismic  hazard  are  requested  by  UK. 
Seismic  occurrences  should  be  considered  by  P  accident  scenarios. 
Earthquakes  are  included  among  the  danger  sources  in  the  FRG.  GR  feels 
that the  issue  needs  to  be  further  considered. 
Aircraft crash  hazards  {questions  3.3.1  to 3.3.3) 
The  problem  does  not  seem  to  have  been  considered  by  8,  E,  GR 
and  L;  and  impact  analysis  is  not  yet  included  in  the  Italian 
guidelines.  Mostly  landing/taking  off  corridors  are  considered  as 
criteria for  considering  aircraft _hazard~.  ··F~· ·OK,_  ·UK :use  probabilistic 
evaluations  of  incident .'rate  for  any  consequential  action.  Normally 
the  owner·  ·is  responsible  of  setting  data  and  propose  methodologies.  · 
·Some  national  laboratories  like  RISO  {OK),  CEA  {F),  TNO  {NL),  SRD  {UK) 
have  developed  some  guidance  notes  or  expertise  for  analysis.  In  most 
of  the  countries  administrative  procedures  or  regulations  can  be  used 
to create exclusion  zones.  In  some  countries  {e.g.  NL  and  UK)  even  for 
military flights. 
Sabotage  (question  3.5) 
The  problem  does  not  seem  to  have  been  considered  by  B,  GR,  L, 
IR,  whereas  E is  planning  to  ask  for  measures  in  the  future.  In  the 
other  countries,  security  is  not  always  completely  ·1ncluded  into  SRs 
• : 
31 
because  of  the  need  to  keep  secret  the  measures  but  in  any  case  is 
·  ,reglll a  ted· ·by  other means. 
Hazards  from  nearby  installations  (question  3.6) 
Generally  the  authorities  have  the  possiblity  to  facilitate  the 
flow  of information  among  owners.  Only  IR  and  GR  seem  to  have  problems 
as  far  as  installations  not  covered  by  Art.  5 are  concerned.  Again  IR 
notes  a deficiency  in  the  Directive. 
4.4  Installation Description 
In  genera 1  the  answers  do  not  need  a  comment,  s i nee  they  show 
good  agreement,  with  some  few  exceptions.  In  particular  the  following 
items  should  be  remarked: 
Question  4.4  (composition  and  expertise  of  the  team  performing  the 
safety reports) 
·OK  and  Nl- (as· .. far. as  .OSR  is  concerned)  prefer  that  .company_:; 
personnel  and  not  consultants  be  involved.  IR  has  the  right  to 
nominate  a  person  when  not  satisfied with  the  competence  of  those  who 
draw  up  SR.  l  has  nominated  an  "organisme  mandates". 
In  general  there  is  the  preference  that  the  company  be  involved 
as  much  as  possible. 
Questions  4.10  and.  4.11  concerning  standards  and.:·arguments  for  new 
technology 
Only  Spain  seems  to  have  not  yet considered  the  item. 32 
Question  4.18  (waste  treatment,  etc.) 
-"France- and  -FRG  are  emphasizing  (see  also ·the  ·answer  to  the 
question  4.27  extra  information)  environment  protection,  whereas  in 
other  countries  only  the  information-~-rel~vant  for  r.re1eases  able  to 
create  a  major  accident  are  included  in  the  SRs,  and  smaller  releases 
and  controlled  releases  are  dealt  with  by  other  legislative  acts  or 
authorities. 
Questions  4.19  to  4.24  concerning  safety  organization,  operator 
training,  procedures,  etc. 
Whereas  the  human  factor  aspects  have  been  recognized  by  some 
authorities  as  a  most  cri t i ca 1  part  of  the  safety  report,  the  same  ' 
awareness  is not  shown  by  all  authorities  (see  also  the  answers  to  the 
question  5.6  concerning  in  general  the  analysis  of the  human  factors). 
Question  4.27  (further information) 
I  asks  in  the ·report  information  -on  company  insurance  for 
·liability with. respect  to public  and  environmental  damages. 
4.5  Hazard  Identification 
Historical  experience  (questions  5.1{.1  to  .4)  and  5.3) 
All  .countries  use  .more  ·or  -less  historical. experience  on 
accidents  as  a  basis  of  knowledge  and  hazard  .awareness.  Checklists 
based  on  past  accidents  have  been  established  in  FRG. .  .. 
33 
Systems  analysis  procedures  {questions  at section  5.2) 
·All-· autllor'iti'es  ,·encourage· or· ·prescribe ·ttlat:.:.:systems  analysis 
techniques  {like  HAZOP,  FMEA,  etc.)  are  used  for  hazard 
i dent i fi cation.  The  genera 1  trend  is .  .-to  --1 eave  the --cho·i ce  of  the  most . 
appropriate  one  to  the  manufacturer,  who  should  indicate  the  reason  of 
his  choice  and  present  analysis  transparent  for  the  authorities.  Only 
Italy  requires  a  mandatory  screening  methodology  {derived  from 
Mond/Dow  and  Italian  toxicity  indexes),  whereas  NL  limits  the 
mandatory  requirements  for  indices  to  the  OSR,  where  the  ranking  is 
performed  for  i dent i fyi ng  which  further  ana 1  ys is  steps  have  to  be 
required. 
As  far  as  criteria  used  for  judging  completeness  of  the  hazard 
identification  in  a  SR,  even  by  warning  against  the  fact  that 
checklists  can  never  be  exhaustive,  F has  produced  some  checklists  as 
a  guidance  for  the  inspectors. (5.1.4)_, :.wherea_s.,(5.2,2)  .UK  relies .on 
;the analysis_of the.SR  on··an  expert multi-disciplinary basis. 
·- · 'Questions  5.4,  5.5  and  5.6  concerning  plant  states,  runaway  reaction 
hazard  and  human  factors  which  may  be  major  contributors  to  the 
overall  risks. 
It  must  be  remarked  that  not  all  authorities  seem  to  have 
considered  at a sufficient extent·  how  to  address  ·such.:jtems  in  a SR. 
4.6  Safety Systems  and  Procedures 
Sufficient  deta i 1  s  and  ex amp 1  es  of  extensive  requirement 
description  can  be  seen  in  the  Appendix.  It should -be  remarked  that at 
the  present  state  of  development  of  guidelines,  Spain  has  not  yet 34 
considered  which  requirements  concerning  standards  and  safety criteria 
the  SR  has  to  address  (questions  6.1  - 6.6).  Quantitative  reliability 
targets  seem  to  be  requested  by  OK  and  NL  for  certain  safety  relevant 
systems;  some  authorities  (F  -and  FRG)  may  ·  require  special 
redundancies,  other  authorities  (I,  UK)  are  encouraging  re  1  i abi 1  i ty 
assessments. 
Pollution  Protection Systems  (questions  6.8  - 6.10) 
The  answers  show  a  variety  of  positions,  because  in  most  of  the 
cases  they  refer  to  responsibilities  of  different  authorities  and 
regulated  under  different legislations. 
On-site emergency  plans  (question  6.11) 
It  appears  that  even  if  such  a  plan  is  a  fundamental 
organizational  safety  measure,  not_  al<ways. ifs .. description  ,-i·s·  inc~uded 
in  the  SR. 
The  answers  to  question  6.12~are quite  differentiated  among  the 
statements:  F  (no  zero  risk can  exist),  and  FRG  (the  probability  of  a 
public  hazard  must  be  zero). 
4.7  Accident  Scenarios 
·The  basic  phi 1  osophy  is  different  from .:.:country  to  country . 
(questions  7.1  - 7.3).  FRG  is.evaluat.ing  consequences.-J{)f-malfunctions 
of units  in  order  to demonstrate  that there  is  no  public  hazard  (there 
is  the  assumption  that  no  more  than  a  certain  number  of  bui 1  t-in 
·J .barri er.s  ___ . can ,.,.,fai 1) ~ .. _,.A  . complete  .... ~probabi  1  i st  i  c-~,~ttsk - .. assessment  is 
requested  by  the  Netherlands.  At  a  different  extent  probabilistic 
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ana 1  yses  are  required  by  other  authorities,  whereas  F  and  UK  tend  to 
<--. ··> · .•  , ttcrve·  ·?·a~-,~lct'UT'e"'~,f~ ·1:onsequence's  ·\of~  ··a - ·1 arge  -·-s·pee.trum ····of  poss i b  1  e 
accidents  {UK  does  not  discourage  use  of  probabilistic  methods  but 
avoiding  cut-off  or  target  values).  The  reason  behind  .this  choice  is 
that  evaluation  even  of  remote  scenarios  increases  industry  awareness 
about  risk and,  therefore,  moves  towards  a  better prevention.  Envelope 
scenario  for  F  {see  question  7  .1),  worst  reasonably  foreseeable  for 
UK,  e.g.  full-bore  failure  of  a  large  diameter  liquid  pipeline,  BLEVE 
of  LPG  sphere  are  at the _basis  of emergency  plans.  No  further  examples 
have  been  given  by  other  authorities,  who  however  supply  to  the 
emergency  planners  the  results of the  SRs. 
Useful  indications  on  the  praxis  of  dispersion,  fire  and 
explosion,  vulnerability  models  as  well  as  of  calculation  conditions 
can  be  found  in  the  answers  to  the  questions  7. 4  - 7.13  of  the 
questionnaire. 
4. 8  . -Other  Genera 1 -Quest 1  ons 
Acceptance  criteria {questions  8.1  - 8.2) 
Only  the  NL  has  established  risk criteria for  acceptance  of  ESR, 
whereas  probabilities,  when  used,  are  assumed  as  one  among  other 
elements  in  the  overall  judgement  by  the  other  authorities.  State-of-
the-art· techniques-, ·best.  engineer.~ng judgement, mostly.~·supported  by  ad-
hoc  studies  especially  for  new  plant.  types,  are .at -the  basis  of  the 
acceptance  criteria for  all  authorities. 
As  far as  backfitting  is concerned  some  different statements  are 
worth  to  be  reported: 
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F  backfitting  is required  according  to a well  defined  program; 
,_WR& ·',i.:-.badfitti·ng ur -closure; 
NL  backfitting  or  closure.  If  the  actions  required  correspond  to 
up-to-date  safety  techniques,  no  compensation  is  foreseen.  I  ( 
additional  measures  are  required  because  of  land-use,  support  is 
given  by  the  government; 
UK  on  cost/benefit considerations. 
Independent  assessments 
OK,  F,  GR,  FRG,  IR,  I,  L have  the  possibility  to  require,  in 
addition  to  the  SR,  an  independent  study  or  an  assessment  at  cost  of 
the manufacturer  (question  8.3,  see  also  answer  to question  4.4}. 
Most  of  the  authorities  have  (or  have  planned  to  have} 
sufficient  expertise  to  perform  va 1  i dati on  of  the  scenarios  supp 1  i ed 
by  the  manufacturer. 
__  _.  Mostly  _updating  of  SR  is  .requested  systematically  at  --time~~l· 
intervals  ranging  from  2  years  to  10  years,  unless  inspection  or 
incidents  show  the  need  to  do  that  out  of  any  schedule.  Of  course, 
major  modifications  are  subjected  to  the  complete  repetition  of  the 
procedure  (question  8. 5).  The  fo 11 owing  tab  1  e  summarizes  the 
situation. 
B  OK  E  F  FRG  GR  IR  I  L  NL  p  UK 
Periodic 
revision  10  5  4  2-4  2  3  3  4  3 
(years)  (OSR)  (ESR) 
unless  major 
modifications  3 





Inspection  policy 
... ,.  >The- answers-· given  to  quest 1  on  '8. 6  show  that  the  prob 1  em  of 
planning  inspections  or  safety  audits  on  the  basis  of  SR  is  not  yet 
completely  solved  by  all  authorities. 
The  comparison  of  the  times  for  approving  or  analyzing  the 
report  cannot  be  made  on  the  basis  of  the  answers  given  to  the 
question  8.8,  because  the  prescribed  times  are  interrupted  each  time  a 
supplementary  piece  of  information  is  required,  trial  can  be 
implemented,  etc. 
Support  to the  SR 
Most  of the  authorities give  the  industry  only  information  about 
the  contents  and  guidance  note,  in  certain  cases  they  give  advice. 
Only  NL  as  far  as  ESR  is  concerned  gives· not  only  advice  but  may 
participate in  the  study  and  share  the  costs  {question  8.9). 
Responsibility  problems  have  not  yet  been  solved  by  legislation 
in  Greece  {question  8.10). 38 
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Hazardous  Incident  Ordinance,  27  April  1982  {SGAR  or  Annex  1). 
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Ireland 
European  Communities  (Major  Accident  Hazards  of  tertain  Industrial 
Activities)  Statutory  Instruments,  Ministry  for  Labour,  1986. 
Italy 
App 1  i caz i one  de 11' art  .12  de 1  decreto  de 1  Pres i dente  de 11 a  Repubb 1  i ca 
17  maggio  1988,  n.1757,  concernente  rischi  rilevanti  connessi  a 
determinate  attivita  industriali,  Gazzetta  Ufficiale,  21  aprile 
1989  (referred to  as  DPCM,  31.3.1989). 
The  Netherlands 
The  External  Safety  Report,  April  1989  (VROM). 
Occupational  Safety  Report,  Designatory  guidelines  for  AVR,  mandatory 
installations  (1988),  Labour  Inspectorate. 
Guidance  for  the  contents  of  the .occupational- safety  report  (revised 
1990). 
Portugal 
Not i fi cacao  Da  Seguranca,  Contec i do  Esquemat i co  de  Ori entacao  para  a 
sua  Apreciacao,  AO  ATRIG-89/046  Rev.01. 
United  Kingdom 
The  requirements  of  United· Kingdom  safety  reports  to  comply  with 
Article 5  are  specified  in  Schedule  6  of  the  Control  of 
Industrial  Major  Accident  Hazards  (CIMAH)  Regulations  1984, 
·._k<.referred .to  .in  this questionnaire  as  Schedule .. 6 .. 40 
Guidance  on  the  preparation  of a  UK  safety  report  is given  in  HS(R)21, 
A guide  to  the  Control  of  lndustri al  Major  Accident  Hazards 
Regulations  1984,  referred  to  in  this questionnaire  as  HS(R)21. : 
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: 
• ..  . 
: 
1.  INDUSTRIAL  COMPLEXES  VS  INSTALLATIONS 
on  the  same  site there  may  be  several  installations 
operated by the same  owner. 
1.1.  Do  you require a  single safety report for the site 
or multiple  safety  reports  for the single major 
hazard units? 
B  (ML)  For  every  plant,  the  manufacturer  must  present  a 
safety  report.  He  is  free  of  presenting  a  single 
global  one  or  one  for  each  installation or  unit.  In 
the  case  of  several  installations  it  has  been 
revealed  more  convenient to  prepare  a  general  report 
explaining  the  general  safety  policy  and  one  report 
for  every  installation  where  the  safety  measures 
adopted are detailed and  justified. 
DK  Single.  A  safety  report  shall  cover  all  facilities 
at the plant  and  consists of  individual  sections  for 
each installation. 
All  substances  involved,  even  in  quantities  less 
than the thresholds,  have to be listed. 
E  Multiple.  It is  required  a  safety  report  for  each 
installation. 
F  Single.  Normally  an  industrial  activity  is  defined 
as  delimited  by  the  fence  of  the  site.  Of  course, 
for  existing  industrial  complexes  it  is  accepted 
that  separate  safety  reports  are  submitted  at 
different  times.  These  however  should  then 
constitute a  single dossier. 
FRG 
Interactions must  be  considered  from  one  part to the 
other. 
Multiple.  (The  workers  in  a  neighbouring  unit 
considered  as  11  Public  11  The  safety  study  of 
unit  must  demonstrate  that  no  public  hazard  is 
to  the  workers  of  the  neighbouring  units. 
workers  are associated with  a  specific unit  and 






GR  Single. 
IR  Single. 
I  Multiple.  It is  under  discussion  the  possibility  of 
requiring  a  single  safety  report  for  every 
industrial activity (fence). 
L  Single. 
NL  Single:  for external safety report  (ESR). 
Multiple:  for occupational safety report  (OSR). 
However  OSR  covers only a  subset of the units in a  site. P  Multiple. 
UK  Multiple.  Each  installation  (unit)  requires  a  safety 
report  ( SR) :  but  it is  quite  acceptable  to  have  a 
site SR  dealing with all matters  common  to the  whole 
site  (the  Core  SR)  which  is  supported  by  SRs 
covering  specific  matters  at  each 
installation/units. 
1.2 
.  . .: 
• 
1.2. If multiple,  do  you  require  an additional report for 
possible interactions among  units? 
If yes,  do you consider only major hazard units? 
B  (ML)  For  every  installation  at  the  site  that  may  have 
an  influence  on  plant  safety  presenting  a  major 
accident  hazard,  the  manufacturer  must  indicate  the 
preventive measures  taken to avoid these hazards. 
DK  Not  applicable. 
E  No.  An  additional  report  is  not  required.  Anyway 
possible  domino  effects  between  nearby  units  must 
be considered in every report. 
F  No.  Within  the  fences  of  the  installation, 




FRG  Yes.  They  are  included  in  the  analysis  of  external 
danger sources. 
GR  Not  applicable. 
IR  Not  applicable. 
I  No.  Information  regarding all possible  interactions 
foreseen  among  the  existent  units  are  required  in 
the Safety Report. 
L  Not  applicable. 
NL  No  for  OSR.  Only  for  fire  irradiation.  Toxic  release 




At  the  moment  "no  escape  possibility"  has  been 
detected  for  risky units:  ESR  and  OSR  result  in  a 
complete  coverage  of  risk  control.  Should  some 
weakness  in the system be  detected the  laws  would  be 
changed. 
No,  however  in  every  safety  report  external  hazards 
due  to  the  other  neighbouring  units  or  plants  must 
be considered  . 
No.  We  require  each  specific  installation  SR  to 
deal  with  interactions  between  itself  and  other 
installations plus  those  non-Article  5  installations 
which  could  either  cause  a  major  accident  at  an 
Article  5  installation or affect the severity of the 
consequences of  such an accident. 
1.3 1.3. If multiple,  do  you  require  detailed  information  on 
responsibility  sharing  and  on  the  overall 
organization for emergency for the whole site? 
B  (ML)  Yes. 
DK  Not  applicable. 
E  Yes.  For  every  installation  it  is  required  the 
internal organization. 
For  industrial  complexes,  a  common  action  plan  for 
emergencies  is required. 
F  In  the  single  dossier,  the  complete  responsibility 
sharing  and  the  organization  scheme  must  be 
supplied,  as  well  as  the  existence  of  mutual  aid 
agreement  with  other  industries  in  the  nearby 
sites. 
FRG  Yes.  This  is  achieved  by  a  particular  chapter  of  a 
Safety  Report,  but  in  some  cases  there  may  be  a 
general report covering the site organization. 
GR  Not  applicable. 
IR  Not  applicable. 
I  Yes. 
L  Not  applicable. 
NL  Yes.  Even  in  OSR  there is  a  common  part describing 
the overall organization structure. 
P  No.  For  industrial  complexes,  every  plant  must 
present  an  internal  emergency  plan,  that  must  be 
coherent with the general  organization for  safety  in 
the complex. 
UK  Yes. 
(a)  In  practice  these  are  matters  that  are  largely 
dealt with  in  the  "Core"  SR  refered to  in  1.1. 
above. 
Also  each  installation  SR  should clearly show  how 
it  links  into  the  Core  SR  and  how  it  implements 
universal site safety procedures  and precautions. 
(b)  In  addition  each  site  has  to  have  an  adequate 
on-site  emergency  plan  detailing  how  major 
accidents  will  be  dealt  with.  This  is  a  separate 
legal  requirement  ( CIMAH  regulation  10) .  This 
plan  must  cater  for  major  accidents  at  each 
separate installation and  for  accidents  involving 
interactions between  installations. 
1.4 
..  .. 1.4. If multiple,  do  you  require  detailed  information  on 
common  possible utilities,  common  auxiliary services 
and  common  protections  against  pollution  accidents 
due to waste treatment,  sewers,  etc.? 
B  (ML)  Yes,  as  far  as 
be  threatened. 
DK  Not applicable. 
the  safety  of  workers  can 
E  Yes.  There  are  some  operative  common  action  plans  in 
industrial complexes. 
F  Of  course,  this is part of the dossier. 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  Not  applicable. 
IR  Not  applicable. 
I  Yes,  for  common  auxiliary  systems.  Information  are 
required for waste treatment. 
Inspectors  may  ask  for  additional  information  during 
safety review. 
L  Not  applicable. 
RL  Yes.  As  for point 1.3. 
P  Yes. 
UK  Yes.  As  for  1.3.  (a)  above.  For  example,  the  "Core" 
SR  should  address  precautions  against  major 
electrical supply or water  supply  failure  and  each 
individual  installation  SR  should  clearly  explain 
whether  these  precautions  apply at that installation 
or  whether  alternative  protective  systems  are  in 
operation. 
1.5 1.5. 1)  How  do  you  deal  with  installations not  exceeding 
separately  the  thresholds  established  for  the 
safety  report  obligation,  but  presenting  major 
accident risk because of their proximity? 
2)  In  case  you  foresee  a  special  requirement  for 
such situations,  which  are the separation  dist~nce 
criteria that you apply? 
B  (ML)  The  rule  of  the  500  m  is  applied.There  exists  in 
Belgium  a  regulation,  called  Prevention  Policy, 
that contains  exactly the  same  obligations  foreseen 
in  Articles  3  and  4  of  the  Directive.  It  is  very 
probable that under this prevention policy  frame,  an 
inspector  may  impose  the  manufacturer  to  prepare  a 
safety report. 
DK  1)  Articles  3  and  4.  If  the  plant  presents  a  major 
accident  hazard  (after  an  inspection)  a  safety 
report  may  be  required.  This  is  decided  by  the 
local  inspector. 
2)There  are,  at  the  moment, 
establishing  safety  distances. 
regulations only. 
no  criteria 
There  are 
for 
some 
Safety distances  are  applied for  the  installation of 
new  plants. 
As  background  information  is  used  experience  and 
guidelines  developed  in  other  countries  (U.K., 
F.R.G.,  N.L.). 
E  Seveso  Directive  criterium  of  500  m.  is  applied, 
with the following differences: 
F 
-For distances  less than  500  m.,  it is required  for 
installations  of  the  same  substance  and 
belonging to the same  owner. 
-When  different  substances  are  considered.  The 
Regional  Authorities  decide  the  criteria  to 
apply. 
For  the  whole  site  of  every  owner,  the  total 
activity  is  considered,  whatever  the  distance  (all 
the quantities are  added).  The  safety report is also 
requested for  units  under  the  thresholds  established 
by  Seveso  Directive.  French  legislation  have  other 
thresholds;  most of them are  lower. 
The  Prefect  can  record  all  units  and  ask  for  all 
information about them. 
FRG  The  rule  of  the  500  m.  is  applied.  Case  by  case 
analysis  and  consequence evaluation are performed. 
1.6 .. 
GR  Only notification is required. 
IR  We  address  such  installations  as  best  we  can  under 
Regulation  10  which  imposes  general  duties  upon 
manufacturers  who  are subject to Articles  3  and  4  of 
the  Directive  and  under  Regulation  9  which  enables 
us  to  require  demonstration  of  safe  operation  and 
storage. 
There  is  in  our  view  a  basic  deficiency  in  the 
Directive  in  that  it  does  not  provide  for  the 
cummulation of adjacent hazards. 
I  The  competent  Authority  defines  the  areas  at 
elevated  industrial activity concentration  and  local 
authorities  (regions)  ask  for  notification  to 
industries sited within  a  500  m.  radius. 
L  If  proximity  makes 
rispective  amounts 
criteria are applied. 
possible  domino 
are  added  and 
effects,  the 
the  required 
HL  It is not required for  ESR.  For  OSR  it  depends  case 
by case;  in some  cases it is not required. 
p 
UK 
However  the  safety  is controlled  through  the  Permit 
Application  (PA),  which  is  a  safety  report  even  if 
no  risk  quantification  is  performed.  It  contains 
hazard  identification,  calculations  of  possible 
accidents,  of duration of releases and doses,  etc. 
For  triggering  this  kind  of  analysis,  there  are  no 
fixed  thresholds  when  chemicals  are  involved:  rather 
this  is  a  matter  of  judgement  for  the  local 
authorities. 
In this way  also  explosives,  military installations, 
dust explosion risks are controlled. 
Portughese  legislation  foresees  the  mandatory 
presentation  of  a  safety  report  for  every  plant 
included in article 5  of the Directive. 
The  safety  reports  regarding  large  industrial 
complexes  will  be  analysed  and  consequently  safety 
notifications  will  be  asked  for  particular 
installations  not  fulfilling  minimun  safety 
requirements. 
In  present  legislation  a  particular  attention  from 
Inspection  Organizations  is  devoted  to  the 
installations included in the Directive  . 
If  the  aggregate  quantity  of  a  specific  individual 
dangerous  substance  in the  installations  exceeds  the 
threshold  level  then  a  SR  is  required.  This  SR 
covers all of  the  installations.  This  applies to all 
installations within  500  meters  of  each other and at 
larger  separation  distances  when  the  installations 
can interact. 
Note:  With  the  exception  of  emergency  planning  and 
1.7 information  to  the  public  the  CIMAH  regulations  is 
not  the  main  safety  standard  setting  legislation  in 
the  UK.  Safety  standards  are  set  and  enforced  under 
the  Health  and  Safety  at  Work  etc.  Act  1974  (HSW 
Act),  approved  codes  of  practice  and  guidance  notes, 
etc.  All  industrial  activities  subject  to  the  HSW 
Act  are  routinely  inspected  at  a  frequency  largely 
determined  by  the  risk  arising  from  those 
activities.  Hence  even  where  the  above  aggregation 
rule  does  not  apply  the  HSW  applies  and  the 
installations are  regularly  inspected to  ensure  that 
the  manufacturer  is  meeting  his  obligations  to 




..  ... ; 
1.6.  How  do  you  deal  with  the  question  raised  at  point 
1.5.  when  installations belong to different owners? 
B  (ML)  These  installations  are  not  subjective  to  Seveso 
Directive.  Nevertheless,  in  view  of  the  Prevention 
Policy regulation  each  owner  has  to take  appropriate 
measures  in order to protect his employees. 
DK 
manufacturer  has  to  consider  possible 
interactions with nearby industries. 
All  plants  are  inspected.  If  needed,  Safety  Reports 
are  required.  The  attention  is  focused  on  safety 
devices  intervening  in  those  cases  when  a  possible 
accident can affect nearby plants. 
There  is  no  written  regulation  (except  in  the 
nuclear field),  but only some  guidelines. 
E  It is not required. 
Law  2/85  from  Civil  Protection  Ministry  may  be 
applied to such cases. 
F  It is  in  the  same  way  as  in  item  1.5.  If there  is  a 
risk,  the  manufacturer  has  to  consider  possible 
interactions with  nearby  industries.  The  Prefect can 
impose  the  safety  report,  and  plant  owners  have  to 
communicate  information to the other manufacturers. 
FRG  Treated similarly as  indicated for point 1.2. 
GR  At the moment  is has not been established. 
IR  There is no  specific prov1s1on. 
We  again would  deal  with  them  under  Regulation  9  and 
10. 
There  is  a  particular  difficulty  here  in  that 
manufacturers  will  argue  that  they  have  no  way  of 
knowing  what  dangerous  substances  their  neighbours 
have  or what the conditions of  storage are.  We  would 
expect  manufacturers  to  address  patent  hazards  on 
adjacent sites. 
This  again  draws  attention  to  the  fundamental 
deficiency  in  the  Directive  referred  to  at  1.5. 
above. 
I  See point 1.5. 
L  Primarily,  separate reports  are  made.  Afterwards,  if 
there  are  possible  interactions,  a  global 
supplementary  analysis  is  done  considering  domino 
effects. 
HL  See  answer to point 1.5. 
P  See  answer to point 1.5 
UK  By  inspection  and  enforcement  under  the  HSW  Act. 
1.9 1.  7.  Is  there  any  further  issue  not  considered  by  the 
previous questions,  that you consider relevant. 
B  (ML)  No  answer. 
DK  The  safety of the pipelines. 
E  No 
F  No 
FRG  No. 
GR  No. 
IR  No 
I  No 
L  Presently,  storage stations are  considered  in safety 
reports.  In  the  future,  it  is  foreseen  to  include 
pipelines  and  transport  roads  for  dangerous 
materials. 
NL  No 
P  No  answer. 






2.  INSTALLATIONS  VS  SAFETY  REPORT  OBLIGATIONS 
The  EEC  Directive and its 2  Amendments  state a  minimum 
common  content,  but  national  praxis  may  use  more 
restrictive criteria for safety report obliqation. 
2.1.  Do  you  include  further  substances  with  respect to the 
Directive? 
If  yes,  which  ones  and  which  are  the  thresholds  for 
subaittinq a  safety report? 
B  (ML)  No. 
DK  Yes,  for articles  3  and  4.  No  for article 5. 
Cancerogenic,  mutagenic,  toragenic and neurotoxicity. 
A  booklet  exists  containing  a  complete  list  of 
dangerous  substances  (Art.  5  substances  included). 
E  No 
F  Yes.  The  sites covered by the "classified instalations" 
regulation. 
FRG  Yes.  See  Annex  1. 
GR  No 
IR  No 
I  No,  substances  and categories of substances  included in 
Allegata  IV  of  D.P.R.  175/88 are required. 
L  No. 
NL  No  for  ESR. 
Yes  for  OSR.  The  list  is  established  according  to 
"criteria" rather than substance names. 
P  No. 
OK  No 2.  2  For  which  substances  do  you  assum.e  lower  thresholds 
with respect to the Directive ? 
B  (ML)  None. 
DK  No  comments  at  the  moment  because  the  issue  is  ~nder 
discussion. 
E  None.  Some  regions  ask  simplified  notification  for 
installations  where  the  amounts  present  are  below 
established thresholds.  Anyway  they are not required to 
present a  safety report in such cases. 
F  For most of them. 
F.RG  For many  of them.  See Annex  1. 
GR  None. 
IR  None. 
I  None  for Article 5. 
See  Art.  3  of  D.P.C.M.  31/3/1989  where  quantitative 
limits are indicated,  regarding the obligations for the 
declaration concerning Articles  3  and  4. 
L  For  flammable  liquid  storage  (gasoline,  gasoil) 
belonging  to  three  owners  and  keeping  their  total 
quantity lightly below the threshold values for Article 
5  application. 
HL  See  answer to point 2.1. 
P  None. 
UK  None. 
2.2 
..  .. ,. . 
2. 3.  Are  further  installations  (e.g.  factories  with  dust 
explosion  hazards)  subjecte  to  the  same  obligations 
concerning safety reports? 
If yes,  which ones? 
B  (ML)  No,· but within the  prevention  policy  frame  the  plant 
owner  may  be  asked  for  to  present  a  risk  analysis  to 
demonstrate  that  he  has  taken  all  the  necessary 
measures. 
DK  Yes.  For  instance  Hexane  extraction  facilities  under 
vacuum. 
Also  for  factories  not  covered  by  the  Directive  (for 
example explosives)  but potentially dangerous,  a  Safety 
Report can be required. 
The  decision  about  the  request for  a  Safety Report  is 
taken  by  the  local  inspectors,  sometimes  with  the 
support of the central authority. 
E  No.  There  are  some  related  norms  from  Ministry  of 
Industry  and  from  National  Institute  for  Safety  and 
Hygiene at Work. 
F  See  answer to point 2.1. 
For  instance:  silos  of  organic  powder,  explosives 
factories,  all  new  installations  (whatever  type  they 
are)  require  a  safety  report  to  obtain  the 
authorization to operate. 
FRG  Yes.  See  Annex  2. 
GR  No. 
IR  No. 
I  There are two  exceptions: 
- Plants  indicated  in  Art.  2,  point  5  of  Seveso 
Directive. 
- Cases  where  an  accident  happens,  for  which  a  safety 
report is required. 
L  Not applicable. 
RL  Yes  for P.A. 
No  for  ESR. 
P  No. 
UK  No. 
2.3 2. 4.  Are  there  special  safety  report  obligations  for  the 
activities  concerning  interface  between  transport  and 
storage/processing facilities;  i.e.  is  a  safety report 
required  for  dock  installations  or  other  loading 
/unloading stations? 
B  (ML)  For  loading  and  unloading  installations  related  with 
plants  subjected  to  the  Directive,  the  manufacturer 
must  indicate what preventive measures  he  has  taken. 
DK  Yes.  If the facility is close to the  factory  or within 
the  area  of  the  factory  there  exist  the  obligation  to 
include  it  in  the  Safety  Report.  If  the  facility  is 
some  Km  far,  it is  not  required  its  inclusion  in  the 
Safety  Report,  but it is covered  by  Art.  3  & 4  of  the 
Directive.  In  any  case  the  facility  is  subjected  to 
inspection.  (The  Directive  is  not  clear  about  the 
border  line:  500  m.  is the  considered distance).  Ships 
are  not  covered.  Transport  means  outside  the  area  of 
the factory are covered by other regulations. 
E  No.  They  are considered part of  the  installations  and 
must  be  included in the safety report. 
There are special regulations for  loading and unloading 
of hazardous materials in docks. 
F  France  recognizes  the  risks  connected  with  sites which 
are  still  belonging  to  the  "transport"  regulations, 
whereas  they  constitute  a  kind  of  storage  area. 
However,  at  the  moment  only  loading/unloading 
facilities  connected  with  fixed  installations  are 
included  within  the  safety  study  of  such  connected 
installations.  storage  installations  are  also  included 
upon  some  thresholds. 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  Terminals are included. 
IR  No.  If  dock  installations  are  an  integral  part  of  a 
major  hazard  installation  the  safety  report  would  be 
expected to deal  fully with  them  in the context of  the 
site. 
If  a  jetty  is  in  the  vicinity  we  would  expect  the 
occupier  to  address  it in  the  same  way  as  other  off-
site hazards. 
2.4 
.. . I  Yes.  The  transport  activities  functionally  connected 
with  the  installations  are  included  in  the  Safety 
Report.  In general,  Italy is considering the  problem  Of 
transport  (pipelines,  marshalling  yards)  to  be  not 
sufficiently covered by existing regulations. 
L  Hazards  inherent to storage  stations  are  integrated  in 
safety reports. 
NL  Yes.  Docking  and  loading/unloading  activities  fall 
under  requirements  of  the  Nuisance  Act,  and  thus  under 
the  major  hazards  regulation.  An  ESR  is  required  for 
the  major  ones. 
P  No.  However  if they  belong to  industrial  installations 
subjected to the Directive,  they must  be  considered in 
the safety report for that plant. 
UK  No.  Not  explicity  but  as  these  interfases  and 
operations  are  likely  sources  and  causes  of  major 
accidents,  they must  be  dealt with  in detail  under  the 
requirements  of  Paras  5  (a),  5  (b)  and  5  (c)  of 
Schedule  6. 
2.5 3.  INSTALLATIONS  VS  SITE  RELATED  EXTERNAL  HAZARDS 
3 .1.  Do  you  require  that  a  special  analysis  is  devoted  to 
external hazards  possibly having  a  heavy  impact  on  the 
installation? 
B  (ML)  Yes. 
DK  Yes.  External  hazards  shall  be  assessed  in  accordance 
with Art.  3  & 4. 
We  are preparing guidelines  for the manufacturer  on  how 
to prepare the Safety Reports. 
Anyway,  for  particular  aspects,  the  manufacturer  may 
get advice  from the authority. 
E  Yes.  Safeguard  procedures  to  avoid  intrusion  are 
required as  a  part of the safety report. 
Some  external  hazards  have  to  be  considered  (flooding, 
etc.). Aircraft impact analysis is not required. 
F  Yes.  Even  if  the  term  "special"  is  not  applicable, 
indeed  all  external  hazards  (technical  and  natural  ) 
having  impact  on  the  installations  are  normally  to  be 
identified  and  analysed  in  the  safety  report  (a  SMHV 
chart for  France  has  been  made  available). 
FGR  Yes.  It is part of the safety report. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  No.  We  do  require  however  that patent off-site hazards 
be  addressed  in  terms  of  their  possible  impact  on  the 
site  •  (c.f.  5th Schedule  5  (a)  ). 
I  Yes.  In  the  D.P.C.M.  31/3/89  the  analyses  to  identify 
external risks to installations are indicated. 
Inspectors  may  ask  additional  analysis  during  safety 
report review. 
L  No. 
HL  Yes. 
p  No.  Not  being  considered  as  a  special  analysis,  it is 
required a  description of  the external  hazards  coming 
from  other  industrial  units,  transport  structures, 
natural  characteristics  of  the  site,  sabotage  or 
vandalism acts. 
UK  No.  But  the  report  for  the  installation  must  address 
all relevant external hazards. 3.2. Seismic hazards 
3. 2. 1.  If  a  seismic  site is  concerned,  do  you  establish 
the  seismic  parameters  against  which  the  installation 
must be safely designed? 
B  (ML)  No. 
DK  No.  Not  relevant  for  Denmark,  because  the  probability 
E 
is low  (10  -6  10  -7  ). 
Yes.  Seismic  analysis  is required.  Installlations  must 
be  designed  according  to  antiseismic  construction 
national standards. 
F  It  is  duty  of  the  plant  owner  to  ask  the  BRGH 
(Institute for  Geology  and Mining Research)  for getting 
the  seismic  parameters  applicable  to  the  site  and  the 
corresponding  construction  rules.  The  manufacturer  has 
to demonstrate that these rules are respected. 
FGR  Yes.  See  Nl  3.2.4.2.C)  Jrd.  line of  S.  G.  A.  R. 
GR  Construction  must  be  made  according  to  seismic 
regulations. 
IR  No.  This is not seen as  a  problem in Ireland. 
I  Yes.  They  are  established  according  to  the  national 
norms  for building construction. 
L  No.  Luxembourg  is not situated in  a  seismic  zone. 
NL  Seismic hazards are irrelevant for Netherlands. 
p 
UK 
No.  But  it  is  required  to  demonstrate  that 
legislation  on  the  subject  has  been  met  (Law 
of  31st May  ) . 
current 
235/83 
No.  But  the  report  should  address  relevant  issues  and 
show  that  the  installation  design,  construction  and 
operation are adequate  for the seismic hazard. 
Standard  methodologies  and  guidence  texts  are 
acknowledged  for the assessment of seismic hazards  as  a 
function  of  the  location of the site in the  UK  and  the 
local geological conditions. 
3.2 
..  .. .•  .. 
3. 2. 2.  If  yes,  which  are  the  criteria  adopted  for 
assigning the relevant parameters? 
(If published rules exist please provide a  copy). 
B  (ML)  Not  applicable .. 
DK  Not  applicable. 
E .  There  are  no  general  rules.  They  depend  on  specific 
site characteristics  . 
F  Design  reference  is  the  SMHV  (  Earthquake  Historical 
Maximally  Probable  )  +  1  (a  step  superior  to  the 
maximun  recorded),  called SMS.  But all elements  must  be 
searched  for  by  the  manufacturer.  Even  existing plants 
are being checked against earthquakes. 
FRG  They  are established in  DIN  4149,  part  1  (April  1981). 
The  existing plants are being reviewed according to the 
norms. 
GR  No  answer. 
IR  Not  applicable. 
I  National territory is devided  in seismic  zones  to which 
different parameters are assigned. 
L  Not  applicable. 
NL  Not  applicable. 
P  Not  applicable. 
UK  See previous  answer. 
3.3 3.2.3.  In  addition to fix  the  parameters,  do  you  favour 
particular methodologies for  a  seismic safety analysis? 
If yes,  please indicate them. 
B  (ML)  Not  applicable. 
DK  Not  applicable. 
E  Yes.  They are included in the Antiseismic standards. 
F  No  particular methodology  is  favoured,  but  for  serious 
cases in depth analyses are requested. 
BRMG  or  CEA  has  been  asked  to perform  special  studies, 
for  instance,  dynamical  stress  analysis  of  double 
containment of very toxic substances  (phosgene). 
FRG  No. 
GR  No  answer. 
IR  Not  applicable. 
I  No.  Inspectors  may  require  the  application  of 
particular  methodologies  for  seismic  analysis,  during 
the safety review. 
L  Not  applicable. 
NL  Not  applicable. 
P  No.  However,  possibilities of seismic occurrence has to 
be  hypothised when  analysing likely accident scenarios. 
UK  See  above,  but  in  addition  any  methodologies  may  be 
used  provided  they  are  transparent  to  the  competent 
authority. 
3.4 ..  . 
3. 2. 4.  If,  at  the  time  being,  you  do  not  require  any 
seismic analysis,  are you planning it for the future? 
B  (ML)  No. 
DK  Not  applicable. 
E  Not  applicable. 
F  Not  applicable. 
FRG  Not  applicable. 
GR  For the time being,  no  planning is possible. 
IR  Not  applicable. 
I  Not  applicable.  Italy  is  reviewing  the  geological 
mapping  (  Law  305,  28  August  1989  ) 
L  No. 
NL  Not  applicable. 
P  No. 
UK  Not  explicitly,  but  see previous  answers . 
3.5 3.3. Aircraft crash hazard. 
3.3.1.  Under which circumstances do  you require taking 
into account for aircraft crash hazards? 
B  (ML)  Aircraft crash hazards  should be considered in the 
DK 
general  context  of  off-site hazards.  An  aircraft crash 
on  a  process  plant  is  normally  very  unlikely  in 
Belgium. 
If the plant is situated near  a  landing corridor. 
E  It is not considered in any case. 
F  The  owner  has  to  study  the  level  of  probability  of  a 
plane accident and  justify his calculations. 
Whatever  the  level  is,  he  must  evaluate  the 
consequences  of  such  an  accident  destruction:  of  the 
biggest vessel,  biggest storage tank fire,  etc. 
In case the probabilistic level be significant,  he  must 
study the ways  to protect the installations. 
FGR  Air  traffic  as  a  source  of  danger  can,  as  a  rule,  be 
neglected  if the installation is located: 
near airports outside the  approach  zone  (Article 
12,  para  1,  Nl  5  LuftVG+)  or  outside  the  approach 
sector,  but  less  than  4  km.  from  the  beginning  of 
the  runway or 
in  the  case  of  landing  grounds  outside  a  sector 
of  75  m.  on  both  sides  of  the  axis  of  the  landing 
strip  at  the  beginning  of  the  landing  strip,  and 
within  a  sector of  225  m.  on  both  sides  of  the  axis 
of  the  landing strip at  a  distance  of  1.5.  km.  from 
the  beginning  of  the  landing  strip,  unless 
particular  conditions  are  giving  rise  to  an 
increased  hazard  rate  (e.g.  obstacles  to  aire 
traffic in the vicinity of the airport.) 
+)  LuftVG  = Air Traffic Act. 
GR  No  answer. 
IR  Aircraft  crash  hazards  should  be  addressed  in  the 
general context of off-site hazards. 
I  Whether  the  factory  is  below  a  flight  landing/taking 
off corridor. 
3.6 
..  .. 
..  .. ..  .. 
L  Aircraft crash hazard is not considered. 
NL  Whether  the  factory  is  below  a  flight  landing/taking 
off corridor.  (Military flights are included) 
P  When  it is considered pertinent  (  near airports or air 
corridors  ). 
UK  Their  relevance  should  always  be  considered  in  a  SR: 
consequential  action  is  a  function  of  the  probability 
of incident,  and the potential effectiveness of counter 
or mitigating measures . 
3.7 3.3.2.  In the case you require aircraft crash analysis,  do 
you  provide  the  owner  with  relevant  data  and 
guidance notes? 
B  (ML)  No. 
DK  Yes.  Riso  has  developed  a  specific  methodology  for 
assessing the aircraft crashing probability.  In case of 
request  of  such  analysis,  we  supply  the  manufacturer 
with the methodology and relevant data. 
Until  now  no  requests of this type  have  been made. 
E  Not  applicable. 
F  Data must  be  provided by the owner. 
A  technical  office  in  France  (DRAC  Delegation 
Regional  de !'Aviation Civile)  can  furnish  them  . 
The  manufacturer  has  to  calculate  the  probability  of 
accidents. 
FGR  It is the owner's responsibility. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  No.  The  owner  is  responsible  for  acqu1r1ng  relevant 
data,  establishing and  justifying methodologies. 
I  No.  It  is  not  generally  requested.  A  case  by  case 
approach is used .. 
Inspectors  may  ask  for  an  analysis  during  the  safety 
review. 
L  Not  applicable. 
NL  Yes.  If  relevant,  local  authorities  supply  the 
necessary  data  obtained  from  the  National  Air  Traffic 
Control  Service,  and  expertise  available  at  some  few 
specialized groups like TNO. 
P  No  answer. 
UK  No.  Not  directly,  but  HSE  and  others,  including  SRD, 
publish  limited  guidence  on  aircraft  strike  rates  and 
on methodologies  for assessing aircraft risks. 
3.8 ..  .. 
3.3.3  Do  regulations exist which  impede civil or military 
flight-corridors over particularly hazardous sites, 
once these hazards  have been  identified  after  a 
safety report? 
B  (ML)  No. 
DK  Yes,  for nuclear facilities. 
No,  for  industrial facilities. 
We  have  never had  an experience of this type. 
However,  in case  of  accident  in  a  factory,  the  airport 
is warned. 
E  Not applicable, 
F  Presently,  a  discussion is pending regarding how  to lay 
down  a  particular  chart  for  regulating  the  problem. 
Several  plants  have  been  already  noticed  on  aeronautic 
maps  with  a  cross,  mentioning  forbiden  places.  This 
will  applay  to  low  altitude  flights,  e.g.  turistic 
ones.  For commercial  flights the proximity of  landing 1 
taking off corridors will be taken into account. 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  Yes.  Under  the  Air  Navigation  and  Transport  Act  1936 
the  Department  of  Tourism  and  Transport  can  create  an 
exclusion  zone  over any premises. 
overflights  have  been  prohibited  over  certain 
installations  using this  legislation.  However  this  has 
so  far  been  on  an  ad  hoc  basis  and  has  not  been 
formally  related  to  plant  safety  reports  wich  are  a 
relatively  new  requirement.  However  if  it  becomes 
apparent  in  the  light  of  a  safety  report  that  air 
traffic  poses  a  particular  hazards  to  a  specific 
installation it is foreseen that steps will be taken to 
create an  exclusion  zone. 
I  See  answers to item 3.3.2. 
L  No. 
RL  Yes,  very  complex  flight  regulations  do  exist  which 
consider  the  problems  put  by  hazardous  sites.  These 
regulations  obviously  control  low-altitude  both 
military  and  civil  flights,  and  is  respected  even  by 
NATO  aircrafts  • 
P  No.  However  technical  authority  for  serious  industrial 
risks,  after the analysis of safety reports may  propose 
pertinent legislation. 
3.9 UK  No.  But  administrative  arrangements  exist  in  certain 
cases  to  restrict  or  prevent  over-flying.  Such 
arrangements  are  rarely  the  direct  result  of  the 
preparation of the  SR. 
3.10 
:. : 
3 • 4 •  other natural hazards  • 
Do  you  require  analysis  and  protection  against  other 
natural  site-dependent  risks  (e.g.  flooding,  tornado, 
extreme  meteorological  conditions,  lightning, 
electroaagnetic perturbations, etc.  ) ? 
B  (ML)  Yes. 
DK  Yes.  The decision is taken by the local inspectors. 
When  needed  the  manufacturer  is asked  to consider  such 
risks  and  to  describe  in  detail  the  safety  measures 
taken. 
E  No.  There  exists  only  general  normative  for 
construction.  No  specific analysis are required,  except 
data  for  flooding  and  extreme  meteorological 
conditions. 
F  Yes,  for  all  hazards  applicable  to  the  site. 
Information  for  plant  owners  is  available  from 
"Meteorologie  National  ",  where  they  can  extract 
extreme  natural  conditions  for  external  hazards 
evaluations. 
FRG  Conditions  or  events  that  are  due  to  natural  site 
characteristics shall include: 
- flooding,  flood  waves  or  tidal  waves  if  the 
installation  is  located  in  an  area  which,  as 
several years of experience have  shown,  may  be  deemed 
to be endangered 
landslides  or  subsidence  if  the  installation  is 
located in a  mining area 
- earthquakes  if  the  installation  is  located  in  a 
seismic  area  as  defined  in  DIN  4149,  Part  1  of  April 
1981. 
GR  Not  applicable. 
IR  Yes. The  owner  would  be  expected  to  address  the  impact 
of  natural  hazards  on  the  site.  For  example  flooding 
would  have to be  addressed if the location was  prone to 
flooding. 
I  Yes.  Only  information regarding protection is required, 
without establishing specific methods  of analysis. 
Along  the  safety  review  period,  this  analysis  may  be 
required. 
L  No. 
3.11 NL  Yes,  specially  flooding  and  geological  risks 
(foundations instability)  which are peculiar NL  risks. 
P  Yes. 
UK  Yes.  The  depth  of  the  investigation  and  the  extent  of 
the  precautions  required  are  functions  of  the 
likelihood  of  the  event  (s)  and  the  magnitude  of  the 
potential  consequences.  Source  data  and  methodologies 
used  in an assessment must  be  adequatly referenced. 
3.12 ..  .. 
.  .. 
; 
3.5.  Do  you  ask  for  special  security  requireaents  against 
externally induced sabotage? 
B  (ML)  No.  Anyway  the  plant  owner  must  take  measures  to 
interdict the entrance in hazardous units to all people 
that do not  work  in these areas. 
DK  Yes,  if necessary.  See  3.4. 
This risk from  sabotage is not  a  priori excluded. 
Generally,  if the plant is very dangerous  and  something 
can be done,  we  ask the manufacturer to do it  • 
E  Yes.  There  are  specific  regulations  for  public 
refineries. 
They will be applied to private refineries and later on 
to other industrial sectors. 
F  In  the  safety  report  general  measures  are  described 
without giving details. It depends  on the risk. 
As  far  as  LPG  structures  are  concerned,  there  may  be 
requirements  for  resistance  to  external  impacts, 
equivalent  to  bazooka  shots.  Further  information  can 
be obtained by the inspectors. 
FRG  Yes.  "Unauthorized  persons"  shall  be  deemed  to  be 
especially those  persons  who  acquire  illegal  access  to 
the area of the installation. 
Dangers  caused  by  persons  who  act  on  the  installation 
from  outside  with  the  intention  to  destroy  shall  only 
be considered if the parts of the installation that are 
of  significance  from  a  technical  safety standpoint are 
particularly accessible to such actions. 
GR  No. 
IR  No.  A  reasonable  general  level  of  security is expected 
appropriate to the  nature  of  the  installation.  However 
specific  precautions  against  guerrilla  attack  are  not 
sought. 
I  Only  general  information  in  the  safety  report.  Alonq 
inspection  period,  detailed  information  may  be  asked 
for. 
L  No • 
RL  Yes.  But these are not contained in the safety reports, 
since all this  information  is secret,  known  however  by 
all  relevant  authorities  (specially  by  secret 
services). 
P  Yes. 
3.13 UK  No.  Site  security  is  however  1  to  be  addressed  I  where 
relevant in a  SR. 
·-
3.14 
.  .. 3.6.  For  an  installation  within  the  ranqe  of  fire, 
explosion,  missile  hazards  provoked  by  nearby 
installations  of  different  owners,  shall  the  safety 
report take account of such risks? 
Who  is  responsible  for  assiqninq  the  relevant  input 
data to the owner so that he can adequately analyse the 
risk induced by such external activities? 





the  Seveso  Directive,  within  the  notification dossier, 
must  identify  the  hazards  provoked  by  the  nearby 
installations.  It  may  happen  indeed  that  on  a  same 
site,  installations·  are  exploited  by  different 
manufacturers. 
If a  manufacturer plans to install a  new activity or to 
modify  an  existing  installation  and  this  may  increase 
the risk,  he is obliged to submit his plant to a  permit 
application  according  to  the  regulations  on  classified 
installations.  During  the  public  inquiry,  all  the 
interested parties  have  the  possibility to consult  the 
dossier  and  therefore  have  access  to  the  information 
concerning  the  risk  of  nearby  installations.  In  the 
praxis there is a  good  cooperation in Belgium  among  the 
manufacturers  interested  by  the  Seveso  Directive  to 
exchange  information. 
Yes.  The  owner  in collaboration with the Authorities. 
Yes.  Domino  effects  must  be  considered  among  these 
different plants,  even  though not  enough  experience  on 
the subject is available. 
The  Competent  Regional  Authorities  are  responsible  of 
information flow regarding this subject. 
Yes.  Even risks induced by transport activities outside 
the  establishment  have  to  be  taken  into  account 
(pipelines,  trucks,  ships,  railways,  etc.) 
The  owner  of  nearby  installations  gives  the  necessary 
information.  In  case  of  difficulties  the  Prefect  can 
facilitate  the  exchange  of  relevant  information.  The 
Prefect is in fact  aware  of  the situation through  the 
declaration and notification procedures. 
Yes,  according to the following criteria. 
a)  Not  only  immediately  adjoining  installations 
shall  be  regarded  as  danger  sources,  but  also 
installations  at  a  greater  distance  if  the 
installation  under  review  is  within  the  danger 
zone of any of these installations. 
Only  such  installations  shall  be  deemed  to  fall 
under  this  category  which  may  cause  danger 
3.15 through  explosion,  vibrations  or  the  release  of 
acutely toxic subtances. 
b)  Neighbouring  transport  facilities  (road, 
railway,  water)  shall  be  considered  as  sources  of 
danger if the increased risk is due to the traffic 
conditions  in  the  vicinity  of  -the  installation 
(e.g.  traffic  de.nsi  ty,  traffic  routes,  type  · of 
transports,  weather  conditions) . These  conditions 
are,  as  a  rule,  fulfilled in the following cases: 
- fuel or gas wharfs at Federal waterways, 
- shunting stations for tank wagons, 
- traffic areas of large-scale fuel  depots 
or corresponding filling stations, 
- internal roads,  including access roads 
where  flammable  gases or liquids are 
transported and  loaded or unloaded. 
Data collection is the plant owner's responsibility. 
GR  There  are  problems  to be  solved  by  legislation,  but it 
is  possible  to  make  an  extended  use  of  existing 
legislation to force  something. 
IR  Yes.  The  safety  report  is  expected  to  address  patent 
off-site hazards. 
There  is  no  mechanism  for  the  provision  of  relevant 
information to manufacturers  by their neighbours  unless 
the  sites  are  subject  to  Article  5.  Again  the  problem 
arises due  to  a  deficiency  in the  Directive  which  does 
not deal explicitly with  'domino effects'. 
There  is  no  problem  if  both  sites  are·  subject  to 
Article 5. 
(c.f.  Schedule  5,  5(a)). 
I  No.  Only  information  is  required.  Competent  Authority 
may  require  a  safety  report  for  the  whole  area  (Art. 
12,  point  3d in D.P.R.  175/1988). 
L  Yes.  Auditory organizations are involved in this task. 
NL  Normally  this  information  is  given  by  the  responsible 
owners:  until  now  no  difficulty  has  appeared.  In  any 
case  the  Ministry  would  have  the  possibility  to 
intervene heavily. 
P  Yes. 
UK  Yes.  In the first instance,  it is for the owner to seek 
to obtain the requisite data from his neighbours. 
Under  section  3  of  the  HSW  Act  1974  there is a  general 
3.16 
; "  "' 
public  and  neighbours  etc.  This  includes  cooperating 
with each other in the provision of information,  and it 
is this duty which will be used to modify regulation  12 
of  the  CIMAH  regulations  to  incorporate  item  (k)  of 
Annex  B of directive 88/610/EEC. 
3.17 .. 
- .. 
..  . 
4.  INSTALLATION  DESCRIPTION 
A  safety report can  be  assessed only if the  concerned 
installation is carefully described with respect to its 
production/storage  activity,  its  interrelations  with 
the site,  and the overall organization for  safety.  The 
amount  of  information  that •ay  be  required  can differ 
substantially in ter.s of extent and detail. 
The  questions  laid  down  in  the  following  cannot  be 
considered to be exhaustive. 
If you require further information fro• the plant owner 
please describe it at the end of this section. 
Do  you require information on  : 
4 .1. ownership  and  links  with  mother  and  associated 
co•panies? 
B  {ML)  Yes. 
DK  No. 
E  Yes. 
F  Yes,  but not too detailed. 
FRG  Yes.  The  responsibility  for  plant  operation  has  to  be 
stated in the safety report. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  No. 
I  Yes.  One  objective will be the promotion of  research of 
new  technologies  in  less  dangerous  process  to  limit 
environmental  hazards. 
L  Yes. 
NL  Yes,  for both ESR  and  OSR. 
P  No.  It is possible to know  it informally. 
UK  No.  Many  of  the  companies  submitting  reports  will  be 
national,  international or well  know  local firms. 
These  details  will  generally  be  known  from  other 
inspection contacts with them. 4.2. Managerial and safety responsibilities? 
B  (ML)  Yes. 
DK  Yes. 
(for 
Name  of  persons  responsible  for  the  plant safety 
major accidents)  and organization. 
E  Yes. 
F  Yes,  with the description of the organization. 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  Yes. 
I  Yes.  A  detai1ed  scheme  regarding  hierarchical 
organization and responsabilities is required. 
L  Yes. 
NL  Yes,  for  PA/ESR  and very detailed into OSR. 
P  Yes.  The  general  organigram  of  the  company  and  the 
safety organigram are required,  including a  description 
of  attributions  and  responsibilities  of  different 
hierarchical levels. 
UK  Yes.  These are-specified in para  4  of schedule 6. 
4.2 
- . .  .. 
4.3. Updating of these responsabilities in time? 
B  (ML)  Yes. 
DK  Yes.  Only  if  the  organization  structure  significantly 
changes or,  regularly,  every  5  years. 
The  information  on  the  organization  is  also  required 
when: 
1)  an accident occurs; 
2)  a  new  know  - how  is introduced; 
3)  the potential hazard of the plant is increased. 
E  Yes.  When  responsibles  are  changed,  data  must  be 
updated. 
F  Yes.  Any  time  that  the  onsite  emergency  plan  has 
important  modifications  (and  responsibility  sharing  is 
an  important  one)  this  shall  be  communicated  to  the 
Prefect. 
But the responsabilities in front of the law remains 
on the director of the site. 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  Yes.  Safety cases have to be updated every three years. 
If  any  event  we  would  expect  all  organization  charts, 
job descriptions etc.  referenced in the notification to 
be updated on  an ongoing basis. 
I  Yes.  Every  3  years whether there are no modifications. 
L  Yes.  Auditory  organizations  perfom  periodic  safety 
audits to update respective responsibilities. 
HL  Yes,  in OSR  (a copy of which is supplied also to VROM). 
P  Yes. 
UK  Yes.  As  requied by  CIMAH  regulation 8;  other than this, 
current  information  is  collected  and  recorded  during 
normal  inspection  work  and  from  updating  on-and-off 
site emergency plans. 
4.3 4.4.  Composition  and expertise of the  team having  performed 
the safety reports? 
B  (ML)  Yes. 
DK  Yes.  The  factory  itself  shall  be  directly  involved  in 
working out safety reports,  according to the guidelines 
supplied by the authorities. 
E  Yes.  Personal references and experience are required as 
well as responsible signing. 
F  No.  In  reality  the  full  responsibility  is  put  to  the 
manufacturer,  even though the "ltude de danger  "  can  be 
done  by consultants. 
The  inspectors  tend  to  increase  the  awareness  of  the 
manufacturer in safety matters,  to encourage  keeping of 
historical  records  of  the  reasons  why  particular 
devices  do  exist  in  the  plant,  to  increase 
participation of  industry personnel  in  the  preparation 
of the safety report. 
FRG  Yes.  No  special  requirements.  But  generally  the  large 
company  performs the safety report by itself. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  Not  specifically  but  our  inspectors  would  monitor  the 
calibre  of  those  persons  involved  in  drawing  up  the 
document.  Regulation  14  provides  that when  the  Central 
Competent  Authority  is  not  satisfied  with  the 
competence  of  those  who  draw  up  a  report  the 
manufacturer may  be required to have  a  new·report drawn 
up  at  his  own  expense  by  a  person  nominated  by  the 
Authority. 
I  Yes. 
L  Yes.  In the case of  Article 5,  this study is performed 
by  an specialized organization. 
NL  No  particular requirements.  However  this information is 
known  because of existing collaborations. 
For  ESR  there is no  preference. 
For  OSR  it  is  preferred  to  be  compiled  by  company 
personnel and not by consultants. 
P  No. 
4.4 
.  . UK  No.  It is prefered that the  company  does  it and  to  be 
closely  involved if consultants are  employed  such that 
the  report  becomes  transparent to the  company,  so that 
it understands  implications for safety management  (Para 
1.1.4 of  HS  (R)12). 
4.5 4.5. Siting of the installation,  which  demonstrates  how  the 
owner  is aware  of  natural  or  human  induced risks  from 
outside the establishment? 
B  (ML)  Yes.A map  is required. 
DK  Yes.  A  map  is required,  with  a  scale  depending  on  the 
type of the plant and of the accident. 
E  Yes. 
F  Yes.  In  particular,  the  risks  of  flooding,  sliding, 
other plants,  transport of dangerous materials,  etc  •. 
FRG  Yes.  See section 3  of this questionnaire. 
GR  Yes,  for natural events. 
For  industrial  risks  a  legislation  step  needs  to  be 
implemented. 
In  emergency  plans  agreement  for  mutual  aids  is 
required. 
IR  Yes. 
I  Yes. 
L  Yes.  Analysed by  a  designated organization. 
HL  Yes. 
P  Yes. 
UK  Yes.  This  is  specified  in  Para  3  (a) ·Schedule  6. 
However  in  general  the  emphasis  is  on 
assessment of hazard arising on the installation on  the 
environs rather than vice-versa. 
4.6 
.  .,. ,.  .. 
..  .. 
4.6. Sitinq  of  the  installation  with  respect  to  the 
neiqhbourinq land use? 
B  (ML)  Yes.  A map  is required  (refer to 4.5.). 
DK  Yes. 
E  Yes.  A  map  is  required  containing  the  following 
information  within  a  distance  of  10  km  : 
- Installation perimeter; 
- forests or green areas; 
- lakes and rivers; 
- farms; 
- other residencial,  industrial,  recreative or 
commercial  installations; 
- transport lines; 
- land use  in a  radius of  5  km; 
hunting and fishing activities in the area; 
- water sources siting,  nature and uses. 
• 
F  Yes.  Specially  regarding  land  planning  to  avoid  new 
houses  around the  plant. 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  Yes. 
I  Yes. 
L  Yes.  For  new  installations,  separation  distances  are 
defined.  For  existing  facilities,  negotiations  are 
foreseen  with  responsibles  for  national  and  regional 
territory disposition. 
HL  Yes,  regarding  population  distribution,  land  use, 
monuments  and  particularly  sensitivity  of  water 
courses,  soil and groundwater to pollution problems. 
P  Yes. 
UK  Yes.  Details are specified in para  3  (e)  of schedule  6. 
In addition HSE  has detailed  knowledge of all existing 
and  proposed  land-uses  in  the  vicinity  of  CIMAH 
installations  because  we  advise  the  Land  Use  Planning 
Authorities  about  the  safety  aspects  of  proposed 
developments • 
4.7 4. 7.  Si  tinq of  the  installation with  respect  to  particular 
ecological protected areas? 
B  (ML)  Yes,  if relevant. 
DK  Yes. 
E  Yes.  Description  of  vegetal  and  animal  life,  habitat 
and  distribution  is  required,  incleding  those  with 
temporal  or  permanent  residence,  their  migration 
periods,  etc. 
Previous  epidemies  or  natural  disasters  that  affected 
such areas  must  be  described,  as  well  as  the  verified 
and/or  foreseen  impact  produced  by  the  installation 
under analysis. 
F  Yes.  Particular ·attention  shall  also  be  given  to  the· 
cultural heritage,  and to the aesthetics. 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  Yes. 
I  Yes.  Only  general  information  is  required.  Inspectors 
may  anyway  ask for it during plant  inspection. 
L  Yes.  Ministry for  Environment  is represented at Seveso 
Interministry Committee. 
NL  Yes. 
P  Yes. 
UK  Yes.  Paras  3  (a)  and  3  (c)  of  schedule  6  are  intended 
to cover the hazards to vulnerable._ ecological areas. 
4.8 
..,  .. 
..  .. : 
.  . 
.  . 
4.8. Siting  ot  the  installation 
•eteorological conditions? 
with  respect  to 




Yes.  Data required are: 
- Annual  frequencies of every meteorological conditiorn 
defined  by  wind  velocity,  wind  direction  and 
atmospheric stability class. 
- Rain  data  with  monthly  rate,  avarage  value  by  month 
and average value for maximum  and minimun monthly rate. 
- Other  natural  phenomena  as  fog,  snow,  etc. ,  with 
monthly rates and averages. 
F  Yes. 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  Yes. 
I  Yes.  See point.  4.7 
L  No. 
NL  Yes. 
p  Yes. 
UK  Yes.  Para  5  (e)  of schedule  6  refers. 
4.9 4.9.  Siting  of  the  installation  with  respect  to 
geological situations? 
B  (ML)  Yes,  if relevant. 











Yes.  Terrain  and  its  surroundings  features  must · be 
described,  including  topography,  statigraphy,  and 
typology of soil and rocks,  enclosing'different maps  in 
adequate  scale.  Acquifiers  in the  area,  until  200  mt., 
will  be  indicated,  including  the  following  data: 
acquifier  flow,  water  properties  and  contaminants,  and 
other acquifier properties. 
Water  courses  in  an  area  of  10  km  will  be  indicated, 
describing  their  main  parameters,  flow  patterns  and 
contaminants. 
Yes.  Specially regarding plant waste discharges. 
Yes.  See  answer to point 3.4. 
Yes. 
Yes. 




Yes.  Paras  3  (a)  and  (e)  of schedule  6  refers. 
4.10 
.  . 
..  .. .  .. 
.. . 
4 .10.  Plan  typology  1  adopted  technology  1  and  design 
standard utilized? 
B  (ML)  Yes.  The  plant  owner  must  specify  which  norms  or 
codes he uses.  Except those established by regulations, 
the  manufacturer  may  use  the  codes  and  norms  he 
prefers.  Anyway  there are certain rules to respect  : 
It is not possible to  ·~  mix  "  the norms . 
- He  must  explain  how  he  treats  the  situations  not 
foreseen in the chosen norm. 
- In case of serious hazards,  an  inspector may  ask for 
some  controls  more  severe  than  those  prescripted 
required by the norms. 
DK  Yes. 
E  No.  Design  characteristics  are  required,  but  not  the 
standards used. 
F  Yes.  There are different legislations which control the 
design standards. 
Inspectors have access to all relevant documentation. 
In  the  safety  report,  reference  has  to  be  made  to  the 
standards  adopted,  and  a  demonstration  has  to be  done 
that  the  best  possible  design  and  process  conditions 
have  been chosen. 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  Section  4b  of  the  5th  Schedule  requires,  inter  alia, 
that the manufacturers provide information to show that 
arrangements are made to ensure that the means  provided 
for  the  safe  operation  of  the  plant  are  adequate.  The 
manufacturer  must  therefore  demonstrate  that 
appropriate  design  standards  have  been  used  and  any 
deviations must be  justified. 
I  Yes.  it is required in detail. 
L  Yes.  There  exist  only  a  general  legislation  regarding 
these  aspects.  According  to  company  convenience, 
normally the design and construction standards  from  the 
company' s  country  are  adopted.  German  standards  are 
prefered  . 
HL  Yes.  All  items must  be described in PA  and  OSR. 
p  Yes. 
UK  Sufficiently  detailed  descriptions  are  required  to 
enable  proper  assessment  of  the  processes  involved  and 
4.11 measures  taken  to  prevent,  control  or  minimise  the 
consequences  of  a  major accident. 
With  standard plants and  common  hazardous  substances it 
may  be sufficient to describe the steps taken to ensure 
that the plant conforms  with  appropriate  standards  eg. 
for  LPG  and  chlorine  conformance  with  HS/G34  and 
HS/G28  respectively  (see  Community  Documentation 
Center  on  Industrial  Risk-CDCIR).  If  the  particular 
plant  differs  from  the  "standard",  then  the  report 
must  contain  technical  justificat'ions  for  these 
variations. 
With  novel plant or with hazardous substances that have 
special problems of containment  eg.  HF,  a  more 
fundamental  series of descriptions are needed including 
descriptions of  the quality control procedures for 
material purchasing and construction. 
4.12 ..  . 
: 
,  .. 
- .. 
4.11.  Specific  arguments  supported  either  by 
calculations  or  experiments  1  for  new  technologies  1 
where  no  previous  history  is  available  and  standards 
are difficult to be applied? 
B  (ML)  Yes . 
DK  Yes.  In case of plants based on  new technologies  we  ask 
for  the  use  of  the  most  safety  and  the  cleanest 
available feasible technology. 
E  No. 
F  Yes.  Examples  already exist for cases in which specific 
requests  have  been  made.  These  can  also  be  requested 
through the legislation on pressure vessels.  Inspectors 
have access to the results of any test or calculations. 
FGR  Yes. 
GR  Yes,  in the near future. 
IR  Yes. 
I  Yes  (some clarifications are expected)  • 
L  Not applicable.  Storage installations in Luxembourg  may 
be considered of standard type. 
HL  Yes.  This  is  the  reason  why  P.A.  is  particularly 
difficult for  new  kinds  of  plants.  Since  the  owner  is 
obliged to supply very extensive documentations  for the 
processes,  he  is  allowed  to  give  certain  information 
under  "secret restrictions":  this will  be  not  included 
into the public reports. 
P  Yes.  It is  always  possible  to  ask  new  information  to 
the manufacturer. 
UK  Yes.  For  example  assumptions  made  in  scaling  up  from 
laboratory  reactions  to  production  scale.  The  report 
must  show  competency  in  the  application  of  predictive 
assessments  and engineering  judgement. 
4.13 4.12.  Plan layout description 
B  (ML)  Yes. 
DK  Yes.  The  layout  of the  whole plant is required. 
E  Yes.  A  plan  with  scale  between  1/500  and  1/5000. is 
required,  containing: 
- Reception and dispatching areas. 
- Possible ignition sources. 
Pipe bridges and  pipe racks. 
- Storage areas and vessels. 
- Process  and auxiliary units. 
- Drainage  and sewers. 
- Plant accesses. 
- Natural  and artificial barriers. 
Partial  plans  are  also  required  for  storage  areas  and 
process units. 
F  Yes. 
FRG  Yes.  See  DIN  28004,  part.1 
The  description  of  the  installation shall  contain  data 
on  the  plant  and  equipment  required  for  operation 
including  ancillary  units  and  equipment  which  must  be 
constructed,  installed and operated on near-by premises 
for  reasons  of  process  technology;  it shall  be  deemed 
irrelevant  whether  the  technical  plant  and  equipment 
was  licensed by  one or several  notifications. 
Location 
The  description  of  the  installation shall  contain data 
on  the  location  of  the  installation  and  of  the 
individual parts of the installation,  especially: 
site survey 
spacing  of  the  individual  parts  of  the 
installation; 
delimitation towards other installations; 
- spacing with  regard to other  installations  and 
buildings; 
distances from traffic routes; 
use  of  the  areas  within  the  danger  zone 
around  the· installation which  is permissible 
according  to  the  development  plan  and  actual 
use  of  the  areas  within  the  danger  zone 
around the installation; 
other  special site characteristics as  far  as 
4.14 
.  ., 
..  .. .  . 
:: 
the required information is accessible to the operator 
without unreasonable expenditure. 
This  documentation  shall,  to  the  extent  possible, 
consist of drawings. 
Structural  characteristics  and  design  data  of  the 
individual parts of the installation 
The  description of  the  installation shall  contain  data 
on the structural characteristics and·on the lay-out of 
the individual parts of the installation,  especially: 
- materials  used,  as.  far  as  they  are  of  significance 
from  a  technical  safety  standpoint  (for  example  with 
regard to corrosion resistance and strength); 
design  data  (e.g.  working  pressure,  operating 
temperatures,  volumes); 
- scaffolding and desing of  load-bearing parts; 
- foundation; 
- heights of buildings; 
- size of storage and collection facilities; 
- static  stability  (static  calculations  and  data  on 
soil mechanics). 
Protective  zones 
Protective zones or any other special  zonings,  e.g.  for 
areas  with  an  explosion  hazard,  protective  or  safety 
spacing,  etc.  shall  be  indicated  as  far  as  they  are 
already existing or envisaged in the installation or in 
its  ·surroundings  or  required  because  of  technical 
safety standards. 
Accessibility of the installation 
The  description of  the  installation shall  contain  data 
on  the  accessibility  of  the  installation,  especially 
on: 
- the escape routes within the installations; 
- its connection to traffic routes  ; 
- the  traffic  routes in the vicinity which  may 
be of  significance  for  rescue  and  salvage 
operations. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  Yes.  It is required  a  map  of  the establishment  and  its 
surrounding  area  to  a  scale  large  enough  to  show  any 
features  that  may  be  significant  in  the  assessment  of 
the hazard or risk associated with the establishment. 
Besides,  a  scale  plan  of  the  establishment  showing  the 
locations and quantities of all significant inventories 
4.15 of the dangerous  substances. 
I  Yes.  It is required in detail. 
L  Yes.  it is required in detail. 
HL 
p 
Yes.  However  P  & I  diagrams  only  for  crucial  parts  in 
ESR,  for which the complete design must be  finalized at 
P.A.  time.  Most  of  ·p  &  I  diagrams  are  certainly 
included into the OSR. 
Yes.  Description must  contain  enough  information  and  a 
degree  of  detail  sufficient  for  the  authority  to 
understand measures  adopted by the manufacturer. 
UK  Yes.  Paras  3  (b)  and  5  (b)  of Schedule  6  refer. 
4.16 
; 
.  . 4.13.  Main processes and mass balances? 
B  (ML)  Yes. 
DK  Yes.  We  may  also  ask  for  mass  balances,  when  the 
understanding  of  the  process  to  a  sufficient  level 
requires it. 
E  Yes. 
F  Yes. 
FRG  Yes.  The description of the process used shall indicate 
the technical purpose of the installation. 
Basic features of the process used 
The  description · of  the  process  used  shall  include  a 
description of  the  operational  steps  required to  serve 
the purpose of the operation,  especially: 
basis operations; 
chemical  and  physical  conversions  and 
transformations; 
on-site interim storage; 
- discharge,  retention,  re-use  and  recycling 
or  disposal  of  residual  substances  and 
wastes; 
discharge and/or treatment of waste gases: 
other  basic  features  of  the  process, 
especially  treatment  and  processing 
operations. 
Process conditions 
The  process  description  shall 
are  of  significance  from  a 
technical  safety  standpoint, 
temperature  ranges  of  the 
process. 
include  the  data  which 
process  technology  and 
e • g •  the  pressure  and 
succesive  step - of  the 
In  addition,  any  specific  precautions  shall  be  stated 
which  must  be  complied  with  during  storage,  transport 
or  handling  because  of  the  specific  substance 
characteristics  (e.g.  protection  from  vibrations  or 
precautions  relating  to  the  state  of  the  ambient  air, 
e.g.  concerning air humidity). 
Description of the process 
Flow sheets containing the information mentioned  in DIN 
28004  Part  1,  June  1977  shall  be  added  to  the 
description of the process. 
4.17 GR 
For  units  of  the  installation or  steps  of  the  process 
which  involve  parts  of  the  installation  that  are 
important  from  a  technical  safety  standpoint,  the 
safety analysis shall also include  a  process  flow sheet 
containing all data mentioned in DIN  28004,Part !,No.5. 
For  the  description  of  individual  parts  of  the 
installation  that  are  of  importance  from  a  technical 
safety standpoint,  a  piping and  instrumentation diagram 
with  information  selected  on  a  case-by-case  basis  in 
accordance  with  DIN  28004  Part  I,·  No.  6,  may  be 
required. 
The  flow  sheets  or  added  tables  shall  in  particular 
contain data on: 
- the  machinery  and  equipment  needed  in  the 
process as well  as the main  flow patterns; 
- energy of energy resource; 
- characteristic  process  conditions,  such  as 
pressure and temperature ranges; 
- dimensions  of the containers and pipes that 
may  contain  substances  under  Annex  II of  the 
Ordinance; 
- characteristic  parameters  of  state for  the 
substances under Annex II of the Ordinance; 
basic  measuring,  control  and  regulating 
requirements. 
The  starting  materials  and  auxiliary  agents  used  as 
well  as  intermediate,  secondary  and  final  products 
shall be given.  The quantities used  and reacting or the 
throughput  shall  be  given  for  the  individual  steps  of 
the process. 
The  residual  substances  shall  be  indicated  as  far  as 
they fall  under  Appendix  II of  the  Ordinance  or as  far 
as  substances falling under Apendix  II of the Ordinance 
may  be  formed  from  them. 
Energy supply 
The  enegy  supply  system  of  the  installation,  including 
the emergency supply system,  shall be  described;  the 
parts  that  may  be  of  importance  for  preventing 
hazardous  incidents or· limiting their effects,  shall be 
marked. 
Yes.  Overall  and  block  diagrams  are  in  report.  More 
extensive  information  must  be  available  to  competent 





.  . ...  ... 
.  . 
IR  Yes.  It is required: 
- a  description  of  the  processes  or  storage  involving 
the  dangerous  substanceand  an  indication  of  the 
conditions under which it is normally held, 
- a  general  description of  the  technological  processes 
used at the establishment. 
I  Yes. 
L  Yes.  There  are  only  storage  stations  at  Luxembourg, 
with the exception of an oxygen plant. 
NL  Yes  in both  ESR  and  OSR.  But  a  special  completeness  is 
presented  by  the  OSR  in  which  all  reactions  (even  the 
side reactions)  are described. 
With  the  information  contained  in  the  OSR  it may  be 
possible to build the plant  !! 
P  Yes,  with sufficient detail  to understand  the  measures 
adopted. 
UK  Yes.Para  3  (c)  of  schedule  6  refers.  The  process 
descriptions  may  be  quite  brief  but  would  include 
reaction  chemistry  and  conditions.  Any  side  reactions 
would  be  described  if  they  could  lead  to  a  major 
accident. 
Process  flow mass  balances would normally be provided  • 
4.19 4.14.  Description and inventory of storage areas? 
B  (ML)  Yes. 
DK  Yes. 
E  Yes.  Detailed plans are required  (scale 1/250 or 1/500). 
Besides,  mechanical  design  specifications  must  be 
detailed  (normal  and  total  volume,  temperature, 
pressure,  dimensions,  materials  and  different  widths, 
heat  transfer  equipment,  safety  valves,  release 
disposal,  etc.). 
F  Yes. 
FRG  Yes.  See answers to points  4.12  and  4.13. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  Yes.  It is required: 
a  scale  plan  of  the  establishment  showing  the 
locations and quantities of all significant inventories 
of the dangerous  substance, 
- a  description  of  the  processes  or  storage  involving 
the  dangerous  substance  and  an  indication  of  the 
conditions under which it is normally held. 
I  Yes. 
L  Yes. 




Yes.  Para  3  (b)  of schedule  6  refers.  The  scale plan of 
the  site  is  asked  for  showing  the  position  and 
inventories  of  dangerous  substances  eg.  in storage,  in 
pipelines or in process.  Loading/unloading in transport 
are  recognised  as  relatively high  risk activities  (see 
answer to 2.4.). 
4.20 
; 
.  .. •  .. 
4 .15.  Orqanization  of  internal  transports  and 
loading/unloadinq facilities with involved substances? 
B  (ML)  Yes. 
DK  Yes • 
E  Yes. 
F  Yes. 
FRG  Yes.  See  answers to points 4.12  and  4.13. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  Yes.  Definition  of  "industrial  activity"  includes 
internal transport. 
I  Yes. 
L  Yes. 
HL  Yes. 
P  Yes. 
UK  Yes.  See  4.14  above. 
4.21 4.16.  Hazardous  potential of substances stored,  processed, 
transported and produced? 
B  (ML)  Yes. 
DK  Yes. 
E  Yes.  Hazardous  substances  related  data  that  are 
required  include  identification  parameters,  general 
properties,  specific properties  for  flammable  or  toxic 
substances,  procedures  for  storage  and  handling, 
emergency procedures in  case of accidental dispersion, 
and/or fire,  neutralization means,  etc. 
F  Yes.  Toxicity and safety data sheets for all substances 
are requested. 
FRG  Yes.  The  information required includes: 
- designation: 
- substance and reaction characteristics: 
- state of the substances: 
- quantities. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  Yes.  It is required: 
a  brief description  of  the  hazards  which  may  be 
created  by  the  substances  including  immediate  and 
delayed effects for man  and for the environment, 
the  chemical  and  physical  behaviour  of  the 
substances  under  normal  conditions  of'  use  in  the 
industrial activity,  and 
any other substances whose presence could have  an 
effect  on  the  potential  hazard  presented  by  the 
industrial activity. 
information  relating  to  situations  where 
substances  may  be  transformed  into  dangerous 
substances  in the  case  of  abnormal  conditions  which 
can be  foreseen. 
I  Yes. 
L  Yes. 
NL  Yes. 
p  Yes. 




...  .. ..  .. 
t 
...  . 
4.17.  Auxiliary services and utilities? 
B  (ML)  Yes. 
DK  Yes.  The  requests  of  information  on  auxiliary  devices 
and utilities depend  on  the  type  and  complexity  of the 
plant.  For  very  simple  plant,  for  instance,  this 
information  is not  required.  The  decision  is  taken  by 
the local authority on request. 
E  Yes. 
F  Yes.  For  their  significant  links  with  environmental 
impact  and risks. 
FRG  Yes.  See  answers to points  4.12  and  4.13. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  Yes. 
I  Yes. 
L  Yes. 
HL  Yes. 
P  Yes. 
UK  Where  relevant in creating any condition or event which 
could  be  significant  in  bringing  about  a  major 
accident.  (See  answers to 1.2 and 1.4). 
4.23 4 .18.  Waste  treataent  and  disposal,  sewer  systeJDS  and 
liquid effluents? 
B  (ML)  Yes. 




Yes,  waste  treatment  and  disposal  have  to  be  described 
to  evaluate  chronic  pollution.  France  also  requires 
information  on  the  confinement  capacity  and  method  of 
treatment  of  polluted  waters  used  for  fire  fighting 
during an accident. 
FRG  Yes.  Waste  treatment and disposal must be described  and 
evaluated.  Even  confinement  capacity  and  method  of 
polluted waters.· 
GR  Yes.  These  aspects  are  normally  controlled  by  the 
Ministry  for  environment  and  also  by  the  Ministry  of 
Health and Agriculture for pesticides. 
IR  Yes.  Where  appropriate. 
This  item  is  particularly  site  dependent  and  we 
envisage  close  liaison  with  local  environment 
authorities in certain cases. 
Yes.  Information  on  plant  facilities  must  be  included 
into the Safety Report.  But the question is principally 
dealt with by other regulations. 
L  Yes.  Cooling of fire fighting waters is considered. 
NL  Yes. 
P  Yes. 
UK  Yes  where  relevant to  an  environmental  major  accident. 
Smaller releases and controlled releases are dealt with 
under  other  legislation  such  as  the  Control  of 
Pollution  Act.  1974,  enforced  by  HM  Pollution 
Inspectorate. 
4.24 
•  .. .  . 
4.19.  Detailed  safety . organization  and  responsibility 
sharing  for  nonaal  and  abnormal  conditions,  for  work 
and :maintenance perai  ts, etc.? 
B  (ML)  Yes. 
DK  Yes. 











Yes.  on  site,  inspectors  have  access  to  operating 
procedures  even  in  normal  operation.  The  problem  of 
work  and  maintenance  permits  (external  companies 
working on the site, possible  communication errors,  no 
awareness  of  the  site  hazards,  etc. )  has  been 
identified as  a  very serious one.  (Lyon  accident,  i.e.) 
However  1  how  to  deal  with  these  problems  in  a  safety 
report is still open to discussion. 
Yes. 
Yes.  There  is  a  legal  obligation  to  nominate  a  safety 




Yes.  Very  detailed  in  OSR,  for  which  guidelines  are 
being finalized.  They will appear in short time. 
Yes.  It  is  required  to  foresee  possible  abnormal 
reactions,  and  to  describe  their  characteristics  and 
control measures  proposed. 
Yes.  Para  4  of schedule  6  refers.  This is considered to 
be  a  most  crucial  part  of  the  safety  report  and 
detailed guidance is also given in Paras  202-207  of  HSR 
21. 
Information  must  be  given  which  details  the  overall 
organization  and  arrangements  for  safety  including 
review  and  revision.  Matters  covered  should  include 
quality  assurance  arrangements  1  operating  procedures, 
training,  management  supervision,  monitoring  1  welfare 
and  management  structure,  etc.  The  report  should  give 
some  indication  of  the  activity  within  each  of  these 
elements.  The  report  would  not  be  considered  adequate 
unless it included descriptions of the procedures for: 
I)  identification  of  work  required  to  achieve  the 
4.25 desired safety objectives; 
II)  the establishment of  standards  for  all  of  the 
management activities; 
III)  performance  measurement  to  assess  degree  of 
compliance with set standards; 
IV)  evaluation  of  performance  over  time  which  is 
communicated  to accountable persons; 
V)  the  means  to correct  deficiencies in perfomance 
standards. 
This  part  of  the  report  (and  those ·covered  by  items 
4.21,  4.22  and  4.23)  form  a  vital  tool  for  HSE 
inspection  of  major  hazard  installations.  Serious 
defects  in  managements  organization  and  arrangements 
for  safety  revealed  by  the  safety  report  can  be 
remedied  by inspectors taking enforcement action under 
the  HSW  Act. 
4.26 
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4.  20.  Humber  of  personnel  and  its 
administrating  buildings,  warehouses, 
units? 
B  (ML)  Yes. 
DK  Yes. 
location  in 
laboratories, 
E  Yes.  Personnel  distribution  inside  the  plant  and 
population data outside it (within  5  km)  are required. 
F  Yes.  The  number  of  people  working  in  administrative 
buildings  within  the  installation  fences  is  also 
controlled. 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  Yes.  (c.f. 5th Schedule  3d). 
I  Yes. 
L  Yes. 
RL  Yes  for OSR. 
P  Yes. 
UK  Yes.  Only actually require: 
- Schedule  6, 3.  (d)  - maximum  number  likely  to  be 
present on the site. 
- Schedule 6,5.  (f)  - estimate of the number  exposed to 
the hazards  . 
4.27 4. 21.  Mi.ni'mal  require•ents  for  personnel  training  and 
education with respect to the hazards  presented  by  the 
activity? 
B  (ML)  Yes. 
DK  Yes,  if necessary. 
E  No.  Personnel  training information  is required,  but  no 
minimal  requirements are fixed. 
F  Yes.  Frecuency  of  training  and  the  way  in  which  the 
personnel  is  informed  on  the  site  hazards  must  be 
included in the safety report. 
FRG  Yes.  Every  6  months. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  Yes. 
I  Yes.  Only general  information is required. 
L  Yes. 
HL  Yes.  The  P.A.  can be approved as  conditiona~ to certain 
provisions  and  therefore,  requirements  on  procedures 
and training can be requested. 
All training is described in o.S.R. 
The  owner  is  responsible  for  the  information  of  the 
workers. 
P  Yes. 
UK  Yes.  Paras  4  (b)  and  (c)  of  Schedule  6  refer.  See  also 
answer  4.19  above. 
4.28 
.  .. 
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4.22  1)  Operational procedures for  normal  and abnormal 
plant conditions? 
2)  Do  you  require,  in  the safety report,  a  list 
of  main  parameters  that  must  be  controlled  and  the 
measures to correct their deviation? 
B  (ML)1)  Yes  in both cases. 
DK 
2)  No.  Only critical parameters. 
1)  Yes.  We  ask for the existence of procedures,  but we 
do  not ask  for  their  inclusion in the  Safety Report. 
The  inspectors  may  ask,  at  any  moment,  to  look  at  a 
given  procedure  considered  to  be  particularly 
important. 
2)  Yes. 
E  1)  Yes. 
2)  Yes. 
F  1)  Yes.  It is required that all procedures be clearly 
laid down  and easily readable. 
2)Yes.  Safety  reports  do  not  cover  all  details;  but 
for  major  risks  the  alarms  and  signals  available  or 
necessary must  be  included.  France is putting a  great 
stress  on  "important  parameters  for  safety"  and 
"important  equipment  for  safety".  They  have  to  be 
listed  in  the  description,  indicating  why  they  have 
been  selected  and  how  they  have  been  sized, 
demonstrating  their  efficiency.  Inspectors  have 
access  to  all  kind  of  information  and  further  many 
controls are achieved by inspections. 
FRG  1)  Yes. 
2)  Yes. 
GR  1)  In  the  safety  report  the  procedures  must  be 
mentioned,  but  the  information  can  be  consul  ted  in 
the plant  • 
2)  No  answer. 
4.29 IR  1)  Yes. 
2)  Yes. 
I  1)  Yes. 
2)  No. 
L  1)  No.  Operating  procedures  are  analysed  in  plant 
during safety audit. 
2)  No.  Critical parameters that are controlled in plant 
are verified during safety audit._ 
NL  1)  Yes.  Both in P.A.  and O.S.R. 
2)  Yes. 
P  Yes  in both cases. 
UK  1)  Yes.  Paras  3  (c),  4  (b),  5  (a)  and  5  (c)  of Schedule 
6  refer.  See also answers to 4.19  above. 
2)  Yes. 
4.30 
.-. 
...  .. .  . 
...  ... 
..  . 
4.23.  Minimal  requireaents  for training of control rooa 
operators and field operators? 
B  (ML)  Yes. 
DK 
E 
Yes.  In the report the manufacturer  is asked to  supply 
this  information.  After  that  the  inspectors  judge. if 
this is sufficient or not  • 
No.  Personnel  training information  is· required,  but  no 
minimal  requirements are fixed  . 
F  Yes. 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  Yes. 
I  Yes. 
L  Yes. 
NL  Yes. 
p  Yes. 
UK  Yes.  Para  4  (c)  of  Schedule  6  refers.  See  also  answer 
to 4.19  above • 
4.31 4. 24.  Do  you  require  to  describe  the  degree  of 
involvement  of  operators  in the  elaboration  of  normal 
and emergency procedures? 
B  (ML)  Yes. 
DK  Yes.  All  situations  involving  safety  have  to  be 
considered by the management  and the staff. 
E  No  it is not  required.  It is  recommended  as  desirable 
for  a  good quality of  HAZOP  results. 
F  Inspectors are aware of the "spirit "  of the operators, 
if  they  are  informed  and  condivide  the  reason  of 
certain procedures. 
Operators  presence  in  the  working  team  performing  the 
safety report is encouraged in France. 
Employees  will  be  officially consulted  by  the State on 
normal  and  emergency  procedures  laid  down  by  the 
manufacturer,  before  the  analysis  be  made  by  the 
administration. 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  No. 
IR  Yes.  Inspectors  assess  this  area  routinely  in  the 
course of regular inspection of premises. 
I  Yes. 
L  Yes.  These  elements  are  considered  by  the  organization 
designated and outlined in the safety report. 
HL  In principle no specific requirements. 
The  owner  must  organize  in  such  a  way  that  the 
operators  follow  the  procedures  correctly.  No 
requirements  for  simulators.  How~_ver  new  plants  have 
them for training. 
Safety audits  are often organized both through  the  OSR 
procedure  and  through  conditions  under  which  PA  is 
accepted. 
P  No. 
UK  Yes.  But  good  management  practice  would  be  to  consult 
the operators when  formulating these procedures. 
During  routine  inspection  HSE  pay  particular attention 
to whether  operators  understand  the  need  for  adherence 
to  specified  procedures,  and  whether  the  company  has 
exercised  reasonable  foresight  about  operators  taking 




..  .. ..  . 
4. 25.  Security  procedures  with  respect  to  external 
persons and transport •eans? 
B  (ML)  Yes. 
DK  Yes,  if necessary.  If  the  facility  presents  a  certain 
risk,  as  part  of  the  emergency  plan  we  ask  the 
manufacturer  to  describe  the  measures  taken  for  the 
safety of the external persons and transports  • 
E  Yes.  Procedures  for  installation  access  control  are 
required.  Transport  access  procedures  are  prepared  by 
plant owner. 
F  These  must  be  generally  indicated  (see also  answers  to 
points  3.6 and  4.19) 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  Not specifically. 
I  Yes. 
L  Yes.  They  exist,  but  they  are  not  described  in  the 
safety report. 
RL  Yes  in OSR  (for "sabotage secrets" see point 3.5.) 
P  Yes.  Safety  procedures  and  rules  to  be  respected  by 
subcontractors are required. 
OK  No. 
4.33 4.26.  Can  you  list  the  documents  and  drawings  (with 
indication  of  the  level  of  detail)  you  require  on 
siting,  plant  1ay-out,  topography,  systems 
descriptions,  flow-diagrams,  etc.? 
B  (ML)  Topographic  map 
industries,  railways·, 
courses .••. 
indicating 
roads  and 
villages, 
airports, 
General  layout of the plant  (1  :  1000). 
other 
water 
Meteorolgical  data  usually  provided  in  the  form  of  a 
"wind rose"  on  a  map. 
Plot plan of Seveso equipment  (1  :  200). 
Block  diagrams  containing  all information  regarding 
dangerous substances in the different process steps. 
Simplified process flow-sheets. 
Management structure diagrams. 
DK  - MAP  1:  4000 
Plan  lay-out  for instance 1:  500 
- Flow-diagrams  (PI  diagram  frequently  simplified,  but 
complete  for  those  parts  of  the  plant  that  present 
some risk.). 
- Physical planning in the area of system descriptions. 
- Topography is necessary. 
- Description  of  safety  systems  (those  involved  in 
preventing major accidents). 
E  MAP  with  an  adequate  scale,  containing  the  following 
information: 
- Plan proprietry limits. 
- Main structures of the installation.  · 
Position  of  other  industrial,  residencial  or 
recreational centres in the area. 
~  Roads,  railway  lines  and  water  courses  in  the 
area. 
Indication  of  any  historical,  archeological, 
architectural  ,  cultural  or  social  element  of 
interest. 
Demography:  population  distribution  in  a  10  km  radius 
area,  at  different  distances  ( 250  m., 500  m.  , 1  km,  2 
km,  5  km  and  10  km)  and  for  16  wind  sectors.  Data 
should  include  age  and  sex  distribution  in  different 
sectors,  when  available,  as well  as the population with 
cardio - respiratory problems. 
Also  data  regarding  the  itinerant population  should  be 
included,  in different periods of the year  (days,  weeks 
and seasons). 
4.34 
..  .. .  .. 
F 
Transport  networks  within  a  distance of  10  km  (roads, 
railway  lines,  ports,  canals,  etc)  including  some 
traffic references. 
Sanitary installations. 
See  answers  to  points  4.6,  4.7,  4.8,  4.9,  4.12,  4.14 
and  4.16. 
Map  1:  25000  or 1  :  50000  indicating plant location. 
Map  1:2500  containing  plant  site  and· its  surroundings 
until a  distance equal to 1/10 of the radius stablished 
in  Annex  3  (  minimum  value  of  100m).  In this  map  all 
buildings  and  their  destination  will  be  included,  as 
well  as  railways,  public  roads,  bridges,  channels  and 
other water courses. 
A plan 1:200  minimum,  indicating plant layout,  as well 
as,  and within  a  distance of at least  35  m,  the use  of 
neighbour  buildings  and  terrains  and  the  sewers 
network. 
FRG  See answers to points 4.12  and 4.13. 
GR  Case by case,  according to external site. 
IR  - Map  of establishment and surrounding area 
I 
L 
- Site plan 
- Process  flow diagram or simplified P  & I. 
In  addition specific  P  &  I  diagrams  must  be  sought  if 
required. 
Many  plant  diagrams  and  plans  are  required  for  all 
these  items: 
- Site  plan  1:25000,  including  the  plant,  its  limit 
and surrounding areas within a  radius of  5  km.  In this 
plan  indication must  be  given  for  schools,  hospitals, 
buildings,  industries.  roads,  railways,  highways, 
airports,  air corridors,  etc. 
- Plan  map  1:  2000  including  the  surrounding  areas 
within a  radius of 1.000  m. 
- Plot  plans  of  different  plan  sections  (  1  :  500) . 
for  significant  details  scale  must  be  at  least  1  : 
200. 
- Block diagrams  indicating raw materials and products 
processing steps. 
Simplified  process  flow-sheets,  including 
quantitative information. 
- Meteorological  information for the last 5  years. 
- Site plan 1:  2500 
- Construction plan 1:100 
4.35 NL 
- Layout plan. 
- Fault tress and event trees. 
- Startup procedures. 
- Fire fighting system description and procedures. 
- Evacuation plan. 
Photos of the sites are not obligatory. 
All  the  drawings  available  at  P.A.  time.  These  are 
certified  (the  plant  must  correspond  to  its 
documentation). 
The  remaining  documents  are  in  OSR.  Any  change 
concerning OSR  must  be  communicated. 
P  - Topographic  map  1  :  25000  of the area,  indicating  : 
villages,  other  industries,  railways,  roads  and 
airports,  water  courses,  high  voltage  lines  and 
electrical installations,  protected areas,  etc. 
General  layout  of  the  plant,  indicating 
buildings,  structures,  equipments,  process  areas, 
storage areas,  warehouses,  etc. 
Installation  plan,  indicating  main  equipment, 
control  rooms,  laboratories,  energy,  water  and  raw 
materials  supply  systems,  raw  materials  and  product 
storage  areas  and  transport  structures,  internal 
roads,  access points to the  plant,  etc. 
Process  flow diagrams 
Process  diagrams  containing  all  information 
regarding  dangerous  substances  in  the  different 
process steps 
UK  - Ordinance  survey  map  1:  10000  - See  paras  3  (a)  and 
(e)  of Schedule  6. 
Scale  plan  with  location  and  inventories  of 
dangerous  substances  (3(b)  of Schedule  6  ). 
Plant  diagrams,  usually  simplified  p1p1ng  and 
instrumentation  drawings  showing  significant  features 
(para  5  (b)  of Schedule 6). 
- Meteorological data,  usually provided in the  form  of 
a  "wind rose"  on  a  map  (para  5  (e)  of Schedule 6). 
Normally also a  scaled plan of the site. 
- Management  structure  diagrams,  flow  diagrams. and 
other systems  information  are usually also included. 
4.36 
.  . 
.  .. 4.27.  Extra information 
B  No. 
DK  The  extra  information  required  differs  from  plant  to 
plant,  concerning all  those  aspects  that  need  to  be 
described  for  a  better  comprehension  of  the  safety 
report. 
E  No. 
F  It is  required  to  plant  owners  to  describe  the  means 
they  have  to measure  the  consequences  of  an  accidental 
pollution inside or outside the plant,  either in air or 
water. 
They  are  also  asked  which  means  they  have  to  fight 
against these effects outsite the plant 
(  closing  roads  to traffic,  give  general/partial  alarm 
to population andjor authorities,  etc.). 
FRG  All the required information is detailed in the SGAR. 
GR  No. 
IR  No. 
I  Asks  in  the  safety  report  information  on  company 
liability. 
L  No. 
IlL  No. 
p  No. 
UK  No. 
4.37 ... .  . 
5.  HAZARD  IDENTIFICATION 
The particular hazards presented by an installation can 
be  identified  by  analysis  of  past  occurrences  on 
similar  plants  andjor  structured  systems  analysis 
procedures.  A  coabination  of  both  techniques  should 
result in a  more exhaustive assessment  • 
5.1.  Historical experience 
5.1.1.  Do  you  require  that  previous  malfunctions  in 
installations  by  the  saae  owner  are  comm.ented  upon, 
with  the  lesson  learned  and  implemented  to  aaeliorate 
the concerned installation? 
B  (HL)  Yes. 
DK  Yes.  Previous  history 
accidents  occurred  and 
recurrences. 
if  available  in 
measures  taken 
terms  of 
to  avoid 
E  No. 
F  Yes.  Historical  occurrences are not however  the bases 
of  French  evaluations,  even  if  they  are  an  important 
reference.  French  approach  is  more  deterministic  than 
probabilistic  and  source  of  information  is  the 
notification of incidents to the inspectors. 
F.RG  Yes.  Other  regulationsdeal  with  reporting  of  dangerous 
occurrences either for workers or for the environment. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  Yes,  if significant. 
I  Yes  (see  answer  to  item  2.2.4.).  Italy  is  planning  to 
implement  a  procedure  for  systematic  reporting  of 
dangerous occurrences. 
L  No. 
NL  Yes.  For both  ESR  and  OSR,  even  on similar plants.  The 
normal  requirement  for  P.A.  is  ·that  the  licensing 
authorities  be  informed  on  all  abnormal  occurrences, 
not  necessarily  leading  to  accidents.  (Permit 
Conditional to). 
Records  to  be  kept  by  owner  are  regulated  by  law. 
(Labour Conditions Act.  Art.9). 
P  No.  It  must  be  considered,  but  it is  not  required  a 
recording system. UK  Other  regulations  dealing  with  the  reporting  of 
accidents  and  dangerous  occurrences  provide  a 
complementary  flow  of  information  about  events  which 
are not major accidents. 
5.2 
"'  . 
...  .. ...  . 
5 .1.  2.  Do  you  require  that  the  safety  report  shows  a 
sufficient  awareness  of  aain  accidents,  their  causes 
and consequences,  occurred in si•ilar plants? 
B(ML)Yes. 
DK  Yes. 
E  Yes. 
F  See answer to point 5.1.1. 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  Yes.  There  would  not necessarily be  a  specific section 
dealing  with  this  but  we  would  expect  the  safety case 
throughout  to  reflect  this  when  appropriate.  In  the 
course  of  their  site  visits  our  inspectors  would 
monitor  whether  personnel  were  appropriately  aware  of 
such matters. 
I  Yes. 
L  Yes. 
RL  Yes. 
P  Yes. 
UK  Yes.  In  so  far  as  they  are  relevant  to  the  plant  in 
question. 
5.3 5 .1.  3.  Do  you  require  a  description  of  the  information 
sources  fro•  which  the  historical  experience  has  been 
drawn? 
B  (ML)Yes. 
Dk  Yes,  if  necessary. 
E  No.  It is foreseen to develop specific data banks. 
F  Yes,  but bibliographic references could be enough. 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  No.  But  they  should  at  least  be  referenced  and  made 
available if required. 
I  Yes. 
L  Yes. 
NL  Yes. 
P  Yes 
UK  No.  But  such  information  may  be  sought  as  part  of 
discussions arising out of the report. 
5.4 
.. 
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"  .. 
5.1.4.  Have  you  established  a  generic  or  plant  specific 
check  list  only  based  on  past  occurrences,  against 
which an installation •ust be protected? 
If yes,  please supply exaaples. 
B  (ML)No. 
DK  No.  However  we  give  full  advice  to the manufacturer  on 
how to perform the safety report. 
E  No. 
F  No.  A  checklist  cannot  be  exhaustive.The  fact  that 
something  has  never  occurred  does  not  imply  that  it 
will not happen in the future. 
Checklist  may  be  useful  to  guide  the  inspectors  in 
analysing the safety reports. 
F.RG  Yes.  Provided by various data banks. 
GR  No. 
IR  No. 
I  No. 
L  No. 
RL  No. 
P  No. 
UK  Not  specifically,  but  these  matters  are  dealt  with 
either via: 
a)  or codes of practice/standards: 
b)  or generic guidance/model cases 
For example  HSG  34  refered to above  and GNl  "A  Guide  to 
the  Writing  of  LPG  Safety  Reports"  published  by  the 
Liquiful  Petroleum  Gas  Industry  Technical  Association. 
(See  CDCIR) • 
5.5 5.  2.  Systems analysis procedures 
5.2.1.Do  you  require  specific  •ethodologies  being  employed 
for hazard identification? 
B  (IIL)Ministry  for  Employment  and  work  requires  a 
qualitative  analysis.  Ministry  does  not  impose  any 
method,  but  it  must  have  an  equivalent  level  to 
F.M.E.A.  There  may  be  exceptions  to  this  criterium 
either  when  there  are  enough  historical  data  on  such 
plants  indicating  good  operating  records  without 
dangerous situations or when the manufacturer can  show, 
f.i.  through  DOW  index  method  or  preliminary  risk 
analisys,  that the  whole  installation or  parts  of  it 
presents a  lower risk. 
For  those  installations  presenting  a  particular  risk, 
the  Ministry  expects  that  the  manufacturer  makes  an 
analysis  deeper  than  F.M.E.A.  (  f.i.  HAZOP  ,  fault 
trees  ,  etc.  ) 
The  plant  owner  must  supply  the  following 
information  regarding the risk analysis: 
- The  description  of  the  chosen  method  and  how  he 
has applied it. 
- The  composition of the team that has  performed the 
analysis. 
- The time devoted to the analysis. 
- The  measures  taken  after  the  conclusion  of 
works  and  the  destination  of  recommendations 
proposed by the analysts. 
The  whole analysis must not be enclosed with the safety 
report,  but  it  must  be  available  at  the  plant  for 
inspection. 
DK  Yes,  if  relevant.  Normally  hazop  is  required.  Other 
methods  could  be  required  if  a  certain  aspect  of  the 
plant  is  relevant.  This  is  possible  because  of  the 
communication between authority and manufacturer during 
the preparation of the safety report. 
E  Yes.  HAZOP  methodology is recommended. 
F 
Other  techniques  may  be  used  if  they  meet  certain 
acceptability criteria. 
No.  It  is  expected  that  the  manufacturer  utilizes  a 
systematic  hazard  identification  procedure  but  the 
choice  of  the  most  appropriate  one  (HAZOP,  What  if, 
Cause-Consequence  Diagrams,  etc.)  is  free  for  the 
manufacturer,  who  must  justify  the  reasons  why  a 








FRG  Yes.  See  answer to point 7.1.2. 
GR 
The  safety  analysis  to  be  prepared  by  the  operator 
according  to  Article  7  of  the  Ordinance  is  a 
documentation  which  must  be  intelligible  as  such,  and 
summarize  and  evaluate  a  systematic  assessment  of  all 
conditions which are of significance for the safety and 
security  of  the  installation  and  its  operation.  This 
documentation  shall  only  be  deemed  complete  if· it 
contains  the  information  required  according  to Article 
7,  para 1,  Nl.  3.2.  of the Ordinance. 
The  information shall be sufficiently·comprehensive and 
detailed  to  allow  the  responsible  authority  to 
adequately  assess  the  operator's  compliance  with  the 
safety obligations pursuant to Articles  3  and  6  of  the 
Ordinance.  If  calculations  are  required  for  this 
purpose,  it  shall  become  manifest  from  this 
documentation that they have  been carried out. 
The  safety analysis shall also provide  a  clear picture 
of  the  various  steps  of  the  assessment  methods  used 
for  the  systematic  analysis  of  the  installation  with 
regard  to  the  parts  of  the  installation  which  are  of 
significance  from  a  technical  safety  standpoint, 
critical situations,  the effects of hazardous  incidents 
and  safety  precautions.  Deterministic  methods  of 
process  and  regulating  technology  or other methods  may 
be  used,  e.g.  Hazop  (Hazard  and  operability  study, 
tabular checklists,  failure  modes  and  effects  analysis 
( 2) ,  preliminary  risk  analysis  ( 2) ,  fault  trees  ( 3) , 
event analysis  (4).) 
(2)DIN  25448  of June  1980. 
(3)DIN  25424  of June  1977. 
(4)DIN  25419,  Part I  of June  1977. 
DIN  25419,  Part II of February 1979. 
Not  a  specific,  but  an  appropriate 
under study. 
one  to  the  case 
IR  No.  But  a  systematic  approach  is  required. 
I 
L 
Manufacturers must  justify methodologies used. 
Yes.  A  mandatory  screening  methodology  (derived  from 
MondjDow  and  italian  toxicity  indexes)  is  required. 
Other  methodologies  are  suggested to be  adopted  on  the 
identification  of  events,  evaluation  of  their 
probability and  assessment  of  the  consequences  for  man 
and  environment. 
No. 
lfL  Yes.  However  the  methodologies  listed  in  the  guidance 
note have to be chosen according to the problem. 
5.7 P  Yes.  However,  methodologies  to  be  used  are  a  free 
decision of the plant owner. 
UK  But  their  use  is  not  discouraged. 
necessary  that  every  methodology  that 
transparent to the competent authority. 
It  is 
is 
however 
used  is 
5.8 
.. 
• ...  .. 
5.2.2.  If not,  what  do  you  require  to the  aanufacturer  in 
order to  judge  wbether  his analysis  is as  coaplete as 
desirable? 
B  (ML)See  previous answer. 
DK  Not applicable. 
E  Not applicable. 









Any  methodology  provided  that  applicability  criteria 
are adequate. 
The  onus  is  upon  a  manufacturer  to  supply  sufficient 
evidence to support his case. 
(See 5.2.1). 
Identification  methods  are  chosen  by  the  designated 
organizations.  For  every  potential  hazard,  the  maximun 
risk is estimated with the its safety radius.  Generally 
a  quantitative  analysis  is  required  for  existing 
installations.  The  Seveso  Committee decides eventually 
whether analyses are complete or not. 
Not applicable. 
Not applicable. 
It is for  the  manufacturer  to define  the  limit  of  his 
analysis.  HSE  then examines the SR  on an  "expert multi 
disciplinar~  basis*  to  see  if  we  accept  that  the 
analysis  1.s  sufficiently  comprehensive  in  every 
important aspect.  If it is not action is taken to make 
the manufacturer  improve  his  coverage  of  these_issues. 
Usually  this  is  done  by  discussions  with  the 
manufacturer but CIMAH  regulation 9  gives  HSE  the legal 
power to demand this further  information. 
*  Each  report  is  examined  by  risk  assessmant  experts 
and  experts  in  chemical ,  mechanical ,  electrical,  and 
civil engineering  as  well  as  by  factory  inspectors  who 
are  experts  in  human-factors  managerial  aspects  of 
safety. 
5.9 5.  2.  3 .1.  If yes,  do  you  require that the aethodology to be 
chosen  is depending  on  the  seriousness  of  the  hazards 
involved? 
B  (ML)  See previous answer. 
DK  Yes.  As  discussed before.  Obviously,  for less critical 
plants,  a  less detailed hazop may  be sufficient. 
E  Yes.  When  foreseen  hazards  are  considered  relevant, 
quantitative analysis  may  be  required  by  the  competent 
Authorities. 
F  Yes.  See answer to point 5.2.1. 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  No.  But  the  manufacturer  must  justify the  methodology 
used as being appropriate to the risk. 
I  (see 5.2.1). 
L  Yes. 
HL  Yes. 
P  Yes.  See answer to point 5.2.1. 
UK  No,  but the manufacturers  are  encouraged to tailor the 
depth  of  his  investigation  of  the  risks  to  the 
significance. 
5.10 .  . 
..  . 
.  • 
5.2.3.2.  Do  you ask for check list •ethods? 
Please give us examples. 












No.  Normally,  we  do  not  ask  specifically  for 
check  list  methods,  but if the manufacturer  wants  to 
use it, he can do it but only after approval . 
Yes.  It is recommended as  a  possible method to use. 
Not systematically. 
Yes.  Hazop and failure mode  and effect analysis  (FMEA). 




It  can  be  used  if  appropriate  for  the  case  being 
examined. 
They are admitted. 
No.  But  these  are  frequently  used  and  their  use 
is  not  d±scouraged.  However  it is  stressed  that 
check lists are not necessarily exhaustive  • 
5.11 5.2.3.3.  Do  you  ask  for  ranking  hazards  according  to  fire 
and explosion and  toxicity indexes  ? 
If yes  ,  which of thea? 
B  (ML)  See  answer to point 5.2.1 
DK  No.  Normally we  do  not ask specifically  for the use of 
ranking hazards according  to  DOW,  MOND  indexes. 
We  accept,  however,  such  an  analysis  if  the 
manufacturer  presents it (or he is willing to use it), 
but ~  for  screening purposes  (i.e.  for  proving that 
for  some  units  it  is  useless  to  perform  the  Hazop 
because of the  low level of risk). 
E  Yes.  Toxicity: 
-Pel 30  (permiteed exposure limit). 
- Health and safety immediate and dangerous 
limit  (IPVS). 
Thermal  radiaton  :  Continental  Oil  Company  Indexes 
(1986). 
Missiles  and  explosions:  several  recommendations  from 
different Institutions. 
F  Such  kind  of  indexes  are  not  encouraged,  except  for 
chemical  plants that produces  many  substances  changing 
operation process weekly or monthly. 
FRG  No. 
GR  No.  Ranking is required for possible scenarios. 
IR  No.  But hazards must be ranked in some  way: 
I  Yes.  Detailed  information is required  in order to  rank 
hazards  (see answer to 5.2.1). 
L  No. 
HL  No.  Indices are exceptions in ESR,  even if some  ranking 
is performed for QRA. 
They  are  obligatory  used  in  OSR,  where  their  values 
trigger subsequent analysis to be performed. 
P  Tney are admitted. 
OK  "Q,  Bq~ their use is not discouraged. 
5.12 
.  . 5.2.3.4.  Do you ask for  hazop analysis? 
Yes  for all sections. 
Yes  for selected sections. 
Ho. 
B  (ML)See  answer to point 5.2.1. 
DK  Yes  for  selected  sections.  Hazop  is  requested  for  the 
most  critical  sections  of  the  plant. ·The  selection  of 
these  sections  is  performed  by  the  authority  (the 
judgment is frequently based on experience). 
E  Yes  for selected sections. 
F  Yes  for selected options.  See answer to point 5.2.1. 
FRG  Yes  for selected·sections  (safety relevant units). 
GR  Yes  for selected sections.  It is one  of the  techniques 
required. 
IR  Any  of these methods  may  be acceptable. 
I  Yes.  It is requested for new  installations. It could be 
useful for existing ones. 
L  No.  There  are  only  storage  installations,  relatively 
simple. 
HL  Yes  for  selected  sections  in  OSR  according  to  i-ndex 
values. 
In ESR  it depends  case by case. 
It  is  especially  requested  for  new  plants  (the 
information  otherwise  is  not  considered  to  be 
sufficient for accepting a  P.A.) 
P  They are admitted. 
UK  No.  But their use is not discouraged.  More  importantly, 
the  criteria  for  judging  the  apprQpriateness  of 
remedial  measures are required to be transparent. 
5.13 5.2.3.5.  Do  you ask for other  techniques  even only at 
a  qualitative  stage  (e.g.  whatif,  FMEA,  cause-
consequence  diagrams,  fault  trees, event  trees, 
etc.)? 
B  (ML)Yes.  See  answer to  p~int 5.2.1. 
DK  Yes.  FMEA  for instance. 
The  type of technique required depends  on the potential 
hazards presented by the section of the plant (i.e.  the 
need  to identify the  behaviour of the plant  in case  of 
malfunction  of  one  or  more  components  or  in  case  of 
human  error) • 
E  Yes.  Modifications  to  Hazop  or  other  alternative 
techniques  are  commented  in  Safety  Report  Elaboration 
Guide. 
F  Yes.  See  previous answers  in this section. 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  Only  in  extremely  dangerous  situations  or  very 
important for the owner. 
IR  No.  Manufacturers  may  make  a  case  for  such  techniques 
as are appropriate. 
I  Yes.  It is  accepted  as  an  alternative  to  HAZOP 
5.2.3.4)  • 
L  Yes.  Fault trees.  Even trees. 
HL  These  techniques can be used in ESR. 
(see 
OSR  can  ask  for  fault  tree  qualitative  analysis  when 
new plants and  new  techniques are concerned. 
P  They are admitted. 
UK  No.  But their use is not discouraged  and  many  form part 
of the report or supporting documentation. 
5.14 
..  . ..  ,. 
..  .. 
5.  3.  Do  you  ask  both  for  historical analysis and for 
systems analysis procedures? 
B  (ML)Yes. 
DK  Yes.  If that is of interest in the case involved. 
E  Yes. 
F  It depends  on  the cases  analysed.  See·  previous  answers 
in this section  • 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  Yes.  Historical  analysis  is  required  to . rank  the 
possible  relevance  in cummulative  frequency.  Hazop  or 
FMEA  are the techniques mostly required. 
IR  Possibly. 
I  Yes. 
L  Yes.  An  historical  analysis  of  previous  accidents  in 
similar installations is required. 
IlL  Yes. 
P  They are admitted. 
UK  Not  specifically  but  indirectly  such  approaches  are 
welcomed  • 
5.15 5.4.  Do  you  ask  to  perfora  hazard  identification  in  every 
plan  state  (e.g.  noraal  operation,  start-up,  noraal 
shut-down,  anticipated  transients,  JDaintenance, 
loading-unloading)? 
B  (ML)Yes. 
DK  Yes,  if relevant. 
B  No. 
F  Yes.  All states must  be considered.  Even  the effects of 
maintenance  on  possible  transients  should  be 
described. 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  Yes. 
I  Yes. 
L  Yes.  Hazard  identification is required  only  for  normal 
oper~tion,  loading and unloading. 
RL  Yes  for both  ESR  and OSR. 
P  Yes. 
UK  Yes.  All  conditions  and  events that may  be  significant 
in bringing about  a  major  accident must  be  considered. 
Start-ups  and  shut-dpwns  are  recognised  as  periods  of 
higher risk than normal. 
5.16 
,  . 
.  . - .... 
5.5. Runawayjsidejdecoaposition reaction hazards. 
Since the risks of  runaway reactions are hardly to 
be  catched  by  systems analysis •ethods  please 
give a  free description ot the requireaents you ask 
the.  •anufacturer  concerning  description  of 
hazardous  processes,  experi•ental  caapaigns, 
iapuri  ty control, etc. 
B  (ML)The  manufacturer must indicate if there is any risk of 
runaway reaction. 
The  extent  of  the  experimental  research  would  have  to 
be  referenced.  The  implications  of  a  runaway  scenario 
must  be  described.  Normally  a  fault  tree  analysis  is 
necessary  in  order  to  illustrate  the  relevant 
safeguards. 
DK  If runaway reactions may  be  suspected,  the manufacturer 
shall  take  necessary  steps  to  prevent  and  reduce  the 
risk. 
E  No  answer. 
F  All  experimental  campaigns  and  the  procedures  adopted 
must be  justified.  The safety report must give evidence 
that the risk has been identified and  adequate measures 
taken  to  control  it.  Impurities  control  has  to  be 
specially described. 
FRG  The  conditions  that  may  lead  to  a  hazardous  incident 
(critical conditions)  shall  be  described  in the  safety 
analysis.  Critical  conditions  are  events  prompted  when 
a  danger  source  is  becoming  active.  The  critical 
conditions  may  also  be  described  together  with  the 
danger source concerned. 
See also points 3.2.2.1. 
GR  No  answer. 
IR  Manufacturers  must  provide  basic  process  details  and 
identify  potential  exothermic  steps  e.g. 
polymerisations,  nitrations,  Grignards,  etc. 
Manufacturers should identify hazards as  folows: 
(1)HAZOP. 
(2)Hazard Analysis 
Assessment  of  process,  experimental  and 
chemical  hazards- look  at process  chemistry  here 
- thermochemistry  rates  of  reaction,  laboratory 
5.17 techniques  to  determine  reaction  rates  DSC,  DTA, 
Dewer  Calorimetry  current  techniques  in  reactor 
venting  - DIERS  systems  - to  ven  or  not  to  vent 
justify this. 
Assessment  of  consequences  of  a  reactor 
explosion  including  risk  to  operators,  risk  to 
other personnel  in nearest ·buildings,  risk to the 
public. 
(3}  Fault tree analysis. 
The  extent  of  the  experimental  research  would  have  to 
be referenced. 
The  extent  of  the  campaigns  carried out  would  have  to 
be  detailed  and  the  quality  control  procedures  should 
be also referenced. 
I  The  owner  must  ·  perform  the  required  analysis  to 
determine  the possibility of  existence  of  uncontrolled 
reactions. 
L  Not applicable. 
HL  It is  necessary  to  rely  on  what  the  company  supplies 
when  exothermic or side effect reactions are inspected. 
ARC  tests,  impurity controls,  etc., can be requested. 
It  is  a  matter  of  experience  for  the  inspectors  who 
refer also to data  from  sources like 
- Brethick  (1975)  in Lees'  Loss Prevention,  page  1080. 
- Data bank  DIMDI  in Germany. 
- NFPA  guide USA. 
-Process Safety Analysis  (enclosed). 
P  The  manufacturer  should  foresee  runway  reactions,  and 
emphasize the meens  to prevent them. 
UK  Where  a  major  accident  hazard  can  be  perceived  to 
result  from  an  excursion  (unwanted  or  uncovenanted 
situation)  the  implications  of  that  scenario  are 
to  be  investigated  and  the  relevant 
safeguardsdescribed. 
Any  risk  of  an  exothermic  reaction  leading  to  a  major 
accident  hazard  would  be  covered  in  the  process 
description  or  when  describing  sources  of  major 
accidents.  Precautions  such  as  venting  and  scrubbing 
systems,  vessel  design,  etc. ,  would  be  covered  by 
paras  5  (c)  of  Schedule  6.  The  role  of  impurities  and 
stabilisers would  be covered together with descriptions 
of  management  arrangements  for  i~suring safe  operation 
of the plant. 
5.18 5.6. Hu:aan  factors 
Please  give  a  brief description  regarding  the  way  you 
ask  that  hUJ181l  factors  are  included  into  the  hazard 
identification procedure. 
B  (ML)For  Ministry  safety  organization  and  personnel 
training are very  important.  Plant  owner  must  describe 
in detail  how  these  activities  are  performed.  He  must 
also  indicate  how  he  communicates  to  personnel  from 
external companies that perform some  works  in his plant 
the particular hazards existing in the installation. 
The  Ministry  has  prepared  a  questionnaire  based  on 
questionnaire MORT,  to examine  internal organization in 
the company. 
Methods  like  SHARP  and  THERP  are not  used  by  chemical 
industry yet.  There  are  some  companies  that have  asked 
other external companies to audit their organization. 
DK  Only  in relevant cases  (risky situations)  and  by  using 
the  single  failure  criterium  which  is  the  normal 
procedure for the analyser. 
E  It is included as  a  part of Hazop technique. 
Not specific analyses are required. 
F  No  quantification is required. 
The  consequences of human  faults shall be investigated. 
A particular study on  human  factors has  been  committed 
to  C.E.A.  as  based  on  its  previous  experience  with 
nuclear power plant. 
FRG  The  following  human  actions  that  may  endanger  the 
GR 
safety of the installation,  must be considered: 
- Lacking  compliance  with  the  safety  provisions 
under  public  law,  with  accident  prevention 
requirements or with operating instructions. 
- Operator errors. 
- Errors  made  during  monitoring  and  maintenance 
operations,  e.g.  when  checking  the  operation  of 
parts of the installation  that are  important  from 
a  technical  safety  standpoint,  or  errors  made 
during  the  supply  of  the  installation  with  types 
of fuel  or energy which are of  significance  from  a 
technical safety standpoint. 
It  can  be  included  in  Hazop  or  other  techniques. 
5.19 Operation procedures are required. 
IR  We  would  expect  human  factors  to  be  addressed  as  an 
integral part of whatever procedure is used. 
I 
L 
In  any  event  human  factors  are  routinely  addressed  in 
the course of routine inspections of premises. 
It  is  required  on  the  evaluation  of  failure  event 
probability. 
It is not specifically required.  Only in the event trees 
these interventions are considered. 
NL  ESR:  many  kinds  of  human  errors  are  already  included 
into the components failure rates. 
For typical  human  actions it is necessary  to single  out 
the  appropriate  datum  and  evaluate  consequences  of 
errors. 
OSR:  qualitatively human  factors  are  always  included  in 
Hazop. 
Sometimes  a  special  hazop  study  has  been  devoted  to 
human  actions  only.  The  systems  must  be  tolerant  to 
human  failures.  It  is  possible  to  ask  for  certain 
automatic processes. 
It  is  controlled  that  the  control  load  to  single 
operators for computer surveillance is not excessive 
A  special attention is given  in OSR  to the  organization 
structure. 
P  It is  not  required  specifically,  considering  that  they 
are englobed in applicable methodologies. 
UK  Human  factors  should  be  addressed  whenever  appropriate 
when  identifing possible  major  accident  hazards.  We 
would  expect operater errors to be  addressed  as  well  as 
human  behaviour  during  normal  operations  and  in 
emergencies. 
Specific  advise  on  how  to  deal  with  human  factors  is 
given  in  HSE  booklet  HS(G)  48  - "Human  Factors  in 
Industrial  Safety"  recently  forwarded  for  the  Community 
Documentation Center on Industrial Risk. 
s.2a 
"'  • ...  ... 
6.  SAFETY  SYSTEMS  AND  PROCEDURES 
Internal and external hazardous  occurrences identified in the 
previous  iteJDS  of  a  safety  report  should  be  prevented  to 
develop  into  aajor  accidents  by  protection  systems  and 
emergency procedures.  Should these fail,  then major accidents 
might  occur  which  a:re  dealt  with  in  the  next  section.  The 
questions  asked  in this section refer to the characteristics 
of preventive,  protective and mitigating systems. 
6 .1.  Do  you  require  that  in  the  safety  report  there  is  a 
detailed description of the safety criteria assumed  in the 
design to protect equipment and buildings froa: 
- out of normal process variables, 
- overpressures, 
- heat radiation, 
- wind loads, 
-other internal and external random  loads 
(If yes,  please indicate them below). 
B  .(ML)  Yes  .• 










other loads  :  for those identified by the manufacturers. 
A  check  of  safety  criteria  is  performed  for  all 
situations identified in the risk study. 
Safety systems description  is required.  Safety criteria 
followed are not required. 
Yes  for all cases. 
Yes  for all cases.  See  answer to point 6.2. 
Yes  for all cases. 
Yes  for  all cases.  Other  loads  :  mechanical  damage  due 
to transport,  for example. 
Yes  for all cases. 
Yes  for all cases. 
Yes  for all cases. 
It is  required  to  give  indications  regarding  the  safety 
solutions  adopted  at  project  design  phase  of 
installations,  with  specific  regards  for· control  and 
command  units. 
UK  Yes  for all cases. 
6.1 Where  relevant,  For example,  the safe shut-down of a  plant 
may  be  dependent  on  the survival of operators  in  a  blast-
proof _or  positively pressurised control  room.  Similarily, 
the  integrity of  a  bulk  storage  vessel  may  depend  on  it 
being  designed  to  withstand  certain  degrees  of 
overpressure,  levels  of  flood  or  intensity  of  earthquake 
shock. 
6.2 6.2.  To  what  extent  do  you  require  that  logic  diagrams, 
interlock systems,  fix-e fighting systeJDS,  explosion relief 
systems,  eaerqency  procedures,  etc.  are  described  into  a 
safety report? 
B  (HL)  Ministry  does  not  ask  all. details.  Plant  owner  must 
explain in the safety report his safety policy/philosophy, 
illustrating it with  examples  and  making  reference to all 
available  documents  that  may  help  inspectors  to  perform 
their work.  · 
DK  Fully  description  if  necessary  based  on  the  identified 
hazards.  For  complicated  interlock  systems  the  testing 
program adopted is required. 
E  Exhaustive description is required. 
F  A rather detailed description is required. 
FRG  The  safety  analysis  must  contain  a  description  of  the 
parts  of  the  installation  which  are  of  significance  from  a 
technical safety standpoint.  Parts  of  th&  installation that 
are of  importance  from a·technical safety standpoint are:. 
-parts  of  the  installation  containinq  specific 
substances 
- safety equipment,  installations and structures, 
- other  parts  of  the  installation that  are  required  for 
safe operation. 
The  description of the parts of the installation that are 
of significance from  a  technical safety standpoint shall,  in 
particular,  indicate the: 
- function, 
- type  and  extent  of  strains  and  stresses  to  be 
expected, 
significance  from  a  technical safety  standpoint, 
- specific  design  characteristics,  to  the  extent  they 
correspond to specific risks. 
Parts 2f the installation containing sgecific substances 
Parts of the installation containing specific substances are 
parts of the  installation  where  a  substance  may  be  present 
or formed  in significant quantities  from  a  technical  safety 
standpoint,  especially: 
- handlinq,  processing  and  storage  vessels  (tanks, 
bunkers,  silos), 
reactors, 
-furnaces, kilns and.ovens 
6.3 - filters,  separators,  scrubbers, 
columns,  distillation  units, 
- pumps,  compressors,  ventilators, 
- heat exchangers,  includinq condensers, 
- piping. 
Safety eguipment,  installations And  structures 
Safety  equipment,  installations  and  structures  include  in 
particular  : 
a)  systems  designed  to  limit  the  release  of  any 
substance  under  Annex  II  of  the  Ordinance  or  of 
substances which  may  form  any  substances  under  Annex  II 
of the Ordinance,  such as: 
- rapid closing interlocking devices and mechanisms, 
- collecting vessels, 
- water  or  vapour  screens,  sprinkler  systems,  spraying 
and scrubbing systems, 
- compressed-air  barriers  (to  produce  traps  on  water 
surfaces); 
b)  fire protection units and systems,  such as: 
- fire protection walls, 
- traps for  flammable  liquids, 
- stationary or  mobile fire-fighting units, 
- sprinkler systems for cooling purposes; 
c)  units  and  systems  for  the  protection  against  the 
impact of explosions,  e.g.: 
- pressure  relief  systems,  such  as  blow-down  towers, 
expansion and relief systems 
- protective walls,  protective embankments. 
- bunkers. 
Other  parts  of  the  installation  that  are  required  for 
safe o.peration: 
machinery  and  equipment  for  safeguarding  an 
appropriate  energy  cycle,  e.g.  pumps,  compressors, 
control valves,  switches,  emergency generators, 
- machinery  and  equipment  for  safeguarding  appropriate 
mass  flow,  e.g.  pumps,  valves piping, 
- Parts  of  the  installation  used  for  the  discharge, 
disposal  or  retention  of  substances  under  Annex  II of 
the  O~dinance which  may  be  present  in  the  installation 
6.4 
J ..  ... 
during  normal  operation or of  substances  from  which 
substances under Annex  II of the Ordinance may  be  formed 
e.g.  filtering  and  scrubbing  equipment,  flare  systems 
and after-burning installations, collecting vessels, 
chimneys,  blow-down  towers,  emergency  expansion  and 
relief systems. 






The  above  should  be  described  in  sufficient  detail  to 
allow preliminary  judgements to be made. 
References should be  included as to when  further specific 
information is  given~ 
See  D.P.C.M.  The  following  details  are  generally 
required; 
- Design standards/norms followed. 
- Operating conditions and design description. 
- Testing criteria. 
Availability parameters, if available. 
- Quality  control  procedures  followed  during  their 
manufacturing and installation. 
From  the  mechanical  standpoint,  the  safety  report 
describes the type,  the  physical  characteristics of  the 
protection and the construction code. 
ESR  requires  full  description  of  fire  fighting  systems, 
explosion  protection,  emergency  procedures,  monitoring 
of  important equipment.  The  other information depends  on 
the case. 
OSR  asks for more  information concerning logical diagrams 
and  interlocks  even  for  less  significant  safety  ~elated 
items. 
Information  contained  in  the  safety  report  must  be 
sufficiently  comprehensive  and  detailed  to  permit  the 
authority  to  perform  a  global ,  in  depth  and  coherent 
assessment  of  plant  safety  aspects,  including  hazard 
identification  and  evaluation,  preventive,  protective 
and  control  measures,  and  workers  training  and 
information. 
In  a  form,  at a  level,  and to an  extent which  makes  the 
information  provided  comprehensible  to  the  Health  and 
Safety Executive. 
Only those systems fundamental  to the prevention, 
control  or  minimisation  of  a  major  accident  would  be 
6.5 covered  but  then  a  description  complete  enough  for 
adequate assessment would be required with references as 
appropriate.  For  example,  the  design  brief  for  an 
emergency  shut-down  system  may  be  required  with 
justification  for  the  use  of  a  Proqrammable  Electronic 
Control  system  or  the  adoption  of  a  particular 
maintenance  regime.  These  are the sort of  matters  that 
would  be followed  up  by subsequent general  inspection. 
6.6 
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6.3.  1) Is  the  conformance  of  safety  systems,  safety 
devices,  safety  distances,etc.,  to  acknowledqed  design 
standards  and  codes  of  practices  accepted  as  a 
sufficient criterion to allow plant operation? 
B  (ML) 
2)  or  do  you  ask  for  the  reasons  why  a  given  design 
standard has been assumed  by the owner  as  applicable to 
the case under investigation? 
See answer to point 4.10 
DK  1)  Yes.  If not,  we  will ask for t·he  2nd question. 
2)  Yes. 
E  1)  No. 
2)  No. 
F  1)  No. 
2)Yes.  If it is  considered  necessary,  safety  audits  by 
independent  expert  can  be  organized  on  the  site,  to 
verify it. The  safety report could be  itself examined  by 
an independent expert. 
FRG  1)  Yes. 
2)Yes.  "State-of-the-art of  safety technology"  means  the 
state-of-the-art of development of  advanced  process, 
equipment  and  modes  of  operation,  which  indicates  the 
practical suitability of  a  measure  to  prevent  hazardous 
incidents  or  to  limit  their  effect.  The  assessment  of 
the  state-of-the-art  of  safety  technology  shall  in 
particular  be  based  on  comparable  processes,  equipment 
or modes  Of  operation that have  been successfully proven 
in practice. 
GR  1)  Yes.  When  no  greek  standards  are  available,  appropriate 
international  standards  are  accepted,  according  to  the 
case analysed. 
2)  No  answer. 
IR  1)  Yes.  We  would  expect  that  an  appropriate  recognised 
I 
standard  is  used,  onus  on  owner  to  justify  choice  of 
standard.  We  would  not  accept  an  obscure  standard  with 
lesser criteria or  an  "  a  la  carte  "  approach  choosing 
lowest elements of different standards. 
2)  Yes. 
1) No. 
2)Yes.  During  inspection  and  for  certain  cases  it  may 
be  required  to  justify  why  an  specific  standard  was 
chosen. 
6.7 L  1)  No. 
2)  Yes. 
1)  Yes,  i.e. API  standard 520  or DIERS  por relief systems. 
VDI  norms  for dust explosion 
2)  No.  The  licensing  authorities  know  the  applicable 
standards. 
More  information  and  arguments  are  requested  when 
runaway reactions are of  concern. 
P  1)  Yes. 
2)  Case  by case. 
UK  1)  Yes. 
2)  Yes. 
Sometimes,  in  both  cases.  Well  established  criteria 
tend  to  requi  re  less  further  justification  (see 
previous  answers) •  In  most  cases  the  fitness  of  a 
particular  standard,  whether  international  ,  national, 
industry or legal would  be  obvious.  If it is not obvious 
then  justification would be required. 
6.8 
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6.4.  Do  you ask for quantitative availability  targets  (as 
obtainable either by historical data or by a  reliability 
analysis)  for  certain particular siqnificant safety 
systems?. 
B  (ML)  No.  However,  the  manufacturer  may  invoke  his  own  or  other 
companies experience to justify the safety system he has 
chosen.  This experience must  be  documented  and available 
for inspectors. 
DK  Yes.  Only for systems  involved in major accidents. 
E  No. 
F  No  quantitative targets.  However,  it is possible  to 
require  special  redundancies,  diversity  and  reparation 
for particularly significant safety systems.  Besides 
inspectors  can  impose  that  important  equipment  for 
safety  be  sized  on  quantitative  criteria,  i.e.,  resist 
to overpressures of  "  X  11  mbars,  to a  radiation level of 
11  Y  "  kwjm2,  etc  •• 
FRG  No.  However,  the  reliability  of  safety  and  control 
systems must  be described,  for instance,  through  : 
Indicated  equipment  whose  reliability  is  certified 
(according to the meaning of D.I.N.  40  042)  • 
Use  of fail-safe devices. 
- Redundancy,  diversification,  independence  of  multiple 
redundant  components,  tests at regular time intervals. 
GR  No. 
IR  No. 
I  Yes.  Only  at  informative  level.  The  inspector  may 
ask for it during safety review and audit. 
L  Yes.  Quantitative  evaluation  of  systems  reliability 
p 
UK 
is  based  on  historical  data  for  pipelines  and  on 
reliability analysis for  BLEVE. 
Yes,  sometimes.  But  the  targets  are  at  the 
discretion  of  the  licensing  authorities.  (There  is  a 
tendency to move  to a  quality class concept- CEN). 
No. 
No.  Not  specifically,  but their use  is not  discouraged; 
and such information may  be  sought additionally,  as part 
of on-going inspection procedures. 
6.9 6.5.  1)  Do  ydu  ask  for  selected  special  inspection  and 
testing  for  particularly  significant  cOJDponents  (e.g. 
relief  valves,  emergency  diesel  generators,  piping  and 
vessel  corrosion,  possible  leak  points)?To  what  extent 
should  these  procedures  be  described  into  a  safety 
reports?. 
B  (ML) 
2)  DO  you ask for frequency and  iteJDS to inspect? 
1)  Yes.  Certain  components  (pressure  vessels,  relief 
valves,  electrical  equipment .•.  )  are  subject  to 
inspections  according  to  special ·regulations  (steam 
Boiler Law). 
2)  Procedures  should  be  described  in  general  terms. 
Ministry  does  not  ask  all  details  (see  also  answer 
number  62). 
DK  1)  Yes.  If  not  already  covered  by  existing  regulations 
(i.e.  pressure· vessels  regulation)  these  problems  are 
discussed  with  the  authority,  who  requires  that 
procedures for testing particular significant components 
be sufficiently described. 
2)  No.  Not  explicitely  required  because  it is part  of 
the maintenance  program of  the  factory,  which  is  always 
required. 
E  1)  No. 
2)  No. 
F  1)  Yes.  Certain  components  (pressure  vessels)  are 
subjected  to  inspections  according  to  special 
regulations covering particular aspects. 
2)  Yes.  An  internal  inspection  plan  is  generally 
proposed  together  with  the  safety  report  by  the 
manufacturer. 
FRG  1)  Yes. 
2)  Yes.  The  following measures are required: 
Monitoring ~  surveillance.  maintenance 
- Monitoring  of  the  operating  parameters  that  are 
important  from  a  technical  safety  standpoint,  using 
measuring  devices  in  the  process  control  station  or  in 
the unit concerned; 
- surveillance of the parts of the installation that are 
important  from  a  technical  safety  standpoint,  e.g.  by 
marking  rounds  or providing for remote control; 
6.10 
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- Monitoring  of the  services that  are  important  from  a 
technical  safety  standpoint  (e.q.  electricity,  steam, 
instrument air, cooling water,  deactivanting agents); 
- Maintenance at regular intervals. 
Maintenonce And  repair ~ 
- Type of maintenance and repair work; 
- Generally accepted rules of technology applied  • 
1)  Yes.  According to standard specifications,  but not on 
probabilistic criteria. 
2)  No  answer. 
1)  Yes. 
2)  Yes.Procedures  should be  described  in general  terms 
and  detailed  procedures  should  be  referenced.  Frequency 
of  testing should  be  given  and  reasons  for  deciding  on 
frequency. 
1)  Yes.  Some  components  are  subjected  to  inspection 
according to other laws. 
2)  Yes.  The  manufacturer shall provide the  data  of test 
frequency.  See  answer to point 6.2 
L  1)  Yes.  Periodic  testing  are  mandatory  by  law  for 
pressure vessels. 
2)  Yes. 
ltt.  Yes  for  both  questions.  Either  because  frequencies  are 
established  by  special  regulations.  (f.i.  Steam  Boiler 
Law)  or  because  it  is  determined  by  quantitative 
reliability studies (f.i., crack propagation rate). 
P  Yes  for both questions. 
UK  1)  Yes. 
2)  Yes. 
Some  pieces of  plant will  be  subject  to statutory tests 
and  examination.  Others  will  be  subject  to  a  system  of 
periodic  checking  and  testing  established  by  the  firm. 
The  report  may  summarise  and  refer  to  site  standards, 
but  it  is  for  the  manufacturer  to  justify  that  his 
inspection periods are adequate,  etc.  Often such periods 
are  established  by  published  codes  or  by  existing 
industry custom and practice. 
6.11 6.  6.  1)  Do  you  ask  information  on  the  location  of  automatic 
detection  systems  for  toxic or  flammable  substances  if 
these are present? 
2)  Have  you  criteria  or  technical  guidance  notes  to 
require installation of automatic detection systems? 
Please supply us with existinq technical rules. 
B  (ML)  1)  The  manufacturer  must  describe  how  he  detects  releases 
of  flammable  or toxic products.  If there  is  a  detectipn 
system,  he  must  supply  a  plan  indicating  detectors  lay 
out and explain what criteria he used for design. 
2)  Ministry  has  no  directive  or  norms  to  recommend  or 
impose  for these systems. 
DK  1)  Yes.  A scheme of the detection systems is requested. 
2)  No.  There  are  institutions  that  can  supply,  as  a 
technical service,  guidance  on this problem. 
E  1)  Yes. 
F 
2)  No.  It  is  under  study  by  Technical  committee  for 
Chemical  Hazards. 
1)  Yes. 
2)  No.  The  manufacturer  shall  explain  the  criteria 
adopted. 
FRG  1)  Yes. 
GR 
IR 
2)  Yes.  It is decided case by case. 
1)  Yes. 
2)  No. 
1)  Yes. 
2)  Yes.In  some  cases:e.g. 
I.S.  3216:  1988  Code  of Practice for the Bulk Storaqe of 
LiquefiedPetroleum Gas 
I.S.  3213:  1987  Code  of Practice for the Storage  of  LPG 
Cylinders  andCartridges. (Published  by  the  National 
Standards Authority of Ireland,  Dublin 9,Ireland). 




1)  Yes. 
2)  No.  The  manufacturer  shall  explain  the  criteria 
adopted. 
1)  Yes.  Automatic detection requiremets  depends  on  the 
case analysed  . 
2)  No. 
1)  Yes. 
2)  No .. 
1)  Yes. 
.2)  )lo. 
UK  1)  No.  Not  in  the  report,  but  inclusion  of  such 
information is not discouraged. 
2)  No.  Not  normally,  but  some  guidance  exists  {HSE, 
trade, technical association publications,  etc.),  eg 
Health  and  Safety  at  Work  Guidance  note  CSl  "Flammable 
Gas  Detectors". 
In  general  it  is  for  the  manufacturer  to  demonstrate 
that his plant is "fit for purpose"  and that accordingly 
the  detectors,  etc. ,  are  properly  located  for  early 
detection of  significant releases. 
6.13 6.7.  Is a  particular section of  a  safety report  devoted  to 
the  description  of  protective  :measures  aqainst  doDlino 
effects? 
B  (ML)  The  manufacturer  must  describe  the  preventive  and 
protective  measures  taken  against  hazards  coming  from 
neighbouring plants. 
DK  Yes. 
E  Yes.  It is  not  a  special  section,  but  information 
regarding domino effects is required. 
F  Of  course.  Domino  effects  shall  be  discussed  in  the 
safety report. 
FRG  Yes.  Many  sections  of  the  safety  report  must  consider 
this problem,  not  mentioning it specifically as  domino; 
but it is included in the general sense  of effects. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  No.  But  domino  effects  within  the  installation  would 
have to be addressed. 
I  Yes,  they  must  be  considered  and  the 
preventive/protective measures  against them described. 
L  Yes. 
NL  Yes. 
p  It depends  on the case analysed. 
UK  No.  But  such hazards  should be addressed where  relevant. 
6.14 
.  . 6.8.  When  the plant is provided with  a  secondary containment 
(e.g.  for  runaway  reaction  quenching  or  avoiding  toxic 
and  flaJIDDable  substance  release) ,  do  you  ask  in  the 
safety report for design criteria,  availability studies 
and description of final safe disposal  of the  contained 
substances? 
B  (ML)  Yes. 
DK  Yes. 
E  No. 
F  Y~s. 
FRG  No. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  Yes.  Should  be  summarised  with  reference  to  detailed 
specification. 
I  Yes.  Detailed  analysis  could  be  requested  during  safety 
review. 
L  Not  applicable. 
HL  Yes,  in P.A. 
P  Yes. 
UK  No.  But inclusion of such  information is not discouraged, 
and  in any event may  be  sought as part of the inspection 
procedures  by  HSE. 
6.15 6.9.  Do  you  require  measures  to  avoid  that  non-major 
e•ergencies  lead  to  release  of  pollutants  or  toxic 
substances into water courses, without any treataent? 
B  (ML)  Normally  only  the  major  malfunctions  are  part  of  the 
safety report. 
DK  Yes.  If this can occur. 
E  Yes.  Analysis  of  these  emergencies ·is  required  as  will 
as  protective  measures  foreseen  to  minimize  damage.  No 
specific protective measures are required. 
F  This  part  is  rather  a  grey  area  between  environmental 
impact  study  and  the  safety  report.  Normally  only  the 
major  malfunctions  are part of  the  safety report,  being 
the  chronical  ones  part  of  the  environmental  impact 
report.  But it·is treated in one or the other. 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  Yes.  There  is  legislation  regarding  major  events  for 
pesticides.  There  are  strict regulations  concerning 
accidents with oil releases on the see. 
IR  No.  These  measures  are  dealt  within  legislation 
implementing  other  Directives  and  enforced  by  D.O. E •• 
Appropriate  liaison  would  be  carried  out  with  local 
authorities  responsible  for  routine  environmental 
monitoring  to  determine  what  would  in  fact  be  regarded 
as  a  major  accident  in  the  context  of  a  particular 
installation. 
I  Yes.  Design criteria to reduce  the  effects of  hazardous 
substances must be described. 
L  Yes. 
NL  Yes,  either in P.A.  or in permit from water authorities. 
No  escape possibility,  more  probable is duplication. 
P  No.  However  these  aspects  are  considered  during 
licensing  period  and  along  controls  of  industrial 
production. 
UK  No.  This may  be required by other legislation,  not based 
upon directive 82/501/EEC.  (See previous answers). 
6.16 1 
6.10  Do  you  require  availability  targets  for  effluent 
treataent  systems?  Are  these  targets .depending  on  the 
particular  water  basin  into  which  the  plant  may 
discharge? 
B  (ML)  No.  This  is  taken  into  account  for  the  waste  water 
discharge permit. 
DK  No.  The targets depends not only on the particular water 
basin,  but  also  the  substance  involved  and  a  pipeline 
can be connected to the effluent system and even through 
an aquarium. 
E  No.These  matters  are  managed  by  specific  organizations 
like General  Direction  for  the  Environment,  Nuclear 
Safety  Council,  etc.  These  normatives  determine 
acceptable thresholds for every case. 
F  The  same  inspection deals with emissions in water and/or 
air,  so  that  no  different  policies  exist.  Norms  for 
emission  limits  are  to  be  respected  all  the  time 
including  during  accidents.  Courts  have  decided  that 
even  during  accidents  plant  owner  must  respect  the 
rules. 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  No.  It is controlled by the Ministry of Health. 
IR  No.  This  area  is  dealt  with  by  the  Department  of  the 
Environment in the context of other Directives. 
I  No. 
L  No. 
NL  Yes,  under the water pollution act. 
P  No.  These  aspects  are  covered  along  industrial  effluent 
licensing period. 
UK  No.  But  other  anti-pollution  legislation  may  address 
such issues in some  cases- see previous answers. 
6.17 6.11.  Is  the  on-site  emergency  plan  an  integral  part  of  a 
safety report?  Do  you require that such a  plan be tested 
in the presence of authority inspectors? 
B  (ML)  Yes.  The  plant owner  must  describe  how  he  conceived  the 
internal emergency  plan.  Ministry asks  for  this  plan  to 
be  tested.  It is  not  required  inspector  presence  to 
perform the test, but he has the right to attend to it. 
DK  Yes.  The  on-site  emergency  plan  is· part  of  the  safety 
report.  The test of the plan can be  done  in the presence 
of  an  inspector  in  some  cases,  where  particularly 
dangerous plants are of concern. 
E  Industries affected by articles 3  and  4  of the Directive 
82/501/CEE  must  have  them  available.  Those  affected  by 
article  5  must  prepare  an  internal  plant site  emergency 
plan. 
F  Yes.  The  on-site  emergency  plan  (  Plan  de  operation 
interne  )  is done  by  the plant owner  and it is  included 
in  the  safety  report.  Normally  the  on-site  emergency 
plans are tested in presence of the inspectors.  There is 
a  trend to include in the test even the  inmediate region 
external  to  the  establishment  in  order  to  ensure  the 
link between  internal  and  external  emergency  plans.  The 
manufacturer  is  also  in  the  best  situation  to  provide 
the first external interventions. 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  Yes. 
IR  No.  It is a  separate document.  such  plans  are  monitored 
by  the  Industrial  Inspectorate  and  monitoring  could  in 
some  cases  involve  a  test  in  the  presence  of  an 
inspector. 
I  Yes.  Inspectors  Auditors  may  ask  for  an  emergency  plan 
test with their presence. 
L  Yes. 
NL  In  ESR/PA  a  statement about its existence is required. 
OSR  contains only  a  summary. 
It is secret because of sabotage risks. 
Fire brigades are mostly present when it is tested. 
P  Yes.  It is not required the presence of the authority. 
6.18 
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UK  No.  A  summary of the plan is required  (see para  5(d)  of 
schedule 6).  Preparation of an on-site emergency plan is 
required  by  CIMAH  ~egulation  10  but  there  is  no 
requirement  to  submit  a  copy  to  HSE.  However  this  is 
usually done  in practice.  Inspectors will be  involved in 
assessing  that  the  plan  is  adequate  and  may  well  be 
present  during  tests  as  part  of  routine  duties. 
Alternatively  an  inspector  may  be  present  during  a 
review of a  test by the company  and  emergency services  . 
• 
6.19 6.12.  Under  which  circumstances  do  you  consider that  items  1 
to  6  are  sufficient  for  a  safety  report,  so  that  no 
further accident scenario analysis is required? 
B  (ML)  Sections  1  to  6  cover most  application fields  of  royal 
decree of  6  November  1987. 
DK  We  have  not  enough  experience  to  answer  to  this 
difficult question. 
E  Whenever that initial plant  features  and external plant 
conditions do not change significantly. 
F  Never,  for  there is no  zero risk  :  analysis  of  accident 
consequences  for  even  the  worst  conditions  must  be 
performed. 
FRG  If the  requirements  of  the  SGAR  are  fulfilled  there  is 
no  further  accident  scenario  analysis  necessary 
(deterministic  approach,  the  probability  of  a  public 
hazard must  be  zero). 
GR  No. 
IR  Do  not  foresee  any  circumstances  in  which  these  items 
alone would be considered sufficient. 
I  Necessary  and  sufficient  information  are  those  required 
in DPCM  31/3/1989. 
L  No  answer. 
NL  Never  for  ESR. 
Normally  OSR  does  not  include  consequence  calculations, 
excepting  the  adequacy  of  the  flare  capacity,  the 
protection of control  room  operators  from  heat radiation 
and toxic releases. 
P  Never. 
UK  When  the information package  provided is deemed  by  HSE: 
(a)  to satisfy the  information  requirements  detailed  in 
schedule  6  including  proper  assessment  of  the 
consequences of possible major accidents;  and 
(b)  to  satisfy  any  additional  needs  of  the  competent 
authority  to  allow  it  to  discharge  its  relevant 
functions,  i.e.  to  judge  that  the  precautions  and 
control measures  on the plant•are adequate. 
6.20 7.  ACCIDENT  SCENARIOS 
7.1.  Do  you  recommend  the  study  of  accident  scenarios 
according to a  probabilistic criterion? 





Or in selected cases? Which ones? 
The Ministry asks for a  qualitative analysis only. 
Yes.  In  cases  involving  large  quanti  ties  of  toxic 
materials.We  do  not  ask  for  a  preliminary  spectrum  of 
criticality of events. 
Not in general.  Only when  competent authorities consider 
that external hazards  recommend it. 
No.  All  accident  types  must  be  analysed,  even  the 
worsts. 
FRG  No. 
GR  No. 
IR  Yes,  in  selected cases.It  may  be  useful  in  eliminating 
further  consideration  of  highly  improbable  events. 
Useful  for  making  comparisons  and  putting  risks  into 
context. 
I  Yes.  It is  generally  required  a  probabilistic  analysis 
of incident scenarios. 
L  Yes.  For  L.P.G.  storage  and  oxygen  storage,  a 
probabilistic analysis is required. 
NL  Yes 
P  No. 
UK  No.  The  information  about  major  accidents  in  Article 
5 .1.  refers  to  all  events  with  a  potential  to  injure 
people seriously  (several),  on  or off-site,  or to  cause 
serious  damage  to  an  eco-system.  This  could  include 
events  ranging  from  relatively  likely  but  moderate 
consequence  events  which  have  the  potential to escalate 
(eg  leaks  from  joints  in  pipe-work)  up  to  extremely 
unlikely  but  massive  consequence  events  such  as 
catastrophic  failure  of  a  liquid  gas  storage  tank.  The 
safety  report  must  address  a  representative  range  of 
this spectrum of accident severity in order to show that 
the precautions taken are adequate. 
7.1 7.1.1. 
B  (ML) 
1)  If  yes,  do  you  accept  a  cut-off  rule  for  low 
probability events? 
If yes,  which thresholds? 
Do  you recommend particular data bases? 
If Yes,  which ones? 
Not applicable. 
DK  l)No.  The question is at the moment being considered. 
E 
2)Some  data bases  are referenced  in our  risk guideline, 
but not recommended.  (i.e.  FACTS,  OREDA,  API,  EUREDATA). 
l)No. 
2)Yes.  CHAFINCH,  FACTS. 
It is foreseen to develop a  data bank containing: 
- Accidents ocurred; 
- Plant,  system and component reliability; 
- Hazardous properties of substances. 
F  Not applicable. 
FRG  Not applicable. 




l)No specific cut-off point. 
Would  expect  manufacturers  to  justify  what  they  claim 
are acceptable levels with reference to probabilities of 
other events. 
2)No  answer. 
l)No. 
2)No. 
l)No.  Assessment  results  are  analyse~  by  Seveso 
Committee  members.  All  events  are  considered,  included 
those with very  low probabilities. 
2)No. 




2) No.  Mostly  data  are  those  usually  accepted  from 
standard collections,  TNO  experience,  safety database. 
Not applicable. 
No. 
l)In general  we  believe it would  be  counter  productive 
to set  a  specific cut-off  level:  firstly  because  QRA 
are rarely capable of identifying all possible routes to 
the top event;  secondly setting such  a  level  would  make 
it  a  target  which  many  manufacturers  would  waste 
resources trying to prove that their plant met,  instead 
of  showing that further risk reducing  measures  were  not 
reasonably  practicable  (ie  worth  the  extra  cost 
involved). 
2 )We  try  to  encourage  the  widest  possible  use  of  the 
most  appropriate  databases,  including  a  manufacturers 
·own  database  constructed  from  his  own  accident  plant 
failure  and  routine test reports.  Accordingly  we  expect 
industry  to  make  use  of  the  data  which  they  consider 
most  appropriate,  and to  justify their use  of  this data 






If  not,  on  which  basis  do  you  accept  the  scenarios 
proposed by the safety reports? 
Accordinq to historical events? 
Accordinq to a  qualitative rankinq of the  iaportance of 
the  aal-functions  identified  in  the  hazard 
identification study? 
Accordinq to 
"the worst possible case• 
- •maximum credible accident•? 
Maximum  credible accident  (worst  reasonably  foreseeable 
accident). 
See  answer to point 7.1.1. 
No  answer. 
Different cases are fully evaluated. 
Scenarios  found  on  past  accident  occurrences  must  be 
considered. 
Particularly  relevant  are  two  scenarios  :  a  maximum 
credible  scenario  or  reference  accident  and  the  worst 
possible case  (envelope scenario). 
- The  reference  scenario  is  assumed  as  basis  for  the 
physical  planning  and  the  evaluation  of  safety 
distances. 
- The  envelope  scenario  is taken  into  account  for  the 
external emergency plan  . 
Examples:  for  toxic  substance  storage,  the  "envelope 
scenario"  is  defined  as  that  corres·pondig  to  the 
guillotine  break  of  the  maximun  penetration  into  the 
containment;  automatic  valve  is  supposed  to  fail  to 
close:  the  release  continues  until  manual  isolation  is 
possible.  The worst case is the rupture of the vessel. 
The  same  considerations  apply  to  underground  L.P.G. 
storage:  however  in  this  case,  after  the  release, 
ignition and explosion processes are considered. 
The  "envelope  scenario"  can  be  the  break  of  the  whole 
containment  instantaneously.  For  L.P.G.  spheres  the 
B.L.E.V.E.  of  a  sphere  is considered as  an  envelope  and 
reference scenario.  France does  not favour cut-off rules 
to  be  used  to  neglect  some  accidental  scenarios  with 
possible very serious consequences. 
Consideration of these  extreme  cases  results  in  safety 
measure  improvement for  industry. 
FRG  See  answer to point 5.2.1. 
7.4 
.  ,. .  .. 
Information  must  be  given  on  the  potential  effects  of 
credible  hazardous  incidents  (i.e.  those  which 
correspond to the possible loss of the built barriers)  • 
The  loss of  more  than' two  passive,  or  of more  than  3-4 
active barriers is considered to  have  probability  zero. 
The  estimation of  the  consequences  of  the  corresponding 
scenarios  must  demonstrate  that  there  is  no  public 
hazard  • 
Scenarios proposed by the safety report must be based on 
the  following statements. 
Danger  sources  are  conditions  or  events  that  may  give 
rise to hazardous  incidents. 
The  safety analysis shall describe  the  internal  danger 
sources,  the external  danger  sources  and  the  actions  of 
unauthorized persons. 
It is  not  required  to  include  all  thinkable  danger 
sources  but  only  danger  sources  that  cannot  reasonably 
be  excluded.  Practical  experience  is  of  particular 
significance  in  this  context,  the  following  criteria 
being of particular importance: 
-the  general  state  of  technological  and  scientific 
knowledge; 
-experience gained with similar-type installations; 
-calculations,  assessments  or  transfer  of  knowledge  to 
the case in question. 
When  considering the obligations ensuing from Article 3, 
para  1  of the Ordinance,  it may,  as  a  rule,  be  excluded: 
-that various  independent  external  sources,  such  as 
earthquakes  and  flooding,  will  act  on  the  installation 
at the same  time; 
-that substances  which  can  only  form  a  substance  under 
Annex  II of  the  Ordinance  in  case  they  react  with  each 
other will be released simultaneously and  independently. 
The description of the danger sources shall not consider 
any measures  taken to prevent hazardous  incidents. 
The  responsible  authority  shall  assist  in  making  the 
required  detailed  description  possible  if  the  operator 
of  the  installation  is  unable  to  acquire  the  knowledge 
needed for the description. 
7.5 Internal danger sources 
a)Internal danger sources include any potential failures 
and  breakdowns  resulting  from  the  characteristics  of 
relevant  parts  of  the  installations  or  from  error 
functions,  such as: 
-mechanical  failure  of  walls,  e.g.  as  a  consequence  of 
corrosion; 
-breakdown  of  machines,  e.g.  pumps,  compressors, 
ventilators,  agitators; 
-failing energy supply,  e.g.  electricity,  instrument  ; 
-failure of measuring,  control or regulating devices for 
pressure,  temperature,  filling  level,  quantity, 
concentration,  retention time,  etc.; 
-disturbed supply or discharge of thermal  energy; 
-unintended energy supply,  e.g.  frictional heat,  heating 
of revolving parts;  · 
-leakages; 
-plugging,  e.g.  of blow-out or expansion lines; 
-accidents during internal transport operations. 
b)Internal  danger  sources  also  include  actions 
endangering the safety of the installation,  such as: 
-lacking  compliance  with  the  safety  provisions  under 
public  law,  with  accident  prevention  requirements  or 
with operating instructions; 
-operator errors; 
-errors  made  during  monitoring  and  maintenance 
operations,  e.g.  when  checking the operation of parts of 
the  installation  that  are  important  from  a  technical 
safety  standpoint,  or  errors  made  during  the  supply  of 
the  installation with types of fuel or  energy  which  are 
of significance from  a  technical safety standpoint. 
External danger sources 
External danger sources are: 
-neighbouring installations; 
-neighbouring  transport  facilities  {road  traffic, 
railway,  water); 
-conditions  or  events  that  are  due  to  natural  site 
characteristics; 
-provided  they  imply  an  increased  risk  to  the  safe 
operation of the installation, 
pursuant to a)  to c). 
7.6 a)Not  only  immediately  adjoining  installations shall  be 
regarded as  danger  sources,  but also  installations at  a 
greater  distance  if  the  installation  under  review  is 
within the danger  zone of any of these installations. 
Only  such  installations  shall  be  deemed  to  fall  under 
this category which  may  cause  danger  through  explosion, 
vibrations or the release of acutely toxic substances. 
b)Neighbouring  transport  facilities  (road,  railway, 
water)  shall  be  considered  as  sources  of  danger  if the 
increased risk is due  to  the  traffic  conditions  in  the 
vicinity of  the  installation  (e.g.  traffic density, 
traffic  routes,  type  of  transports,  weather 
conditions) .These  conditions  are,  as  a  rule,  fulfilled 
in the following cases: 
-fuel or gas wharfs at Federal waterways; 
-shunting stations for tank wagon, 
-traffic  areas  of  large-scale  fuel  depots  or 
corresponding filling stations; 
-internal  roads,  including  access  roads  where  flammable 
gases or liquids are transported and  loaded or unloaded. 
c)  Conditions  or  events  that  are  due  to  natural  site 
characteristics shall include: 
-flooding,  flood  waves  or  tidal  waves  if  the 
installation  is  located  in  an  area  which,  as  several 
years  of  experience  have  shown,  may  be  deemed  to  be 
endangered; 
- landslides  or  subsidence  if  the  installation  is 
located in a  mining area  ; 
-earthquakes if the installation is located in a  seismic 
area as defined in DIN  +)  4149,  Part 1  of April  1981. 
Actions Q! unauthorized persons 
"Unauthorized  persons"  shall  be  deemed  to  be  especially 
those  persons  who  acquire  illegal access to the  area  of 
the installation. 
Dangers  caused  by  persons  who  act  on  the  installation 
from outside with the intention to destroy shall only be 
considered if the parts of  the  installation that are  of 
significance  from  a  technical  safety  standpoint  are 
particularly accessible to such actions. 
GR  According to historical  events.  The  other alternatives 
are evaluated case by case depending mainly on the site. 
7.7 IR  There  may  be  combinations  of the  above  depending  on  the 
particular case. 
I  Yes,  according  to  historical  events  as  a  part  of  the 
identification process. 
L 
Yes,  according  to  a  qualitative  ranking  of  the 
importance  of  the  identified  malfunctions  as  a  part  of 
the identification process. 
According  to  - "the  worst  possible  case".  For  the 
installations  which  are  subjected  to  the  declaration 
obligation. 
No  criteria are  established,  even  though  these  elements 
are all considered. 
According to -·"the worst possible case" 
- "maximun credible accident"  No. 
Yes. 
Most  unfavourable  cases  must  be  considered,  i.e.  a 
B.L.E.V.E.  on the rupture  of  oxigen vessel. 
The  B.L.E.V.E  is  evaluated  considering  the  maximun 
possible level in the vessel. 
HL  Not applicable. 
P  According to  a  qualitative ranking  of  the  importance  of 
the malfunctions identified in the hazard identification 
study. 
UK  According to historical events? Neither yes  nor no. 
According to a  qualitative ranking  of  the  importance  of 
the  mal-functions  identified  in  the  hazard 
identification study?  Neither yes  nor no. 
According  to  - "the  worst  possible  case"  Neither 
yes  nor no. 
- "maximum  credible accident"  Neither yes  nor no. 
See  previous  answers:  we  expect  the  scenarios  to  be 
chosen  to  reflect  the  whole  range  of  possible  major 
accidents.  Where  explicit quantification  is  used  to 
support  conclusions  about  the  adequacy  of  precautionary 
measures,  the  source  failure  rate  data  should  be 
referenced  and  any  adjustment  of  the  data  to  take 
account of site specific factors should be  explained and 
justified. 
7.8 7.2. 









For which scenarios do you require the information to be 
used in an off-site emergency plan? 
Maximum  credible accident. 
Reasonable accident to be  expected. 
For  most  probable  scenarios  the  maximun  credible 
accidents  are  hypothised  and  consequence  analyses  are 
performed for every case. 
See  answer to point 7.1. 
The  safety  analysis  shall  contain  data  on  the  effects 
that  may  result  from  hazardous  incidents.  The 
description of the effects of hazardous  incidents serves 
the  purpose  of assessing whether  the  operator  has  taken 
adequate  precautions  to  limit  the  effects  of  hazardous 
incidents  as  much  as  possible  - (Article  3,  para.  3  of 
the Ordinance). 
The  maximun  credible  accident.  The  effects  of  any 
hazardous  incident  that  are  of  relevance  for  disaster 
control  planning  shall  also  be  described.  In  case  any 
hazardous  incidents  may  take  different  forms  (release, 
formation,  ignition  or  explosion  of  a  substance  under 
Annex  2  of  the Ordinance),  each of these  forms  shall  be 
described.  When  describing  the  effects  of  hazardous 
incidents,  the precautions  taken  in the  installation to 
limit the effects of hazardous  incidents  may  be  allowed 
for. 
The  off-site  plan  should  focus  on  the  most  probable 
scenarios  but  should  be  capable  of  being  extended  to 
deal with the most  extreme scenarios. 
No  specific criteria are required to the manufacturer. 
Most  unfavourable case. 
HL  External  emergency  plans  are  responsibility  of  the 
Ministry of Interior Affairs.  At the moment,  there is no 
precise  regulation.  For  the  ESR  now  available,  there 
will  be  a  judgement  of  all  scenarios  against  their 
frequency,  specially regarding their preparedness. 
P  All are considered 
UK  Off-site  emergency  planning  is  a  separate  legal  duty 
under  CIMAH  Regulationll.  Under  this  regulation  the 
7.9 manufacturer  must  provide  the  planners  with  information 
about  the  consequences  of  a  range  of  major  accidents 
with  significant  off-site  effects.  The  accidents 
selected  must  be  representative  of  all  possible  major 
accidents which could occur on the site. 
It  is  expected  that  detailed  off-site  emergency  plans 
would  be  based  upon  the  consequences  of  the  "worst 
reasonably  foreseeable"  accident,  eg  full-bore  failure 
of  a  large diameter liquid pipeline. 
7.10 7.3 









Do  you  require  analysis  of 
scenarios  with  effects 
establishment site? 
consequences  of  accident 
confined  within  the 
Yes.  These  are  essential  for  the  purposes  of  on-site 
emergency planning. 
Yes. 
Yes.  But not only these cases. 
Yes.  They  also  include  advice  of  work  inspectors  (and 
fire brigades)  especially for chronical risks. 
Yes. 
Yes. 
Yes.  External effects must also be considered. 
Yes. 
Yes. 
No.  ESR  is directed  to  outsite  risks.  However  the  risk 
contours  give  indications  to  the  OSR  authorities  even 
for risks to workers. 
At  the  moment  the  problem  of  the  acceptability  of  risk 
for  workers  has  not  been  arisen  (voluntary  vs. 
unvoluntary risk). 
A  mean  value for workers is about  3.10 -4 1  year. 
P  Yes. 
DK  Yes.  These  are  vi  tal  for  the  purposes  of  on-site 
emergency  planning,  and  a  means  of  demonstrating  the 
adequacy of prevention control and mitigation measures. 
7.11 7.4. 
B  (ML) 
DK 
E 
Do  you  recommend specific models  and  computer  codes  for 
evaluating  effects  of  fire,  explosions  and  toxic 
substance dispersion? 
No  for the moment. 
No. 
Yes:  TNO  models.  If  other  codes  are  used,  references 
showing experimental validation are required. 
F  No.  It is  always  duty  of  the  manufacturer  to  justifiy 
models  and  assumptions.  But  the  Authority  has  its  own 
computer models to verify the results. 
FRG  No.  Prerequisite is that computer codes  are aknowledged. 
For  toxic  substance  dispersion  see  VDI-Richtlinie  3783, 
part  1  and  2,  where  the  main  features  and  parameters  to 
be used for  a  Gaussian dispersion model  are presented. 
GR  No. 
IR  No. 
I  No.  The  manufacturer must give arguments. 
L  Yes.  The  designated organizations use 
- Technica codes  "WHAZAN"; 
- T.N.O.  models; 
- E.D.F.  models. 
NL  No. 
p  No. 
UK  No.  But  we  expect  those  used  to  be  referenced,  or  if 
they  are  not  publicly  available  we  require  the 
manufacturer to provide sufficient information for us to 
assess  them.  That  is,  we  do  not  accept  "black-box" 
outputs. 
7.12 7.5. 













If  not,  do  you  require  arCJUDlents,  i.e.  validation  by 
test  or  coaparison,  supporting  the  aodels  and  the 
assumptions performed in the safety report? 
Yes. 
Yes. 
See answer to point 7.4. 
Yes. 





If new  models  are used,  strong arguments  and comparisons 
must be supplied to let them be accepted. 
Yes,  justifying the options selected. 
Yes.  See  above. 
7.13 7.6.  For  which  meteorological  conditions  do  you  ask 
consequence evaluations? 
B  (ML)  The  conditions 
manufacturer. 
selected  are  a  matter  for  the 
DK  The  most probable ones?  Yes.* 
Selected defavourable conditions?  Yes.* 
A probabilistic average?  No. 
*  2  scenarios are used:  F2  and  05 with the most probable 
wind direction. 
E  The  most  probable ones?  No. 
F 
FRG 
Selected defavourable conditions?  Yes. 
A probabilistic average?  Yes. 
For  the  envelope  scenario  the  most  defavourable 
conditions  (i.e.,  for  toxic  releases  a  wind  speed  of  3 
mjs).  No  probabilistic approach is mandatory. 
The  most probable ones?  Yes. 
Selected defavourable conditions?  Yes. 
A probabilistic average?  No. 




Each  as appropriate. 
The  most probable ones?  Yes. 
Selected defavourable conditions?  Yes. 
A probabilistic average?  Yes. 
The  most  probable ones?  Yes. 
Selected defavourable conditions?  Yes. 
A probabilistic average?  No. 
The  most  probable ones?  Yes. 
Selected defavourable conditions?  Yes. 
A probabilistic average?  No. 
Most  probable  meteorological  conditions  are  ( D, 5)  and 
most unfavourable  (F,2). 
NL  Six weather cathegories together with 12  wind directions 
(site depending)  must  be considered. 
P  For the most probable ones. 
UK  The most probable ones?  Neither yes nor no. 
Selected defavourable conditions? Neither yes  nor no. 
A probabilistic average?  Neither yes  nor no. 
The  conditions  selected  are  a  matter  for  the 
manufacturer,  but we  expect at least both Pasquil  (D,  5) 
and  (  F,  2  )  to be  included. 
7.14 
• ~ 
7.  7.  Do  you  ask  for  evaluation  of  damages  to  public  and 
properties? 












No  answer. 
Yes.  In some  specific cases only. 
Yes.  A vulnerability study for personnel  and property is 
required through probit equations. 
Yes. 
It  has  to  be  demonstrated  that  no  public  hazard  can 
occur. 
No  answer. 
Yes. 
Yes.  Mainly for public damage. 
Yes. 
For  public yes. 









Which  consideration  must  be  qiven  in  the  safety report 
to environmental damaqes? 
No  answer. 
Toxicity short and  long term impact. 
Ecotoxicity short and  long term impact. 
No  answer. 
Description  of  accident  effects  on ·water  and  soil  must 
be  included. 
Description of eventual  damage  to bodies of soil, water, 
stocks of  fauna  and flora must be  included. 
GR  A  description  of  accident  effects  on  environment  is 
required. 
IR  Appropriate consideration must be given. 
I 
L 
Environmental  consequences  must  be  included  in  the 
accident analysis. 
Description  of  damage  to  environment  remains  very 
general. 




Effects  on  air,  water,  soil,  subsoil  and  eco-systems 
must be considered. 
The  manufacturer  must  address  al~  significant, 
relatively  long  lasting  (but  not  necessarily 
irreversible)  damage  to  crops,  plants  or  animals  or 
contamination  of  land  or  water  arising  from  a  single 
event  (i.e.  not  chronic  pollution effects).  In  deciding 
what  is  significant  the  manufacturer  must  take  account 
of  the  extent  of  the  damage  or  contamination,  the 
toxicity  of  the  substance  released  to  flora  and  fauna, 
its persistence  and  its ability  to  disperse  throughout 
the  environment.  In  preparing  the  report  the 
manufacturer  is  encouraged  to  consult  widely  with  the 
relevant  environmental  organizations  and  agencies,  e.g. 
the local water authority and the regional office of the 
Department  of  the  Environment.  Similarly  in  assessing 
















Do  you  recommend  particular vulnerability  models  to  be 
used? 
No  answer .• 
Yes.  In  some  cases  we  require  use  of  probit  equations. 
We  also supply the coefficients of the probit. 
Yes.  Probi~. models are required. 
For toxicity the  IDLH  criteria are generally considered. 
Levels  have  been  defined  for  overpressuress,  thermal 
radiation  ( Eisemberg' s  curves)  and  doses  of  toxic 






Yes.  According to the designated organization criteria. 
No. 
No. 
No.  We  expect  those  used  to  be  referenced.  Where  non-
published  models  are  used  they  must  be  supported  by 
sufficient information to enable them to·be validated. 
7.17 7.10 












Do  you ask for an overall reca.position of risk in terms 
of risk contours? 
Not applicable. 
Yes.  Only  in  some  cases  in  order  to  define  emergency 
plans. 







No.  Risk  contours  are  defined  by  the  maximun  potential 
risk.  In  certain  cases,  individual  risk  for  population 
is represented as isorisk curves. 
Yes. 
No. 
No.  But  this  occasionally  happens  although  we  do  not 
encourage it because: 
I)  SR  are  rarely  based  upon  full  quantified  risk 
analysis. 
II)  The  variety of  models  and  criteria  used  would  make 
comparison meaningless,  or  worse still misleading. 
Note:  HSE  carry out  QRA  of  CIMAH  installations  for  land 
use  planning  purpose  using  its  own  models  and  criteria 
and  information contained in the  SR  may  be  used for this 
purpose. 
7.18 
-- .....----7.11.  :rn  such  recomposi  tion  which  consideration  is  given  to 
domino effects? 
B  (HL)  Not applicable. 
DK  Not applicable. 
E  According to the possibilities. 
F  Not applicable. 
FRG  Not applicable. 
GR  Not applicable. 
I  Not applicable. 
IR  Not applicable. 
L  Not  enough  knowledge  is  available  to  permit  a  definite 
answer to this problem. 
NL  Domino  effects  should  be  included  into  the  frequency 
calculations. 
P  Not applicable. 
UK  Not applicable. 
7.19 7.12. 










Do  you ask for frequency/expected fatalities curves? 
Not applicable. 
Yes.  In  some  particular  cases  considered  necessary  by 
the authority. 






Yes.  For  L. P. G.  and  oxigen  storage  instalations, 
collective risk curves  were  estimated  (probability  as  a 
function  of  the  number  of  victimes:  Netherlands 
approach). 
Yes. 
P  No. 
UK  No.  See  7.10 but we  do  get them. 
7.20 
"*' .... -~--· 7.13. 









l)If yes,  do  you  allow  any  credit  to  the  existence  of 
emergency/evacuation procedures? 
2)If yes,  do  you  establish  some  time  limit after which 
it is  supposed  that  all  endangered  people  have  been 
evacuated?  (This  time  limit  should  be  used  as  maximum 
exposure time in consequence evaluations) 
If yes,  which are the values or criteria established? 
No  answer. 
1)No. 
2)No  answer. 
1)Yes. 
2)  Yes,  thresholds  values  published  by  NIOSH/OSHA  for 
toxic vapoursjgases. 
For overpressures  (30  KPa)  or impulse  (25  KPa.s)  and  for 
thermal radiation  (5  Kwjm). 
No  answer. 
Not applicable. 
Not  applicable. 
Not applicable. 
Not  applicable. 
1)No. 
2)No  answer. 
NL  1)Yes,  if these  emergency  procedures  are  available. 
p 
Otherwise is a  matter of  judgement  whether  1/2  hour  or 
1  hour exposure to toxic releases has to be hypothised. 
Not  applicable. 
UK  Not  applicable  in  view  of  answer  of  7.12.  However,  in 
its own  QRA  for  land use planning HSE  does  allow for the 
effectiveness  of  emergency  response  and  emergency 
planning,  and  our  criteria  for  making  judgements  about 
these matters are published. 
7.21 ~ 
8.  OTHER  GENERAL  QUESTIONS 
8.1.  If  you  require  probabilistic  analysis,  have  you  fixed 
acceptability  limits?  or  do  you  use  the  probability 
information  as  a  further  element  in  your  judgement 
without normative values? 







No  answer. 
We  use probability information in our  judgement. 
No  acceptability  limits  have  been  adopted.  They  are 
considered as an additional element for  judgement. 
Element of  judgement only. 
Not applicable  .. 
No. 
Manufacturers  are  not  given  any  target  in  the  event  of 
their  electing  to  use  probabilistic  methods  but  must 
make  a  case for whatever level they nominate. 
I  Probabilistic  analysis  is  required,  without  being 
established acceptability limits. 
Information obtained with probabilistic analysis is used 
as  a  further element during the auditing phase. 
L  Dutch  criteria  regarding  unacceptable  risk  are 
considered.  These results are then interpreted by Seveso 
Committee. 
NL  Yes. 
P  A probabilistic analysis is not required. 
UK  Where  probabilistic analysis  have  been  provided  we  take 
account of them in our overall  judgement but do  not have 
fixed criteria. 8.2.  a)  Is your acceptability criterion based  on  the  use  of 
state-of-the-art  techniques  and  best  engineering 
judgement?. 
b)  What about completely new designs? 
c)  Do you ask for backfitting of old type designs? 
B  (ML)  No  answer. 
DK  a)  Yes.  To  a  certain extent. 
b)  No  answer. 
c)  No  answer. 
E  References regarding similar installations are required. 
F  a)  Yes,  especially for  known  processes. 
b)  New  designs  are  normally  subjected  to 
independent  safety  studies  (  etude de surete ). 
c)  For  old  plants,  backfitting  ~s  required 
according to a  program with well defined timing. 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  a)  Yes. 
b)  No  answer. 
c)  No  answer. 
IR  a)  Yes. 
I 
b)  We  would  require  appropriate  tests,  validation, 
etc. 
c)  When  appropriate. 
Acceptability criteria are based  on  state-of-the-art 
techniques  and best  engineering  judgement,  even  for  new 
plants.  · 
Auditing  may  result  in  existing  plant  modification 
requirements. 
L  Until  now,  acceptable risks are not established. 
They will be defined case by case. 
HL  a)  State-of-the-art technique for OSR,  but also for  ESR, 
is a  very significant decision criterion. 
b)  For  new  designs  much  more  arguments are required. 
c)  Backfitting  is  required.  Alternatives  are:  closure, 
inmediate backfitting or backfitting at next maintenance 
period. 
If the  actions  required  correspond to up-to-date  safety 
technique  no  compensation  is  foreseen.  If  further 
measures  are  required  because  of  population  proximity, 
support is given by the government. 
8.2 P  No  answer. 
UK  a)  Yes.  But  supported  where  necessary  by  predictive 
analysis/assessment. 
b)  Here prediction plays  a  more  dominant role. 
c)Depends  upon  costs  versus  risk  reduction  balance  and 
the lifetime of the plant. 
8.3 8. 3.  a)  In  which  cases  do  you  require  an  independent 
assessment to be performed? 





b)  Who  will pay the costs? 
Qualitative  risk  analysis  must  be  performed  by  people 
that  know  the  plant  very  well.  In  this  sense  it  is 
believed  that  specialised  plant  personnel  are  the  most 
adequate to do it. 
a)  In  some  cases  in  which  new  design/technology  are 
used. 
b)  The  cost  will  be  paid  by  the  owner.  For  instance, 
computerised safety systems  have  to be  evaluated  by  the 
Electronic Testing Agency. 
A  Technical  Committee  for  Chemical  Hazards  has  been 
created to treat this and other controversial matters. 
An  independent· assessment  (  etude  de  surete  )  is  very 
often requested  for  major  installations or  new  designs. 
The  study  is  performed  before  the  public  inquiry  for  a 
new  installation.  The  industry  has  the  possibility  to 
choose  select the  organization  performing  the  study 
within  a  list  of  organizations  endorsed  by  the 
authorities.  The  bulk  of  the  costs  is  supported  by  the 
manufacturer,  sometimes  with  the  help  of  the 
Administration. 
In  the  safety  studies  scarse  use  of  probabilities  is 
generally  done  ;  when  done,  it  is  only  in  relative 
terms. 
Each  safety report has  to be  assessed  by  the  competent 
authority or an  independent expert.  The  owner  has to pay 
the costs. 
GR  If the Ministry does  not agree.  (External  consultancy is 
used  in these cases). 
IR  In  the  event  of  an  inadequate  notification  a 
manufacturer  may  be  required  to  have  a  new  analysis 
carried  out  by  a  person  nominated  by  the  Central 
Competent  Authority.  Such  an  analysis  would  be  at  the 
manufacturers  own  expense  (c.f.  regulation 14). 
I  It  is  possible  to  require  an  independent  study  as  a 
result of an audit. 
If it is required by  the owner,  he will pay the costs. 
L  All  assessments are made  by designated organizations  and 
payed  by the plant owner. 




It is not foreseen. 
Never.  However,  in  the  context  of  the  manufacturer 
seeking permission  from  the  local  planning  authority to 
develop  an  installation  he  may  be  required  by  that 
authority to  submit  a  risk  assessment.  HSE  advises  the 
authority  on  the  validity  of  this  assessment  and  the 
significance  of  the  assessed  level  of  risk.  Often  this 
risk  assessment  is  carried  out  by  an  independent 
consultant  and  the  assessment  is  used  as  a  supporting 
document to the eventual safety report.  The manufacturer 
pays all the costs of such  independent assessments. 
8.5 8.4. 




Do  you  perform in your  technical service an  independent 
assessaent of selected scenarios? 
No. 
Yes. 
No.  In the future it will be  performed  by the Centro  de 
Investigaciones  Energiticas  Medio  Ambientales  y 
Tecnologicas  (C.I.E.M.A.T.). 
Yes.  Inspectors  can  verify  the  calculations  and  the 
assessments  of  plant  owner  safety  report  by  their  own 
models  and expertises. 
FRG  See  answer to point 8.3. 
GR  No.  If required,  external consultancy is used. 
IR  We  require manufacturers to carry out their own  analysis 
of  selected  scenarios.  Some  limited  analyses  of 
selected  scenarios  are  also  carried  out  inhouse  when 
assessing the safety reports to compare results. 
I  Yes.  Analysis  is  made  by  technical  organizations 
(I.  S. P. E. S. L. ,  I. s. s. ,  Corpo  Nazionale  dei  V. V. F. , 
C.N.R.).  Only  when  doubts rise regarding the validity of 
assessment,  a  technical  analysis  regarding  incidental 
scenarios may  be required. 
L  No. 
NL  Yes.  In  the  case  that  the  calculations  done  by 
the  company  were  with  all  evidence  negligent,  the 
bill can be  passed to the company. 
P  Yes. 
UK  No.  But  as  a  matter  of  course  HSE's  technical  experts 
will  validate  certain  scenarios  as  part  of  the 
assessment of the safety report 
8.6 
!-8.5.  a)  Do  you  require  a  periodical  updating  of  the  safety 
report? 




b)  Or only after major modifications? 
c)  If  yes,  what  is  considered  to  be  a  major 
modification? 
Yes,  every  10  years  and  after  every  significant 
modification that may  introduce new ·risks. 
We  require updating in the following cases: 
a)  Yes.  Every  5  years. 
b)  After major modifications. 
c)  When  new  know-how  is adopted  (  i.e. it requires  well 
trained people  ). 
d)  In case of accident. 
a)  Yes.  Every  4  years. 
b)  Yes. 
For  major  modifications  (  new  production  unit,  a  large 
storage unit,  etc.  )  all  the  procedure  with  the  public 
inquiry  must  be  repeated.  Also  when  inspections  detect 
or  identify  new  problems.  If  industry  does  not  respect 
the  regulations,  or  after  any  accident,  safety  audits 
andjor updating of the safety report can·be requested. 
The  internal emergency plan must  always  be kept updated. 
As  a  matter of praxis,  an updating is achieved every 2-4 
years. 
FRG  a)  Yes,  every  2  years. 
b)  Yes,  in the case of major modifications. 
GR  a)  Yes. 
b)  Yes. 
IR  a)  Yes.  Three  yearly  and  after  major  modifications  ( 
Regulation 12). 
b)  Yes. 
c)  A major modification would be  any modification to the 
installation or  process  with  a  possible  impact  on 
safety. 
8.7 L 
I  a)  Yes,  every three years. 
b)  Yes. 
c)  Plant  modifications  are  by  the  moment  regulated 
by  D.P.R.  577  and  D.M.  02.08.84, 
Allegata A,  chapter 3. 
a)  Yes. 
b)According  to  the  modification  of  the  risks 
identified and evaluated in the previous report. 
NL  a)Yes.  Every  five  years  for  ESR  or  at  application  for 
p 
permit  for  change  of  the  establishment  which  influences 
'risk,  whichever is earlier. 
b)Any  change·  affecting  OSR  must  be  communicated.  In 
this way it is possible to argue whether an  ESR  revision 
is necessary. 
Every  time  that  significant  modifications  are  done, 
implying possible new risks,  or when  new  technological 
advances are registered on these areas. 
UK  Yes  to both.  As  required in CIMAH  regulation  8  i.e.  : 
a)  periodically - within  3  years of the last report; 
b)  for proposed modification - 3  months  beforehand; 
c)  a  modification  is  one  which  could  materially  affect 
the particulars in the safety report. 
8.8 8.6.  How  the  safety  report  is  utilized  for  the  authority 
inspection policy? 




Until  now,  experience  does  not  justify changing  present 
policy. 
No  firm practice has been established yet.  We  try to use 
it as  a  base for  a  more  systematic inspection. 
(Now  in a  preliminary phase). 
There exists no  experience at all. 
The  safety  report  is  the  contractual  document  :  all 
obligations deriving from  it,  as  well  as  correspondence 
between  real  installation  and  its  description  in  the 
report  must  be  respected;  otherwise  fines  can  be 
applied,  up to the withdraw of the authorization. 
FRG  The  safety  report  is  a  tool  for  the  authority  to 
convince thenselves that: 
- for existing installations the  legal  requirements  and 
technical rules are fulfilled 
- for new  installations a  licence can be  issued. 
GR  Useful parts of the safety report are the emergency plan 
and  information regarding land use. 
It is also used to verify correspondence with reality. 
IR  The  report  is  used  as  the  base  document  for  ongoing 
inspection. 
I  The  report  together  with  the  procedures  and  operating 
manuals  will  be  the  basic  documents  to  perform  the 
audits and the inspections. 
L  It  is  an  internal ·document,  used  by  public  competent 
authorities. 
NL  P.A.  can  be  approved  as  conditional  to  certain 
inspection programs. 
For  OSR,  during  the  6  months  examination  period,  the 
weak  points to inspect are identified. 
P  Plants  will  be  audited  according  to  their  risk 
seriousness.  It is  also  useful  for  the  reinforcing  of 
respective inspections. 
UK  The  report  becomes  an  important  source  document  for 
future  inspection  work.  It highlights  those  areas  that 
both  the  firm  and  the  inspectors  can  address  most 
profitably.  See  section  3  of  the  main  report  to  U.K. 
procedures. 
8.9 8.7. 
B  (ML) 
DK 
E 
Do  you require that the complete report be  submitted to 
the  authority  or  only  an  extended  sUlllllary,  with  main 
documents available to the authority at the plant site. 
It is  not  required  a  complete  safety  report.  Many 
documents  may  be  mentioned  and  kept  available  at  the 
plant for  inspection. 
The  complete report shall be submitted to the authority. 
The  complete report is required. 
F  The  complete  report  is required  (  a  part of it is  kept 
confidential,  if  necessary  ) •  All  other  documents 
necessary must  be available to inspectors on the site. 
FRG  The  complete report is required. 
GR  The  report is considered secret.  An  extended  summary  is 
sent  to the  authorities.  The  approval  is  given  on  the 
complete  report,  which  is at  any  time  available  at the 
plant to the competent authorities. 
IR  The  complete  report  must  be  submitted  to  the  authority 
but many  areas  may  be dealt with  by  an  extended  summary 
with  detail  in  supporting  documentation  which  is 
referenced  in the  report but  does  not  form  part  of  the 
report proper. 
I  The  complete  report is required.  Some  detailed  document 
can be required during the safety review. 
L  The  complete report is required,  in  8  copies. 
NL  A  full  report  is  required.  Even  if  sometines  the  full 
HAZOP  is  not  included  into  a  OSR  (because  of  its 
length),  but it is available at the plant. 
The  OSR  contains however the relevant results. 
P  A complete report is required. 
UK  The  report  as  submitted  must  contain  adequate 
descriptions of all the matters specified in schedule  6. 
In  many  cases  references  may  be  made  to other  documents 
or  their  contents  summarised.  For  example:  safety 








Can  you  give  an  estimation  of  the  average  time  for 
approval of a  subai  tted report,  and any further comments 
on the procedure? 
Approximately six months. 
1  Year  ;  this long time is needed  because  3  authorities 
are involved(  Environment,  Labour and Interior  )  and the 
decisions  made  by  the  local  environmental  authorities, 
can  be  appealed  to  the  Agency·  of  Environmental 
Protection and further to the National Appeal  Board. 
Regulations  established  that  Emergency  Plans  must  be 
finished  two  years  later  than  the  safety  report  was 
presented  by  every  industry.  In  that  period  the 
following  activities  are  included:  new  information 
required  by  the  authorities  to  the  plant  owner,  report 
revision and  emergency plan development  and approval. 
If  the  dossier  has  been  sufficiently  agreed  before  the 
public  inquiry,  the  average  time  is  6/8  months  and  the 
maximun  may  be  even  two years. 
FRG  It  depends  on  the  size  and  complexity  of  the 
installation (several months). 
GR  40  days. 
IR  We  do  not  approve  safety reports  as  we  do  not operate  a 
licencing system. 
I 
Assessment of the limited number  we  have received so far 
is taking several man-months. 
D.P.R.  175/88  is not one of  approval type. 
An  audit  period  of  90  days  is  considered  to  present 
conclusions regarding the safety report. 
supplementary  information  required to  plant  owners  from 
the  inspector  during  the  safety  review  may  imply 
considerable time,  not easily quantifiable. 
L  Period may  range  between  3  months  and  1  year. 
HL  7  months  for  ESR  and  6  months  for  OSR. 
P  For  new  companies  it  is  foreseen  three  months,  with 
eventual  prorogation  if  additional  information  must  be 
required. 
For  existing  companies,  schedule  will  be  defined  after 
July 1989. 
8.11 UK  An  accurate assessment is not available at this time but 
may  become  available. 
Note:  HSE  does  not  formally  approve  safety  reports. 
However,  serious  plant  or  operational  deficiencies 
detected  as  part  of  the  assessment  of  the  SR  and  the 
subsequent  targetted  inspection  are  remedied  by 
enforcement  under  the  HSW  Act.  This  enforcement  can 
include prohibiting the use of the plant. 
8.12 8.9. 
B  (ML) 
DK 
E 
Do  you give any advice or technical support to the plant 
owner in performing the study?  ' 
If yes,  in which cases and to what extent? 
Ministry  invited  all  companies  that  have  to  present  a 
safety  report  to  explain  them  how  to  prepare  the 
document.  Often  there  are  preliminary  contacts  before 
the presentation of the safety report. 
Yes.  We  make  courses,  work out guidelines,  give advices, 
etc.  ,  but we  do  not give  any technical support. 
Yes.  The  following  documents  are being prepared: 
- Basic directives to manage  chemical  hazards. 
- Safety report elaboration guide. 
F  No.  See  answer to point 8.3. 
FRG  Yes. 
GR  Yes.  For all that is available to the Ministry. 
IR  Yes.  Advice  is given  as to what  is required to  complete 
a  notification. 
I  Yes.  Advice  may  be  given,  if  required  by  the  plant 
owner,  only for the safety report preparation. 
L  Negotiations  with  plant  owner  are  done  in  presence  of 
the  designated  organization  and  the  competent  public 
administration. 
Yes.  For  OSR  the  Labour  Inspectorate  gives  advice  but 
the work must be  performed by the company. 
For  ESR,  VROM  may  give  advice  on  request  of  competent 
authorities. 
P  No. 
UK  No.  We  think  it would  be  counter  productive  to  do  so 
because it would transfer some  of the responsibility for 
safety away  from the manufacturer. 
8.13 8.10. 









To  what extent the expert or team  perforDlinq the safety 
report is considered responsible of the content and  the 
conclusions of the safety report? 
The  manufacturer  is  responsible  of  the  safety  report 
content. 
The  manufacturer is responsible,  not the analyst. 
The  manufacturer is responsible,  not the analyst 
The manufacturer is responsible,  not the analyst. 
The  owner is responsible. 
The  owner  is  not  officially  responsible  (only  for  sea 
pollution). 
The  manufacturer  is  considered  responsible  for  the 
content  and  conclusions.If  the  Central  Competent 
Authority  considers  a  report  deficient  a  manufacturer 
may  be  required  to  have  the  report  reported  by  a 
nominated competent person at his own  expense. 
Absolutely  not  responsible.  The  manufacturer  is 
responsible of the content of the safety report. 
Plan  owner's  consultant  might  be  responsible  according 
to the contractual agreement signed between them. 
Plant  owner  is  required  to  specify  what  kind  of 
insurance  has  been  foreseen  for  possible  damage  to 
personnel,  equipment,  people and environment. 
The  designated organization is responsible of presenting 
a  "neutral"  report.  Its  status  of  non-profit 
organization  is  important  in  this  sense.  In  case  of 
irregularities,  the  Ministry  of  Labour  may  cancel  the 
agreement to the designated organization. 
NL  The  owner is the only responsible. 
P  It is not considered responsible in any sense. 
UK  The  manufacturer  is  completely  responsible  for  the 
content  of  the  report.  We  do  not  encourage  the 
production  of  reports  by  third  parties.  If  independent 
experts  are  used  we  expect  them  to  work  very  closely 
with the manufacturer so that the resultant report is an 
accurate  description  of  what  the  manufacturer 
understands  the  major  accident  hazards  of  his 
installations  to  be,  and  what  he  does  to  ensure  the 
safety design,  construction and operation of that plant. 
8.14 